

NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES

THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL ADVERTISING ON FACEBOOK AND INSTAGRAM
BEFORE THE 2020 US ELECTION

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Working Paper 33818
<https://www.nber.org/papers/w33818>

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge MA 02138
May 2025

This paper was conducted as part of the U.S. 2020 Facebook and Instagram Election Study, a collaboration between a team of researchers at Meta and an independent set of external academic researchers. The team designed the project together (with lead academic authors

having final say on the pre-registered analysis plan). Data collection was carried out by Meta and NORC. The pipeline code used to pre-process raw platform data was conducted by Meta and reviewed and approved by the external researchers; both the Meta team and external researchers analyzed the data. The paper was written by the external researchers with feedback from the Meta team, but the lead academic authors had final control rights over text and publication. More details on the collaboration appear in the Competing Interests Section and in Supplementary Note 9. The Facebook Open Research and Transparency (FORT) team provided substantial support in executing the overall project. We are grateful for support on various aspects of project management from C. Nayak, S. Zahedi, I. Rosenn, L. Ahmad, A. Bhalla, C. Chan, A. Gruen, B. Hillenbrand, D. Li, P. McLeod, and D. Rice; engineering from Y. Chen, S. Chen, T. Lohman, R. Pyke, and Y. Wan; data engineering from S. Chintla, J. Cronin, D. Desai, Y. Kiraly, T. Li, X. Liu, S. Pellakuru, C. Xie, and B. Xiong; data science and research from H. Connolly-Sporing; academic partnerships from R. Mersey, M. Zoorob, L. Harrison, S. Aisiks, Y. Rubinstein and C. Qiao; privacy and legal assessment from K. Benzina, F. Fatigato, J. Hassett, S. Iyengar, P. Mohassel, A. Muzaffar, A. Raghunathan and A. Sun; and content design from C. Bernard, J. Breneman, D. Leto and S. Raj. NORC at the University of Chicago partnered with Meta on this project to conduct the fieldwork with the survey participants and pair the survey data with web tracking data for consented participants in predetermined aggregated forms. We are particularly grateful for the partnership of NORC principal investigator J. M. Dennis and NORC project director M. Montgomery. The costs associated with the research (such as participant fees, recruitment, and data collection) were paid by Meta, who collaborated with academics in this project as part of the U.S. 2020 Facebook and Instagram Election Study (for more details see Supplementary Note 9). Ancillary support (for example, research assistants and course buyouts), as applicable, was sourced by academics from (authors' initials in parenthesis): the Democracy Fund (NJS), the European Research Council Starting Grant (EXPO- 756301) (MW), the Guggenheim Foundation (BN), the Hewlett Foundation (NJS, JT), the Hopewell Fund (JT), the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation (DF, DL, NJS, JT, RT), the Charles Koch Foundation (JT), New York University (JT), the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (MG), Stanford University (HA, MG, NM, JP), the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (MG), the University of Texas at Austin (NJS), and the University of Wisconsin–Madison (YMK). These funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

At least one co-author has disclosed additional relationships of potential relevance for this research. Further information is available online at <https://www.nber.org/papers/w33818>.

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The Effects of Political Advertising on Facebook and Instagram before the 2020 US Election Hunt
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NBER Working Paper No. 33818
May 2025
JEL No. D90, L82, O33

ABSTRACT

We study the effects of social media political advertising by randomizing subsets of 36,906 Facebook users and 25,925 Instagram users to have political ads removed from their news feeds for six weeks before the 2020 US presidential election. We show that most presidential ads were targeted toward parties' own supporters and that fundraising ads were most common. On both Facebook and Instagram, we found no detectable effects of removing political ads on political knowledge, polarization, perceived legitimacy of the election, political participation (including campaign contributions), candidate favorability, and turnout. This was true overall and for both Democrats and Republicans separately.

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Introduction

Digital advertising plays an increasingly important and controversial role in U.S. politics. Digital ads rose from 2-3 percent of political ad spending in 2016 to 18 percent in 2020, totaling \$1.6 billion (1). Many commentators have suggested that online ads may have profound impacts on elections (2–4). For example, in his announcement that Twitter would not run political ads in 2020, then-CEO Jack Dorsey wrote that “internet advertising ... brings significant risks to politics, where it can be used to influence votes to affect the lives of millions” (5).

Moreover, there is significant worry about campaigns' ability to target political ads to specific individuals on social media (6, 7). In 2020, over three fourths of Americans said that it is not acceptable for social media companies to use data to target political ads, and over half said that social media companies should not allow political ads at all (8). Internal Meta documents described in (9) outline potential concerns: “targeted political content can potentially harm people by narrowly delivering divisive appeals to vulnerable audiences; inciting violence; intimidating, discouraging, or misleading voters; creating echo chambers; and decreasing ac-

countability for politicians.”

We first present descriptive findings on the reach, targeting, and purpose of ads related to the U.S. 2020 presidential campaign using internal data from Meta. We then present results from a randomized experiment that removed all political ads from users’ Facebook or Instagram feeds for the six weeks before Election Day and replaced them with non-political ads. To test concerns specific to targeted political ads, we also implemented a condition that removed and replaced only the subset of political ads on Facebook that were targeted with user data provided by the advertiser (“list-targeted ads”). We estimate effects on political knowledge, polarization, perceived legitimacy of the election, political participation (including campaign contributions), candidate favorability, turnout, and vote choice. Prior literature has proposed mechanisms by which political ads could substantially impact all of these outcomes (10–12). More details on our sample, experimental design, outcomes, and data can be found in the Methods Section.

We contribute to a distinguished literature on the effects of political advertising (10, 11, 13–16). Many papers report “minimal effects” of political advertising (17–21), but others find evidence of meaningful effects both online (22–25) and offline (12, 26–28). Our paper differs conceptually from most prior work because we remove all or most political ads from users’ feeds instead of randomly varying exposure to specific ads across users. Thus, our paper complements previous literature by providing information on the effectiveness of an entire social media campaign in the weeks before the elections. Many hypothesized mechanisms by which ads could affect outcomes—including voter (de-)mobilization, polarization, and perceptions of election legitimacy—concern the aggregate impact of all ads to which voters are exposed (11), and our large-sample study can capture these aggregate effects for online ads. In addition, like (28), we are able to estimate the effects of a single party’s ads by exploiting the fact that partisans saw almost exclusively ads from their own parties. We also go beyond prior work in surveying tens of thousands of participants multiple times, observing a large suite of out-

comes from both surveys and administrative data, and incorporating internal data from Meta that provides insights into the reach and targeting of political ads.

We emphasize several important limitations. First, our estimates are only directly informative about the set of people who agreed to participate in the study. Second, although we include direct measures of turnout and contributions, many of our outcome variables are self-reported. Third, our estimates are specific to removing the last six weeks of social media ads in the US 2020 general election. Existing evidence suggests that political advertising could have larger effects earlier in the election cycle and in elections that are less politically polarized and heavily covered in the media, either in the US (29) or in other countries (24).

This project is part of the U.S. 2020 Facebook and Instagram Election Study, a collaboration between Meta and academics. The lead academic authors had the final say on the pre-registered analysis plan, had control rights over analysis decisions and the text, and Meta could not block any results from being published. More details of this partnership are available in Supplementary Notes [9](#) and [10](#).

Results

Descriptive Evidence

This section presents descriptive findings on the reach and targeting of political advertising on Facebook and Instagram in the six weeks before the 2020 election. Unless noted otherwise, these findings are based on ad exposure data for our Control group participants. We classify the ad affiliation and its type using two external sources: OpenSecrets (OS) and Wesleyan Media Project (WMP). OS provides a relatively narrow definition of presidential ads based on financial ties (unless stated otherwise, we use this definition). WMP provides a broader definition of presidential ads by predicting whether an ad can be associated with one of the campaigns according to its text. For more details on ad classification see the Methods Section.

Additional figures and tables are presented in Supplementary Note 6.

Ad loads were highly skewed. The top left panel of Figure 1 presents the distribution of political ad load during the study period (in impressions per week) on Facebook and Instagram. We define an “impression” to be a single instance in which an ad appeared in a user’s feed; a given user may have multiple impressions of the same ad. The Facebook Control group mean, median, and 99th percentile of political ad impressions were 23, 9.1, and 175 per week; 79 percent averaged at least one impression per week. The Instagram Control group mean, median, and 99th percentile of political ad impressions were 6.2, 1.8, and 71 per week; 57 percent averaged at least one impression per week.

The variation in political ad load is partially predicted by observable characteristics; see Supplementary Figure 2. For example, on both Facebook and Instagram, participants in swing states and participants who voted in 2016 have higher ad loads.

Individual ads were often shown multiple times to the same user: over the full study period, the average Facebook Control group user was shown 132 political ad impressions corresponding to 72 unique ads.

Ads were seen primarily by their own partisans. The top right panel of Figure 1 presents the average political ad load in the Facebook Control group by party identification. The top line presents the overall political ad load, while the remaining four lines present presidential ads favoring each party. Using their broader and narrower definitions, respectively, WMP and OS coded 61 and 20 percent of Control group political ad impressions as presidential. Using the WMP definition, 67% of the presidential partisan ad impressions were Democratic (the corresponding figure among the full U.S. adult Facebook population is 65%).

While individuals saw on average more Democratic ads, there was substantial variation based on the audience: Democratic presidential ads were shown mainly to Democrats, while

Republican presidential ads were shown mainly to Republicans. Both types of ads were most likely to be shown to the strongest partisans. Independents were shown the fewest political ads overall (see Supplementary Figure 3) as well as the fewest presidential ads. Relatedly, Supplementary Figure 2 shows that participants who reported being undecided voters on the baseline survey see fewer political ads than those who reported that their minds were made up. Supplementary Figures 4 and 5 show that almost all ads on Instagram that we can associate with a party were pro-Democratic (based on the subsample of Instagram users for which we have ad load data). This may partly reflect Instagram's younger user base and the tendency of young voters to favor the Democratic party.

Most political ads were list-targeted. About 62 percent of all political ad impressions shown to the Facebook Control group were list-targeted. For Instagram, the share is 71 percent. When focusing specifically on Facebook presidential campaign ads, this share is especially high: 73 and 90 percent of presidential ads were list-targeted according to the presidential ad coding from WMP and OS, respectively. This heavy use of lists suggests that campaigns' targeting of their own partisans may be an intentional strategy.

Most list-targeted ads use multiple targeting strategies. About 54 percent of all political ad impressions shown to the Facebook Control group used customer list custom audiences, 25 percent used website custom audiences, and 20 percent used lookalike audiences; see Supplementary Table 7.

Fundraising ads were most common. The bottom panel of Figure 1 presents the distribution of ad goals for presidential ads coded by WMP separately based on the participant's party identification and whether the ad is pro-Democratic or pro-Republican. Overall, 46 percent of the presidential ad impressions seen by the Facebook Control group are categorized as seeking donations, 26 percent as persuasive, 17 percent as collecting user information, and 5.5 percent

as merchandise sales. Looking across the facets, own partisans primarily saw donation ads, while persuasion was the most common goal of ads shown to supporters of the other party.

The goals of the ads indicate which outcomes are more likely to be affected when ads are removed. Since persuasion and fundraising ads were the most common, we study the effects on attitudes and turnout, and the effects on engagement (including on-platform donations) and participation (including self-reported donations).

Beyond our sample, ads reached diverse ages and genders. Figure 2 shows characteristics of Facebook political ads shown to the full U.S. adult Facebook population (rather than just our study sample) in the 40 days before the election. The first panel shows the distribution across ads of the share of impressions that were seen by male users. Most ads reached fairly mixed audiences by gender, with 74 percent having between 40 and 60 percent impressions to males. For comparison, the vertical line on the figure shows that 44 percent of users are male. However, approximately 15 percent of political ads do appear to be narrowly targeted by gender, with male shares close to either 0 or 100 percent.

The second panel shows the distribution of ads by the standard deviation of age across their impressions. Most ads have a fairly large standard deviation, indicating that campaigns typically do not target a narrowly defined age group. Still, for most ads, the standard deviation across ages is slightly lower than the population standard deviation of 17, indicating that ads are not distributed at random and reach a somewhat narrower age range compared to the overall Facebook user base. This is consistent with Democrats and Republicans typically seeing different ads, as illustrated in Figure 1, and age being correlated with party identification.

Experimental Estimates

Estimating equation. We define Y_i as an outcome, T_i as a vector of treatment group indicators (with two elements for Facebook and one for Instagram), \mathbf{X}_i as a vector of controls, and ν_s as a vector of randomization stratum indicators. As pre-specified, the controls \mathbf{X}_i are the variables selected in a lasso regression of Y_i on the baseline value of Y_i (if available) and a vector of demographics and baseline survey variables. Controlling for these predictors both improves precision and reduces bias due to naturally occurring imbalances. The estimating equation is

$$Y_i = \tau T_i + \rho \mathbf{X}_i + \nu_s + \varepsilon_i, \quad (1)$$

where the coefficient τ captures the average treatment effect of ad removal. Supplementary Note 3 provides additional detail on control variables and variable construction.

Effects on ad load. The All Ad Removal groups mechanically saw zero political ads over the study period. As described above, 62 percent of political ads and 90 percent of presidential ads in the Control group would have been removed in the List-Targeted Ad Removal treatment. Some of these ads were replaced by other (non-list-targeted) political ads. The average Facebook user in the List-Targeted Ad Removal group saw 10 political ad impressions and 0.55 presidential ad impressions per week over the study period, compared to 23 political impressions and 4.7 presidential impressions in the Control group.

Effects on primary outcomes. We study the effects of ads on nine pre-specified primary outcomes: knowledge, affective polarization, issue polarization, perceived legitimacy, participation, engagement, Trump favorability, turnout, and Trump vote. *Knowledge* is the participant's score on factual questions related to the election, news, or general facts; *affective polarization* is the difference in attitudes toward the participant's own party versus the other party; *issue po-*

larization is the extent to which the participant holds opinions closely aligned with their party; *perceived legitimacy* is agreement with various statements implying that elections are free and fair; *participation* is self-reported political participation, including attending protests or contributing to candidates; *engagement* is engagement with political content on the focal platform, measured using platform data; *Trump favorability* is the sum of Trump’s approval rating and the difference between Trump’s and Biden’s thermometer ratings; *turnout* is whether the participant reported voting; and *Trump vote* is defined as 1 for participants who voted for Trump, -1 for those who voted for Biden; and 0 otherwise. See the Methods Section and Supplementary Note 3 for the precise definitions of these variables.

Figure 3 presents the average treatment effects of ad removal on these outcome variables. The first seven variables are standardized into units of standard deviations within the Control groups. The bottom two variables (*turnout* and *Trump vote*) are reported in their original units.

We estimate statistically zero effects on all primary outcomes, with tight confidence intervals. None of the effects in Figure 3 are statistically significant at the 5-percent level after adjusting for multiple hypothesis testing; see Supplementary Tables 8, 9, and 10. The 95-percent confidence intervals rule out effects greater than 0.043 standard deviations for *knowledge*, *affective polarization* and *issue polarization*, *perceived legitimacy*, and *participation*. The confidence interval is even tighter for *Trump favorability*, ruling out effects greater than 0.024 standard deviations. The confidence intervals rule out turnout effects of greater than 0.0069 percentage points, and effects on *Trump vote* for the Facebook All Ad Removal and Instagram treatments of more than 0.027 percentage points.

Many of our null results are precise enough to rule out substantively meaningful effects. For comparison, college graduates in the Control groups have 0.67 standard deviations higher *knowledge* than non-college graduates, and (30) estimate that affective polarization has grown by an average of 0.021 standard deviations *per year* since 1978. We show below that our effects

on vote choice are substantially more precise than previous estimates in the literature.

The effects on two primary outcomes are marginally significant after adjusting for multiple hypothesis testing. First, the point estimate implies that All Ad Removal on Facebook may have slightly increased *engagement* by 0.02 standard deviations ($p = 0.01$, $q = 0.158$). This result could suggest that removing political ads from Facebook, while having the direct effect of removing some political content, may *increase* overall engagement with (non-advertising) political content on the platform. To unpack this finding, Supplementary Figure 6 shows effects on individual components of the *engagement* index; most estimates are positive, with particularly strong effects on engagement with candidates running for office. These effects on online engagement could arise because political ad removal increases time on platform (regardless of how people spent their time) or because political ad removal shifts online behavior (regardless of time on platform). Supplementary Figure 7 provides some support for both channels: removing political ads increases civic content views more than total content views and may increase time on platform. As our point estimate is only marginally significant after adjusting for multiple hypothesis testing, it is also possible that the removal of political ads on Facebook did not causally affect engagement.

Second, the point estimate implies that List-Targeted Ad Removal on Facebook may have increased *Trump vote* by 0.027 units ($p = 0.0069$, $q = 0.158$). However, several other results suggest that this may be idiosyncratic rather than a reflection of a true causal effect. First, we do not find that All Ad Removal on Facebook affected *Trump vote* (see Figure 3 and Supplementary Table 11), and most presidential ads were list-targeted. Second, any effects of Facebook List-Targeted Ad Removal seem to be driven by users with *below*-median predicted ad load (see Supplementary Figure 8), whereas we might expect users with lower ad load to have smaller treatment effects. Finally, we do not find any detectable effect of political ad removal on outcomes that one would expect would move in the same direction as vote choice: *Trump*

favorability and secondary outcomes Republican vote share in state-level races, pro-Republican affect, and pro-Republican issue positions (see Supplementary Table 12).

Secondary outcomes, including administrative data. In addition to primary outcomes, we also pre-specified a set of 40 secondary outcomes, including individual components of the primary outcome composite variables as well as administrative data on campaign contributions and voter turnout. While a few of the effects are individually statistically significant (as would be expected to occur by chance), none of the effects are significant after adjusting for multiple hypothesis testing; see Supplementary Note 7.2. For both outcomes where we have administrative data (campaign contributions and voter turnout), the estimated effects are not statistically different from the estimates using self-reported data. In Supplementary Note 7.3, we also analyze a set of pre-specified auxiliary outcomes.

Given the large share of ads focused on donations, effects on campaign contributions are of particular interest. We find no statistically significant effect of ad removal on contributions, with 95 percent confidence intervals $(-7.7, 2.3)$ and $(-2.5, 0.78)$ in units of dollars in the survey and administrative data, respectively. For example, we can rule out that seeing political ads over the study period increased contributions by more than \$2.5 per person in the administrative data. In a non-pre-registered analysis in the Facebook sample, we also estimate effects on the *probability* of making campaign contributions. Compared to the continuous campaign contribution variable, this binary variable better captures possible treatment effects on small donations that might be induced by social media ads. We find no statistically significant effect of ad removal on the binary outcome, with 95 percent confidence intervals of $(-0.016, 0.004)$ and $(-0.0049, 0.0022)$ in the survey and administrative data, respectively. Thus, we can rule out that seeing political ads over the study period increased the probability of making a contribution by more than 0.49 percentage points in the administrative data. These insignificant effects may sug-

gest that few participants made contributions via donation ads, that those who did would have contributed through other channels in the absence of the ads, and/or that the effects on contributions were non-zero but smaller than we can detect even in our large sample. As we show below, however, our confidence intervals include contribution effects that would be consistent with a positive return to ad spending.

Subgroup analysis. As pre-specified, we estimate heterogeneous effects using four primary moderators: (i) political party, (ii) an indicator for undecided voters, (iii) an indicator for voters who identify as Black or Hispanic, and (iv) above-median predicted political ad load. The last of these is designed to focus on users who would have seen particularly high volumes of political ads absent our treatment, and who would therefore be most likely to exhibit large treatment effects. We define predicted political ad load based on data from our Control group, where we run a lasso regression of ad load in our study period on a set of predictors including baseline political ad load.

Supplementary Note 8 presents the subgroup analyses. Even among those above the median or 75th percentile of predicted political ad load, we do not find that the treatments had a significant effect on any primary outcome other than *engagement*. There is no statistically significant heterogeneity on any primary outcome by the other three primary moderators.

We also analyze heterogeneous effects by the predicted number of pro-Democratic ads (this moderator was not pre-specified). We test whether participants who would have seen more Democratic ads and were not exposed to these ads because of the treatment, were less likely to vote or support Trump, compared to participants who would have seen more Republican ads. We do not find evidence for such an effect.

Advertising effectiveness. To provide more context on the precision of the null effects on vote choice, turnout, and contributions, we compute the implied returns to advertising spend-

ing by Democratic and Republican presidential advertisers. Our experiment does not directly identify the returns for a single campaign or party because our treatments removed all ads simultaneously. However, Figure 1 showed that people mostly saw ads from their own party. This means that the effect of political ad removal on Democrats was similar to the effect of removing only Democratic ads, and the effect on Republicans was similar to the effect of removing only Republican ads.

To account for the fact that targeting to own-partisans was not perfect, we assume that ads from a person’s own party and ads from the opposing party have equal and opposite effects. (If we instead assumed that the effect of own-party ads was greater than opposite-party ads, our estimates of returns to political ad spending would be closer to zero.) We also conservatively assume that non-presidential ads have no effect on our outcomes. We define τ to be the treatment effect of Facebook All Ad Removal among users from a particular party, Δ to be the incremental pro-party presidential ad impressions (i.e., pro-party impressions minus opposite party impressions) seen by users from that party in the Control group, and p to be the ad cost per impression. The treatment effect of ad removal per dollar of incremental pro-party ad spending is then $\tau/(p\Delta)$. We assume that p is equal to \$25.10 per thousand impressions, the average costs of the ads in our WMP sample, calculated using the cost data provided in the Meta Ad Library (to calculate costs we impute values at the midpoints of ranges provided by the Ad Library).

Table 1 presents the results. Panel (a) calculates Δ , the Control group incremental pro-party ad impressions, separately using the OS and WMP ad definitions. The first and second columns, respectively, show results for Democratic and Republican users (including independents who “lean” toward the respective party). For example, using the WMP presidential ad sample, the average Democratic user saw 74 more pro-Democrat presidential ads than pro-Republican presidential ads over the study period. The third column pools Democrats and Republicans to calculate incremental pro-party ad impressions across both parties.

Panel (b) computes the cost-effectiveness point estimates and standard errors for net presidential votes, turnout, and contributions. Turnout and contributions both use administrative data instead of self-reports. All outcomes are signed so positive effects benefit the party corresponding to the respective column. For example, Facebook All Ad Removal increased Democratic users' net votes for Biden (i.e., decreased *Trump vote*) by a point estimate of $\tau = 0.023$. Dividing that effect by the $\Delta p = \$1.86$ of additional pro-Democrat presidential ad spending (using the WMP coding) seen by the Control group implies that each Pro-Democratic incremental ad spending increased the Democratic vote by a point estimate of 0.012 votes per dollar.

Using the broader WMP presidential ad coding, and focusing on the pooled estimates, the 95-percent confidence intervals (based on the coefficients and standard errors reported in the table) reject that \$1000 of incremental pro-party spending yielded more than 30 net votes, 8.7 additional voters, and \$2,208 of additional contributions. As a point of comparison for the net vote effects, (28) estimate a cost per vote of \$170 for television ads—i.e., a return of 6 votes per \$1000. Thus, we cannot rule out reasonably positive returns to advertising. [Supplementary Note 7.4](#) presents additional tables analyzing electoral effects, including focusing only on participants with above-median predicted ad load and analyzing self-reported outcomes instead of validated outcomes. The conclusions are similar: none of the results are statistically significant, but we cannot rule out positive returns for advertising.

Discussion

This paper provides experimental and descriptive evidence on the reach, targeting, goals, and impacts of political advertising on Facebook and Instagram in the six weeks before the U.S. 2020 presidential election.

Our descriptive results show that political advertising on Facebook and Instagram is not primarily used to target undecided voters with persuasive messaging. Instead, most social media

ads seek campaign contributions and voter information, not mobilization or persuasion, and the overwhelming majority of ads are seen by a party's own supporters. These patterns hold both for all presidential ads and for list-targeted presidential ads.

Our experimental results show that removing Facebook and Instagram political advertising had no detectable effects on outcomes including candidate favorability, turnout, participation (including contributions), political knowledge, polarization, and perceived legitimacy of the election. This is true for both all political ads and the subset of list-targeted ads. It is true even though political ad exposure was substantial—23 ads per week for the average Facebook user over the study period, and 175 ads per week at the 99th percentile. In comparison, (28) report that the average American was exposed to 8.4 political ads per week on television in the 60 days before the 2004, 2008, and 2012 elections. Our confidence intervals rule out even small to moderate effect sizes. Our null effects are consistent with the fact that relatively few ads were aimed at persuasion and mobilization. They stand in contrast to arguments in both the popular press (2–7, 9) and academic literature (12, 29, 31–37) that digital ads are likely to be key drivers of political attitudes and election outcomes.

These results echo some prior experimental literature that has failed to find significant effects of online political ads (11, 29, 38). However, the large scale of our experiment means that the precision of our estimates is greater than that in most prior work. We provide the large-scale evidence of the combined impact of social media advertising on outcomes like turnout, polarization, and perceived legitimacy of the election. For the effect on vote choice – arguably the parameter that has received the most emphasis in the literature – Table 2 shows that our estimates of the number of votes per 1,000 impressions are more precise than those in any prior study of which we are aware. Supplementary Table 19 presents a similar comparison focusing on the cost-effectiveness (votes per dollar) of ads. Supplementary Note 7.5 provides more details on the calculations behind these tables.

Our experiment advances the literature in several ways beyond sample size and precision. First, we combine both surveys and linked administrative data from a social media platform in an experimental study of political advertising. This allows us to provide a much broader and more precise picture of the mix of advertising to which participants were exposed than would be possible with surveys alone. Second, we are able to link our treatments to directly measured turnout and contribution outcomes, limiting concerns about bias in survey self-reports. Third, previous experiments have not studied political advertising on Instagram, one of the most popular social media platforms. Finally, our interventions were relatively light-touch. Participants were aware that their feeds may have been modified in some way, but they did not know that this would concern ads in particular and they were not made directly aware of their own treatment status. This may limit concerns about experimenter demand effects.

At least in the 2020 US presidential elections context, our results provide evidence against a number of specific hypotheses that have been prominent in the literature: for example, that political ads are de-mobilizing and would tend to reduce participation and turnout (47–49); that political ads can be polarizing and that this is likely to be especially true for digital ads (31, 32); that 2020 political ads and political micro-targeting were effective in undermining confidence in the electoral system (33, 34); and that “micro-targeted” (or in our case, list-targeted) ads are particularly effective in mobilizing supporters (12, 29, 35–37).

While we estimate precise null effects on many outcomes, our confidence intervals are nevertheless consistent with a positive return to advertising spending. At the upper end of our confidence intervals, even the effect on donations alone would exceed what advertisers paid for their ads. Taken together, our results thus suggest that the impact of Facebook and Instagram advertising on aggregate political outcomes was minimal at best, but that even very small effects could have been enough to make the advertising worthwhile for campaigns, given its low cost.

We end by reiterating that our results are subject to important limitations. The estimates

are only directly informative about the sample that selected into our study. They are specific to the last six weeks of a highly-contested US presidential election, a situation where advertising might have more limited effects compared to ads placed earlier or in elections where candidate evaluations are less solidified (29). Many of our outcomes can only be measured in surveys, and we cannot rule out that they are affected by measurement error and/or experimenter demand effects. Further improving on these dimensions remains an important goal for future research.

Methods

Ethics

The U.S. 2020 Facebook and Instagram Election Study, which includes this research, was evaluated and approved by the NORC Institutional Review Board (Protocol number 20.08.10, Project number 8870). Academic researchers coordinated with their specific university IRBs to ensure they followed regulations concerning human subject research when analyzing data collected by NORC and Meta, as well as when authoring papers based on the results. Additionally, the research group was provided ethical counsel by the independent company Ethical Resolve to inform the study designs.

All participants in the study provided informed consent and allowed access to data on their activity on the focal platform. Participants were informed that the experiment could involve changing aspects of their on-platform experiences, but they were not informed of the specific treatments for which they would be eligible or that the study was focused on political ads (several companion papers (39–42) study treatments unrelated to political advertising).

As a mitigation strategy to minimize unanticipated negative effects, we defined a pre-registered stopping rule, inspired by clinical trials, which would have ended a treatment if we detected that it was generating changes in specific variables relevant to individual welfare that were much larger than expected. The stopping rule conditions were not met and we did not have to stop the

treatment. For more information on ethical considerations see Supplementary Note [10](#).

Experimental Design

This section provides a high-level overview of the experimental design. Figures [4](#) and [5](#) present CONSORT diagrams summarizing the design. Additional details are in Supplementary Note [1](#).

We ran two parallel experiments, with Facebook and Instagram as the respective “focal platform.” For each focal platform, Meta drew a stratified random sample of users who lived in the U.S., were at least 18 years old, and had logged into their account at least once in the past month. Meta placed survey invitations in these users’ focal platform feeds from August 31 to September 12, 2020. Participants completed a series of surveys implemented by NORC at the University of Chicago, including baseline (responses collected September 8 - 21) and endline (November 4 - 18) surveys. The questionnaires are included in Supplementary Note [13](#). Participants received base payments of \$5 for completing the baseline survey, \$20 for completing the endline survey, and other payments described in Supplementary Note [1](#).

Just after the baseline survey, participants were randomized to a control group or one of several treatment groups that varied the content they saw on their focal platform. Our paper studies the two treatment conditions that removed political ads: “All Ad Removal” and “List-Targeted Ad Removal.” We define “political ads” to be all ads that Meta’s classifiers determine to be about social issues, elections, or politics (details [here](#)). In the All Ad Removal condition, Meta removed all political ads and replaced them with non-political ads. In the List-Targeted Ad Removal condition, Meta removed the subset of political ads that were targeted based on user data provided by the advertiser and replaced them with other political or non-political ads. More specifically, the List-Targeted Ad Removal condition removed and replaced ads targeted using any of the following three strategies: *customer list custom audiences* (described [here](#)), which are lists of people uploaded by the advertiser, *website custom audiences* (described [here](#)), which

are sets of people who have visited the advertiser’s website, and *lookalike audiences* (described [here](#)), which are users that Facebook’s internal algorithm estimates to be similar to users in a set of users defined by the advertiser.

In both the All Ad Removal and List-Targeted Ad Removal conditions users’ total ad load was unchanged and the ads were replaced with the next non-removed ad assigned to the user based on the platform’s algorithm, regardless of the ad’s content. These two separate treatment conditions allow us to speak directly to concerns described in the introduction about political ads in general and targeted ads in particular.

In the Facebook experiment, we implemented both treatment conditions. In the Instagram experiment, to conserve on the total number of treatment arms, we implemented only All Ad Removal. In both experiments, the ads were removed starting on September 24th. We had originally planned to continue the experiment into December, but Meta made an unexpected decision (43) to stop serving political ads starting on Election Day (November 4th). We refer to September 24th through November 3rd as the “study period.” Data collection and analysis were not performed blind to the conditions of the experiments.

Balance and attrition

As described in Supplementary Note [1.3](#), we stratified randomization on self-reported party identification, race/ethnicity, friend/following count, and an indicator for residence in a swing state. Chance imbalance on some other baseline covariates occurred in our Facebook treatment groups; see Supplementary Table [4](#). Other treatment conditions from the same randomization that we study in parallel papers were balanced on observables, making it unlikely that this reflects an error in randomization. (44) find that after controlling for observables that predict the outcome (which we do), correctly implemented randomizations with chance imbalance are no more likely to generate false hypothesis rejections than those without chance imbalance.

The Instagram treatment groups were balanced on all covariates at randomization. More than 70 percent of the primary analysis sample completed the endline survey. Supplementary Tables 5 and 6 show that our samples remain similarly balanced on covariates after attrition and that attrition rates did not differ significantly across control and treatment groups.

Participants and sample size

On Facebook, 14,643,120 users were invited to the study. Of these, 988,247 clicked the invitation, 193,880 consented to participate, and 75,276 completed the baseline survey. A total of 36,906 were randomized to one of the two ad removal conditions or to the Control group and did not delete their account or request data deletion. This final group is our “primary analysis sample.” On Instagram, the analogous numbers are 4,618,628 invites, 531,164 clicks, 135,688 consents, 47,659 baseline completes, and 25,925 participants in the primary analysis sample. We excluded users who deleted their account or requested data deletion from the analysis for ethical reasons and since we could not access their data.

We determined the sample size to provide statistical power to detect small effects (with $\beta = 0.8$ and $\alpha = 0.05$). For example, our power calculations were designed to detect an effect of 1.5 percentage points on self-reported turnout in the Facebook sample and 1.4 percentage points in the Instagram sample.

Of the participants in our Facebook sample, 74% are white, 41% are male, 52% hold a college degree, 55% identify as Democrats or lean Democrat, and 33% identify as Republicans or lean Republican. In our Instagram sample, 61% are white, 38% are male, 58% hold a college degree, 72% identify as Democrats or lean Democrat, and 20% identify as Republicans or lean Republican.

For all analyses, including both descriptive findings and treatment effect estimation, we weight our samples to be representative of U.S. focal platform (Facebook or Instagram) users

on race/ethnicity, political party, education, baseline account activity, and (on Instagram only) whether the respondent was in a swing state. See Supplementary Note 1.5 for additional details on weighting.

Primary outcomes

We have nine pre-specified primary outcome variables. All primary outcomes other than *engagement* are based on survey responses. Supplementary Note 3 provides precise definitions of these primary outcomes as well as of our 40 secondary outcomes. Some of these outcomes are also defined in other papers in the U.S. 2020 Facebook and Instagram Election Study (42).

The variable *knowledge* is the average of standardized scores on three sets of factual questions: (i) *election knowledge* (knowledge of candidates' policy positions); (ii) *news knowledge* (distinguishing recent news events from plausible placebo events that had not happened); and (iii) *fact knowledge* (distinguishing true statements from misinformation that was circulating about topics such as COVID-19 and fraudulent ballots).

Affective polarization is the average of three underlying standardized variables: (i) *political supporters polarization* (the difference in participants' favorability toward people who support their own party versus the other party); (ii) *political candidates polarization* (the difference in participants' favorability toward their own party candidates running for office versus candidates in the other party); and (iii) *party smartness polarization* (the difference in participants' perceived smartness of people in their own party versus people in the other party).

Issue polarization is an index of participants' opinions on eight political issues (immigration, repeal of Obamacare, unemployment benefits, mask requirements, foreign policy, policing, racial justice, and gender relations). The signs of the variables are adjusted so that for each issue, a higher value is closer to the participant's own-party mean. A higher issue polarization value should be interpreted as having opinions more closely aligned with one's party.

Perceived legitimacy is an index of participants' agreement with the following six statements: (i) elections are free from foreign influence, (ii) all adult citizens have equal opportunity to vote, (iii) elections are conducted without fraud, (iv) government does not interfere with journalists, (v) government protects individuals' right to engage in unpopular speech, and (vi) voters are knowledgeable about candidates and issues.

Participation is the sum of indicators for whether a participant reported doing the following six activities: (i) attended a protest or rally, (ii) contributed money to a political candidate or organization, (iii) signed an online petition, (iv) tried to convince someone how to vote (online or in-person), (v) wrote and posted political messages online, and (vi) talked about politics with someone they know.

Engagement is the average of 15 standardized components measuring engagement with political content on the focal platform, in the following seven groups: (i) likes, comments, clicks, reshares, and reactions on content classified as "civic" (i.e., related to politics and social issues) by Meta's Civic classifier, described in Supplementary Note 2, (ii) views and clicks on Meta's [Voter Hub](#) (a tool that provided election-related information to voters), (iii) likes, comments, and reshares on content from politicians running for office, and on Facebook only, (iv) indication of interest in going to civic events, (v) clicking on a petition, (vi) donations to civic causes, and (vii) enabling a constituent badge. None of the *engagement* components include engagement with political ads, so political ad removal has no mechanical effect on these outcomes. We note that we had to modify the construction of this variable compared to the pre-analysis plan because some data was not available and because some engagement indicators were always zero in our sample (for details see Supplementary Note 11).

The *Trump favorability* variable is the sum of two standardized components: (i) Trump approval ratings and (ii) the difference between Trump and Biden feeling thermometer ratings.

Turnout is an indicator of whether the participant reported voting.

Trump vote is defined as 1 for people who reported voting for Trump, -1 for people who reported voting for Biden, and 0 for those who did not vote or voted for some other candidate.

Voting records and campaign contribution data

We matched participants to state voting records and public records of campaign donations. Supplementary Notes [1.6](#) and [1.7](#) provide details on this matching. These directly measured outcomes are an important supplement to our survey-based outcome variables, as they have different measurement errors (from matching errors instead of self-reporting errors) and are available for matched users regardless of whether they completed the endline survey.

Advertising data

We record all political ads seen by our participants during the study period and match them to metadata from the [Meta Ad Library](#) and to internal data on the type of targeting associated with each ad. We match a subset of these ads to additional metadata from two sources: [OpenSecrets](#) (OS) and the [Wesleyan Media Project](#) (WMP) (45).

OS provides data on all ads in the Meta Ad Library whose sponsoring page and/or disclaimer are known organizations that provide financial support to presidential campaigns, including Political Action Committees (PACs) and political parties. This provides a relatively narrow definition of presidential ads based on financial ties. Unless stated otherwise, we use the OS definition of “presidential ads.”

WMP provides data on all ads in the Meta Ad Library whose sponsoring pages ran at least one ad containing keywords related to the 2020 presidential campaigns. They predict whether each ad favored Biden or Trump using the ad’s text and a machine learning model trained on a sample of ads whose sponsor can be associated with one campaign or the other (as in the OS data). This provides a broader definition of presidential ads based on the ads’ content. WMP

also trains a separate model to predict the primary “goal” of the ad from its text, based on a hand-labeled training sample with five categories: (i) donation, (ii) purchase/merchandise, (iii) prompting the user to sign up or provide information, (iv) persuasion, and (v) other.

We also use internal Meta data for the full set of political ads in the Meta Ad Library, including the distribution of exposure to ads by user characteristics and the targeting strategies associated with the ads. Supplementary Note 4 provides more details on the advertising data sources and how they were matched with Meta data.

Pre-analysis plan

The [pre-analysis plan](#) was registered on September 23, 2020 and updated on May 8, 2023, the day before endline data collection began. It specified our sample, how weights would be created, the handling of missing data, the outcomes studied, our main specification, and subgroup analyses. The plan also specified that we would use Benjamini-Hochberg sharpened False Discovery Rate (FDR) adjusted q -values (46) to control for multiple hypothesis testing, with $q < 0.05$. We did not substantively deviate from the pre-analysis plan. Supplementary Note 11 describes clarifications and minor modifications which are mainly driven by changes in data availability. These changes include focusing on ad exposure in Facebook due to missing Instagram data, a change in the construction of several variables (time use, income, urban-rural, engagement, knowledge) due to data availability and minor changes in the endline survey, not analyzing secondary and auxiliary variables for which data does not exist (additional polarization variables, civic events in the feed, distribution of ads by race/ethnicity), and fixing mistakes in the figure shells.

Acknowledgments

This paper was conducted as part of the *U.S. 2020 Facebook and Instagram Election Study*, a collaboration between a team of researchers at Meta and an independent set of external academic researchers. The team designed the project together (with lead academic authors having final say on the pre-registered analysis plan). Data collection was carried out by Meta and NORC. The pipeline code used to pre-process raw platform data was conducted by Meta and reviewed and approved by the external researchers; both the Meta team and external researchers analyzed the data. The paper was written by the external researchers with feedback from the Meta team, but the lead academic authors had final control rights over text and publication. More details on the collaboration appear in the Competing Interests Section and in Supplementary Note 9.

The Facebook Open Research and Transparency (FORT) team provided substantial support in executing the overall project. We are grateful for support on various aspects of project management from C. Nayak, S. Zahedi, I. Rosenn, L. Ahmad, A. Bhalla, C. Chan, A. Gruen, B. Hillenbrand, D. Li, P. McLeod, and D. Rice; engineering from Y. Chen, S. Chen, T. Lohman, R. Pyke, and Y. Wan; data engineering from S. Chinthia, J. Cronin, D. Desai, Y. Kiraly, T. Li, X. Liu, S. Pellakuru, C. Xie, and B. Xiong; data science and research from H. Connolly-Sporing; academic partnerships from R. Mersey, M. Zoorob, L. Harrison, S. Aisiks, Y. Rubinstein and C. Qiao; privacy and legal assessment from K. Benzina, F. Fatigato, J. Hassett, S. Iyengar, P. Mohassel, A. Muzaffar, A. Raghunathan and A. Sun; and content design from C. Bernard, J. Breneman, D. Leto and S. Raj. NORC at the University of Chicago partnered with Meta on this project to conduct the fieldwork with the survey participants and pair the survey data with web tracking data for consented participants in predetermined aggregated forms. We are particularly grateful for the partnership of NORC principal investigator J. M. Dennis and NORC project

director M. Montgomery.

The costs associated with the research (such as participant fees, recruitment, and data collection) were paid by Meta, who collaborated with academics in this project as part of the U.S. 2020 Facebook and Instagram Election Study (for more details see Supplementary Note 9). Ancillary support (for example, research assistants and course buyouts), as applicable, was sourced by academics from (authors' initials in parenthesis): the Democracy Fund (NJS), the European Research Council Starting Grant (EXPO- 756301) (MW), the Guggenheim Foundation (BN), the Hewlett Foundation (NJS, JT), the Hopewell Fund (JT), the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation (DF, DL, NJS, JT, RT), the Charles Koch Foundation (JT), New York University (JT), the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation (MG), Stanford University (HA, MG, NM, JP), the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research (MG), the University of Texas at Austin (NJS), and the University of Wisconsin–Madison (YMK). These funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.

Table 1: Electoral Effects by Party (Facebook)

Panel (a): Control Group Ad Impressions			
	(1) Democrats	(2) Republicans	(3) Pooled
Share of users over study period	0.60	0.40	1.00
Political ad impressions per user over study period	139	133	137
Using OpenSecrets definition of presidential ads			
Share coded presidential	0.182	0.243	0.206
Share of presidential coded pro-party	0.927	0.832	0.889
Incremental pro-party presidential impressions	22	21	22
Incremental pro-party presidential spending	\$0.542	\$0.538	\$0.540
Using WMP definition of presidential ads			
Share coded presidential	0.630	0.602	0.619
Share of presidential coded pro-party	0.917	0.657	0.814
Incremental pro-party presidential impressions	74	27	55
Incremental pro-party presidential spending	\$1.863	\$0.674	\$1.391
Panel (b): Cost Effectiveness of Ads			
	(1) Democrats Point estimate	(2) Republicans Point estimate	(3) Pooled Point estimate
Net President votes per person seeing all ads vs. no ads	0.023 (0.013)	0.013 (0.017)	0.020 (0.011)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (OpenSecrets)</i>	0.041 (0.024)	0.024 (0.033)	0.037 (0.020)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (WMP)</i>	0.012 (0.007)	0.019 (0.025)	0.014 (0.008)
Turnout (percentage points) per person seeing all ads vs. no ads	-0.016 (0.014)	0.002 (0.018)	-0.009 (0.011)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (OpenSecrets)</i>	-0.029 (0.026)	0.004 (0.034)	-0.017 (0.021)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (WMP)</i>	-0.009 (0.008)	0.003 (0.027)	-0.007 (0.008)
Contributions (\$) per person seeing all ads vs. no ads	3.000 (1.632)	-0.640 (1.356)	0.956 (1.079)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (OpenSecrets)</i>	5.432 (2.956)	-1.215 (2.573)	1.763 (1.991)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (WMP)</i>	1.610 (0.876)	-0.950 (2.011)	0.687 (0.776)


Note: This table computes estimates of returns to political ad spending on Facebook, for outcomes measured in administrative data. The first and second columns present separate results for Democratic and Republican users, including independents who “lean” toward the respective party. The third column presents estimates for the pooled sample. Panel (a) presents data on Control group political ad impressions. Panel (b) presents point estimates and standard errors for the effects of presidential ad spending on net presidential votes, validated turnout, and validated campaign contributions. “Net President votes” refers to the candidate of the respective party in each column (net Democratic votes in the first column and net Republican votes in the second column.) The treatment effect per dollar of incremental ad spending is $\tau/(p\Delta)$, where τ is the treatment effect of ad removal on an outcome, Δ is the treatment effect on net pro-party presidential ad impressions, and the ad cost p is equal to \$25.10 per thousand impressions.

Table 2: Comparison to the Literature, Votes per 1,000 Impressions

Paper	(1) Setting	(2) Treatment	(3) Measurement level	(4) N	(5) Votes per 1,000 impressions	(6) Std. error
This paper	2020 U.S. pres. elect., pooled (WMP)	Remove all political ads on FB	Individual	24,546	0.351	0.201
This paper	2020 U.S. pres. elect., pooled (OS)	Remove all political ads on FB	Individual	24,546	0.929	0.502
Brockman and Green (2014)	2012 non-battleground state leg. elect.	Pro-candidate FB ads	Individual	2,984	0.889	0.778
Coppock et al. (2022)	2018 Florida U.S. House elect.	Pro-Democrat ads on FB and IG	Precinct	853	-0.375	7.96
Enriquez et al. (2024)	2018 Mexican municipal elect.	Incumbent performance FB ads	Precinct	13,254	23.087	14.207
Hager (2019)	2016 Berlin state elect.	Pro-CDU FB + Google ads	Postal districts	189	0.918	0.656
Turitto et al. (2014)	2014 Texas Lt. Gov. Rep primary	Pro-candidate digital ad campaign	Individual	5,842	0.701	1.283


Note: This table compares point estimates and standard errors of the effect of impressions on net votes. The first two rows are based on this paper. They show estimates for pooled Democrats' and Republicans' incremental pro-party impressions, where the party leaning is coded using either WMP or OS. These estimates can be derived directly from Table 2 by dividing the effect of seeing all ads by the number of incremental pro-party impressions and rescaling by 1,000. For example, the number of additional votes per 1,000 impressions based on WMP data is $(0.02/55) * 1000 = 0.4$. The rest of the rows in the table provide benchmarks from other studies. Supplementary Note 7.5 details how these estimates were computed. Measurement level is the level at which the study observes outcomes. N is the number of units for which the outcome is observed.

Figure 1: Control Group Political Ad Characteristics




Note: The top left panel presents the distribution of political ad load in the Facebook and Instagram Control groups. The top right panel presents the average political ad load by political party identification in the Facebook Control group, as well as the average presidential ad load favoring each party, as coded by OpenSecrets and the Wesleyan Media Project. The bottom panel presents the distribution of presidential ad goals (as coded by Wesleyan Media Project) shown to the Facebook Control group. The panel shows the distribution separately based on the participant's party identification (with independents who "lean" toward either party included with that party) and whether the ad is pro-Democratic or pro-Republican.

Figure 2: Distribution of User Demographics Across Political Ad Impressions




Note: This figure presents distributions of user demographics across political ads shown to U.S. adult Facebook users in the 40 days before the 2020 election. The unit of analysis is an ad, and the observations are weighted by the number of impressions. The dashed red lines display user-level averages across all users who saw at least one political ad, constructed using internal data from Meta.

Figure 3: Effects of Political Ad Removal on Primary Outcomes




Note: This figure presents average treatment effects of political ad removal estimated using equation (1). Our Facebook sample consists of 36,906 participants, of whom 27,608 completed the endline survey. Our Instagram sample consists of 25,925 participants, of whom 19,483 completed the endline survey. The horizontal lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. For detailed results see Supplementary Tables 8-10.

Figure 4: CONSORT Flow Diagram Facebook



Note: This figure presents a flow diagram of recruitment, randomization, and sample statistics for Facebook study participants.

Figure 5: CONSORT Flow Diagram Instagram



Note: This figure presents a flow diagram of recruitment, randomization, and sample statistics for Instagram study participants.

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Supplementary Information

The Effects of Political Advertising on Facebook and Instagram before the 2020 US Election

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1 Materials and Methods

This study is part of the U.S. 2020 Facebook and Instagram Election Study, a set of experimental and observational studies that occurred as a result of collaboration between academics and Meta. In this Materials and Methods section, we provide information specific to the current study. Additional background on the broader Election Study is provided in Supplementary Note 9 below.

All study participants provided informed consent. See Supplementary Note 12 for the consent materials and Supplementary Note 10 for additional discussion of ethical issues and safeguards. Participants were given the option to withdraw from the study at any time until the data were disconnected from identifiers and, upon withdrawal, to remove their data from the study as long as that was technically possible.

1.1 Sampling

We sampled separately from the populations of Facebook (FB) and Instagram (IG) users. The sampling approach was designed to achieve desired minimum detectable effect sizes based on power analyses conducted prior to recruitment.

The sampling frames included all Facebook and Instagram monthly active U.S.-based users 18 years of age or older eligible to receive general surveys on a given platform (these represent a random set of users from the overall Facebook and Instagram populations) as of August 17, 2020. Participants were asked to confirm that they were over 18 years of age and lived in the United States as part of the recruitment process. The Facebook sampling frame was trimmed by removing predicted fake accounts, employees, and advertisers. The Instagram sampling frame was trimmed by removing these categories of accounts as well as business accounts. Finally, because the use of multiple accounts is common among Instagram users, the Instagram sampling frame was narrowed to include only a user's oldest account.

The sampling frames were stratified along the following dimensions: number of days a user logged in to Facebook or Instagram in the 30 days on or before August 17, 2020, classified into three categories: 1–14 days, 15–29 days, and 30+ days; a user's predicted census region (East, Midwest, South, West); whether the user is predicted to live in a swing state;¹ a user's predicted ideology (liberal, moderate, or conservative); and the census ethnic/racial composition in the zip code in which a user is predicted to live (percent of Hispanic residents and Black residents).²

¹Following the two most recent [Electoral College Ratings](#) by the Cook Political Report prior to August, we defined as swing states those whose complete electoral geography was categorized as “Toss Up”, “Lean Democrat”, or “Lean Republican” in at least one of the reports. “Toss Up” states are: Arizona, Georgia, Maine, North Carolina; “Lean Democrat” or “Lean Republican” states are: Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Iowa, Ohio, and Texas. Nebraska was excluded because only one of three congressional districts was identified as a swing district.

²Some fields had missing values (e.g., predicted ideology, state, and zip code). Individual values were imputed probabilistically using the distribution of demographics in the population. In general, the percent of missing values for a given demographic was quite small, never exceeding more than a few percentage points of the population.

Supplementary Table 1: Target Sample Demographic Distributions Across Studies

App	Demographic	Target distribution
Facebook and Instagram	Number of days user logged in to app	Less than 15 days (4%), between 15 and 29 days (24%), and 30 days (72%).
Facebook and Instagram	Minority users (Black or Hispanic)	Facebook: 56% in swing states and 58% in non-swing states. Instagram: 56% in swing states and 55% in non-swing states.
Facebook and Instagram	Users in swing states	Facebook: 40% Instagram: 35%
Facebook	Predicted ideology	Conservative, liberal, moderate. No initial target.

For relevant variables, predicted values are based on internal Meta classifiers. For Instagram, predicted ideology was not used in stratification as this classifier had not been developed for Instagram. The stratification of the sampling frame for these samples generated 621 and 207 population cells for Facebook and Instagram, respectively.

Having defined the sampling frames, sampling probabilities were computed to achieve specific sample distributions for the set of demographics encoded in the stratification step across each of the samples of interest. The sampling probabilities took into account desired sample size as well as predicted differential non-response across different demographics based on prior Facebook surveys. The initial target distributions are reported in Table 1.

There was no initial target distribution for ideology. We added this dimension to the stratification in the second week of recruitment after seeing that self-reported liberal users were more likely to consent to participate in the study. We therefore over-sampled moderate and conservative users (based on their predicted ideology). No specific targets were identified, but the proportion of users identified as Democrats was reduced.

Sampling was executed sequentially to avoid users being invited to more than one intervention within a given app. This left a small probability that users of Facebook and Instagram could have been invited to participate in the experiment on both apps.

1.2 Recruitment and Surveys

Participants completed up to six surveys which are referred to in the documentation for the wider election study as Waves 1-6. In the current paper, we refer to the Wave 2 survey as the

“baseline” survey and the Wave 4 survey as the “endline” survey. All of our primary outcome measures are drawn from the endline survey. All surveys were implemented by NORC at the University of Chicago.

- Wave 1: A subsample of Facebook/Instagram-recruited respondents were invited to the survey on August 31 in a soft-launch. The remainder of sampled Facebook/Instagram-recruited respondents were invited to the survey on September 1. The recruitment of the sample continued until Saturday, September 12. This wave included the recruitment and consent processes and a short survey.
- Wave 2 (“baseline”): The field period for Wave 2 started on September 8 and continued through September 21.
- Wave 3: The field period for Wave 3 started on October 9 and continued through October 23. This survey is not used in the present study.
- Wave 4 (“endline”): The field period for Wave 4 started on November 4 at 1:05 A.M. Eastern Time and continued through November 18.
- Wave 5: The field period for Wave 5 started on December 9 and continued through December 23. The survey started approximately one week later than the original schedule due to a delay in obtaining approvals for updated informed consent language. This survey is not used in the present study.
- Wave 6: The field period of Wave 6 started on February 16 and continued through March 2. This survey is not used in the present study.

Participants received at least \$5 for completing each of the Wave 2 and 3 surveys, \$20 for completing each of the Wave 4 and 5 surveys, and \$5 for completing the Wave 6 survey. In some cases participants who had not yet completed a given survey were offered additional incentives. All payments were made via electronic gift cards.

1.3 Randomization

Randomization occurred just after the end of the baseline survey. Only participants who completed the baseline survey were eligible for randomization. Participants were randomized into the Control group, the All Ad Removal treatment, the List-Targeted Ad Removal treatment, or one of five other treatment conditions that are analyzed in separate studies.

We adopted block randomization to minimize variance of treatment effect estimates and to ensure in-sample balance in a set of covariates that may be important determinants of the outcomes of interest. Randomization was blocked on swing state, friend count (Facebook) or following count (Instagram), self-reported party ID, and race/ethnicity (36 blocks).

1.4 Empirical Strategy

Control variables. As pre-specified, the controls \mathbf{X}_i are the variables selected in a lasso regression of Y_i on the baseline value of Y_i (if available) and a vector of other demographics and baseline survey variables: gender, age, race/ethnicity (non-Hispanic white, Hispanic, non-Hispanic Black, Asian-American or Pacific Islander, Other), political ideology, 7-point party ID, turnout in 2016, self-reported likelihood of voting in 2020, pre-election candidate preference, news consumption (network TV, average of cable, online websites, average of Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, YouTube, newspapers), political interest, political knowledge, issue positions, sum of political participation, and sum of digital literacy. Stratum indicators and treatment assignment are not included in the lasso regression. The model is estimated on the full sample (treatment and control units). If some but not all levels were selected from a factor variable, we include only the selected level(s) in \mathbf{X}_i . We use the same vector \mathbf{X}_i in all subgroup analyses for a given outcome.

We impute missing values of controls \mathbf{X}_i with the sample mean. If more than ten percent of a covariate's values are missing, we include a missingness dummy as an additional covariate.

Multiple hypothesis testing. To control for multiple hypothesis testing, we base significance testing on Benjamini-Hochberg (I) sharpened False Discovery Rate (FDR) adjusted q -values. Let K1 and K2 denote the numbers of hypothesis tests associated with main effects of our primary and secondary outcomes respectively. Let L1 and L2 denote the numbers of hypothesis tests associated with primary and secondary moderator variables respectively.

- For primary outcomes, we report q -values adjusted for K1 tests.
- For secondary outcomes, we report q -values adjusted for K1+K2 tests.
- For primary moderators, we report q -values adjusted for L1 tests.
- For secondary moderators, we report q -values adjusted for L1+L2 tests.
- For auxiliary outcomes, we report only unadjusted p -values.

Winsorization. We winsorize continuous variables derived from platform data at the 99th percentile.

Bayes Factor. For primary and secondary analysis, we also calculate the Bayes Factor. Bayes Factors are calculated using the default priors and settings for `lmBF()` from the [BayesFactor](#) package in R. We suppose $(\tau, \rho) \sim \text{Normal}(0, Ng\sigma^2([\mathbf{T}, \mathbf{X}]'[\mathbf{T}, \mathbf{X}])^{-1})$, where N is sample size and g follows an inverse Gamma distribution, $g \sim \text{InverseGamma}(\frac{1}{2}, \frac{\sqrt{2}}{8})$. Bayes Factors below 1 indicate stronger evidence for the null hypotheses over the alternative.³

³The Bayes Factors are reported without weights. We note that the analysis of Bayes Factors was not pre-specified and added based on the journal requirements.

1.5 Weighting

We weight our sample to be representative of U.S. focal platform users on a set of observed baseline characteristics.

We first built Inverse Propensity Score Weights (IPSW) using lasso regression with Facebook and Instagram log data. We prioritized covariates used for block randomization and variables presumed to predict treatment heterogeneity. The weights were calibrated to the population of active users 18 years of age or older on each focal platform.

For Facebook, weights were built using:

- Predicted ideology (divided into liberal, moderate, and conservative).
- Friend count (terciles).
- Civic pages followed (terciles).
- The number of days a user logged on to their account in the 30 days prior to August 17, 2020, divided into 29 or less vs. 30.

For Instagram, predicted ideology and civic pages followed are not used as these classifiers do not exist for Instagram. The Instagram weights were built using:

- Number of accounts followed (terciles).
- The number of days a user logged on to their account in the 30 days prior to August 17, 2020, divided into 29 or less vs. 30.
- Whether the respondent lived in a swing state.

The second step used raking to create the set of final weights that calibrate to population estimates of race/ethnicity (white vs. non-white), party ID (Democrat, Independent, or Republican, including leaners as partisans), and education (less than a college degree vs. a college degree or more). The specific targets are based on the Wave 2 Amerispeak panel weights for those who reported having a Facebook (FBACCT_ACTIVE_ONE) or Instagram (INSTACCT_ACTIVE_ONE) account.

Our final step was to trim the weights. Following the [Cooperative Election Study](#), which trims weights above a particular threshold, and the [Pew Research Center](#), which has trimmed weights at the 1st and 99th percentiles, we trimmed the top one percent of the survey weights.

We did not include design weights in the computation of the survey weights as the weights increase the design effect significantly without appreciably decreasing the bias.

1.6 Validated Vote Data

The matching of survey participants to voter file data was conducted by NORC using identifiable information that was not available to the researchers. From the survey data, NORC used the participants' first name, last name, gender, and address (including zip code). Matching was done using a proprietary record linkage software known as NorcLink.

After the NorcLink procedure, NORC provided information to the researchers about the estimated match probability for each participant, whether each participant had voted in the 2020 election, and (if the information was available) the method by which they voted (e.g., by mail, in person, etc.), keyed by the anonymous participant ID. We required that the estimated NorcLink match probability be at least 98% in order to declare a match valid. This resulted in matches for 48.4% of Facebook participants and 48.5% of Instagram participants.

1.7 Campaign Donation Data

The campaign donation data was drawn from two sources:

1. The Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) (2) is a dataset of political contributions made by individuals and organizations to election campaigns at local, state, and federal levels, starting in 1979. The dataset was developed at Stanford under principal investigator Adam Bonica. The subset we worked with was limited to donations made for the 2020 election cycle, containing 11,078,710 records for females who made campaign contributions and 16,006,523 records for males who made campaign contributions.
2. A dataset of political campaign contribution data developed by the Federal Election Commission (FEC).

The FEC dataset includes individual contributions that are greater than \$200. The DIME dataset adds smaller-value donations obtained from the National Institute on Money in State Politics (NIMSP) and the Sunlight Foundation.

The matching of participants to campaign donation data was done by NORC using identifiable information that was not available to the researchers. From the survey data, NORC used the participants' first name, last name, gender, and address (including zip code). For the DIME dataset, NORC used the name, gender, address; for the FEC dataset, they used the name, gender, and zip code.

For each matched participant, we created two variables: the total campaign contributions for the entire election period, as well as the period limited to 30 days prior to the election (to align with the survey question that asked people to report how much they donated in the 30 days prior to the election). We then binned these contributions into 10 bins: [0], (0, 25], (25, 50], (50, 100], (100, 150], (150, 200], (200, 350], (350, 500], (500, 1000], (1000, Inf]. The share of participants matched to non-zero contributions is 5.3% for Facebook and 4.4% for Instagram.

2 Civic Classifier

- **Definition:** This classifier aims to capture content that relates to either *politics* (government, elections, politicians, activism, etc.) or *social issues* (major issues that affect a large group of people, such as the economy, inequality, racism, education, immigration, human rights, the environment, etc.).
- **Usage:** We use the classifications for Facebook posts (any post type: links, photos, videos, text) posts that were created, seen or engaged with by U.S. users during the U.S. 2020 research project study periods. We use the classifications for both English- and Spanish-language content.
- **Performance:**
 - Based on a sample of approximately 10k labeled posts, the classifier has 83% precision and 82% recall on English-language Facebook content.
 - Based on a sample of approximately 17k labeled posts, the classifier has 81% precision and 85% recall on Spanish-language Facebook content.

3 Outcome Definitions

3.1 Primary Outcomes

We use endline survey responses to construct all primary outcomes other than *engagement*. Keys in capital letters in brackets indicate specific survey questions. Survey instruments with exact question wording are in Supplementary Note 13. *Engagement* is constructed from user engagement data collected by Meta.

Knowledge: Average of standardized values of the following:⁴

- *Election knowledge:* Share of the following policy proposals correctly identified as being publicly endorsed by Joe Biden, Donald Trump, or neither. Missing values are coded as incorrect.

⁴The survey questions that define our knowledge outcomes were based on campaign proposals as well as true and false news stories that circulated widely during the period in which our treatments took place. For election knowledge, we chose Trump and Biden proposals that had been prominent in the campaign, and we wrote additional policy proposals that were designed to plausibly sound like they might be endorsed by one candidate or the other but that had not in fact been proposed. For news knowledge, we monitored the news to extract a set of stories that were both politically relevant and widely covered during the study period, and we wrote additional fictitious news items that were designed to sound plausible but did not actually happen. For fact knowledge, we chose false items based on internal lists of currently circulating fact-checked false claims on FB, and we wrote true statements designed to sound similarly plausible. Our methodology is conceptually similar to the approach in prior work, including (3) and (4). The news knowledge questions were inspired by the news reception items used in (5).

- SPECKNOWPOA: Allow undocumented immigrants to get insurance through Medicaid.
 - SPECKNOWPOB: Raise the federal minimum wage to \$15 per hour.
 - SPECKNOWPOC: Withdraw the United States from the World Health Organization (WHO).
 - SPECKNOWPOD: Allow fossil fuel extraction in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.
 - SPECKNOWPOE: Replace the electoral college with a national popular vote.
 - SPECKNOWPOF: Eliminate taxes on corporations based in the U.S.
- *News knowledge*: Average score on items measuring accuracy of beliefs about recent international and domestic news events. Respondents could answer for each item if the event it described “Definitely didn’t happen”, “Probably didn’t happen”, “Probably did happen”, or “Definitely did happen.” For events that happened, these values were coded as {1, 2, 3, 4}, and as {4, 3, 2, 1} for events that did not happen. Missing values are coded as 2.5.
 - SPECKNOWEVA: France lifted all COVID-related restrictions.
 - SPECKNOWEVB: Donald Trump announced that he would stop holding public rallies out of concern for COVID-related risks.
 - SPECKNOWEVC: A militia’s plot to kidnap Michigan governor Gretchen Whitmer was foiled by undercover agents.
 - SPECKNOWEVD: Derek Chauvin, the Minneapolis police officer who killed George Floyd, was promoted.
 - SPECKNOWEVE: Pope Francis voiced support for same-sex civil unions.
 - SPECKNOWEVF: During the final presidential debate, each candidate was given time to speak while the other candidate’s microphone was muted.
 - SPECKNOWEVG: Amy Coney Barrett, Donald Trump’s nominee, became the newest Supreme Court justice.
 - *Fact knowledge*: Average score on items of true and false statements that included misinformation that had been recently circulated at the time of the study. Respondents could answer if each statement was “Not at all accurate”, “Not very accurate”, “Somewhat accurate”, or “Very accurate.” For accurate statements, these values were coded as {1, 2, 3, 4}, and as {4, 3, 2, 1} for inaccurate statements. Missing values are coded as 2.5.
 - MISINFOA: Evidence found on Hunter Biden’s laptop proves Joe Biden took bribes from foreign powers.
 - MISINFOB: The current FBI director, Christopher Wray, has said that the greatest domestic terrorist threat is white supremacists.

- MISINFOC: Amy Coney Barrett said that a woman needs a man’s permission to own property.
- MISINFOD: The U.S. government has a plan to force a COVID-19 vaccine on everyone.
- MISINFOE: Masks and face coverings are not effective in preventing the spread of COVID-19.
- MISINFOF: Millions of fraudulent ballots were cast in the 2020 presidential election.
- MISINFOG: Donald Trump held a Bible upside-down in front of a church.
- MISINFOH: In October, most rural counties were in the COVID-19 “red zone” based on their high rates of new cases.
- MISINFOI: At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, Anthony Fauci did not recommend wearing masks in public.
- MISINFOJ: Prior to the 2016 presidential election, Donald Trump arranged a payment to an adult film star.
- MISINFOK: Joe Biden is a pedophile.

Affective polarization: Average of standardized values of the following measures, each created as the difference between own party and other party [PID or PIDLEAN]. Those who lean toward neither party are eliminated from the analysis [PIDLEAN=Neither].

- Difference in feeling thermometer scores between people who support the party the respondent prefers (0-100) and people who support the other party (0-100) [FT_PEOPD, FT_PEOPC].
- Difference in feeling thermometer scores between people running for office as the party the respondent prefers (0-100) and people running for office from the other party (0-100) [FT_PEOPF, FT_PEOPE].
- Difference in perceptions of how smart people are who support the party the respondent prefers and people who support the other party (1-5 where 5 indicates “extremely smart” for both) [DEMSMART, REPSMART].

Issue polarization: Average of standardized responses to the following issue opinion questions re-signed so that on each question higher values are closer to the own-party mean and lower values are closer to the other-party mean [PID or PIDLEAN]. Those who lean toward neither party are eliminated from the analysis [PIDLEAN=Neither].

- IMMIG: Decrease the number of civilian refugees allowed into the United States from countries where people are trying to escape violence and war.

- HEALTH: Repeal the Affordable Care Act, also known as Obamacare.
- UNEMPLOY: Bring back the extra \$600-per-week unemployment benefit to address economic problems resulting from the coronavirus outbreak.
- COVID: Require all Americans to wear face masks in public when they're around other people.
- FOREIGN: Ban apps that are owned by Chinese companies (like TikTok and WeChat) from operating in the United States.
- POLICE: Reduce funding for police departments and spend that money on social services instead.
- BLACKWHITE[A-D]: In general in our country these days, would you say that Black people are treated less fairly than white people, white people are treated less fairly than Black people, or both are treated about equally in each of the following.
 - BLACKWHITEA: In dealing with the police.
 - BLACKWHITEB: When voting in elections.
 - BLACKWHITEC: When seeking medical treatment.
 - BLACKWHITED: In hiring, pay, and promotions.
- SEXISM1_2[A,B]: Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
 - SEXISM1_2A: Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist.
 - SEXISM1_2B: Recent allegations of sexual harassment and assault reflect widespread problems in society.

Perceptions of democratic performance: (Referred to as “Perceived legitimacy” below) Average of standardized responses (1-4 where 4 indicates “U.S. fully meets this standard”):

- USDEMOCA: Government does not interfere with journalists or news organizations.
- USDEMOCB: Government protects individuals’ right to engage in unpopular speech or expression.
- USDEMOC: Elections are free from foreign influence.
- USDEMOC D: All adult citizens have equal opportunity to vote.
- USDEMOC E: Elections are conducted without fraud.
- USDEMOC F: Voters are knowledgeable about candidates and issues.

Turnout: Self-reported turnout [TURNOUT_POSTELEC]. One for those responding “I am sure I voted”; zero for those stating that they did not vote (“I did not vote (in the election this November)”; “I thought about voting this time, but didn’t”; “I usually vote, but didn’t this time”).

Participation: Sum of the following measures:

- POLPART_1: Attended a protest or rally.
- POLPART_2: Contributed money to a political candidate or organization.
- POLPART_3: Signed an online petition.
- POLPART_4: Tried to convince someone how to vote (online or in-person).
- POLPART_5: Wrote and posted political messages online.
- POLPART_6: Talked about politics with someone you know.

Engagement: Sum of the following measures:

- Engagement with civic content (as labeled by the Civic classifier; see Supplementary Note 2):
 - Clicks
 - Likes
 - Reactions
 - Comments
 - Reshares
- Engagement with Voter Hub:
 - Views
 - Clicks
- Engagement with political figures:
 - Likes
 - Reactions
 - Comments
 - Reshares
- Civic events: indication of interest in going (FB only).

- Petition clicks (FB only).
- Donated to civic causes (FB only). Civic donations are donations made to a page where a majority of its posts are classified as civic (Supplementary Note 2 provides more details on the Civic classifier).
- Has constituent badge (FB only).

Voted for Trump: Vote for Trump self-reported on the endline survey [VOTE_POST], coded as +1 if voted for Trump, -1 if voted for Biden, and 0 otherwise (including did not vote).

Trump favorability: Average of standardized values of the following: (i) self-reported approval of Trump [APPROVAL], coded as 1-5 where 5 indicates "Strongly approve"; (ii) absolute difference between Trump and Biden thermometer ratings.

We further standardize the values of all primary outcomes, with the exception of "Voted for Trump" and "Turnout", so that the outcomes are in standard deviation units.

3.2 Secondary Outcomes

As with the primary outcomes, the secondary outcomes are based on endline survey responses, and specific survey question keys are indicated by all capital letters.

Knowledge: The individual components of the Knowledge primary outcome (described above in subsection 3.1) are secondary outcomes. Specifically, we separately analyze the standardized values of:

- Election knowledge.
- News knowledge.
- Fact knowledge.

Issue polarization: Similarly, secondary outcomes include each of the individual components of the issue polarization primary outcome, described above in subsection 3.1.

Affective polarization: In addition to the individual components of the affective polarization primary outcome, described in subsection 3.1, we analyze the standardized values of the following items related to affective polarization:

- Perceived polarization: Average of the following standardized measures, each created as the difference between own party and other party [PID or PIDLEAN]. Those who lean toward neither party are eliminated from the analysis [PIDLEAN=Neither].
 - Difference in perceived ideology between people who support one's own party and people who support the other party [IDEO_GRD, IDEO_GRE].

- Difference in perceived ideology between people running for office from one’s own party and people running for office from the other party [IDEO_GRB, IDEO_GRC].
- Trump-Biden polarization: Difference in feeling thermometer scores between own-party presidential candidate (Trump for Republicans, Biden for Democrats) and opposite-party presidential candidate [FT_PEOPA, FT_PEOPB].
- Group polarization: Average of standardized measures for the following thermometer ratings, scaled according to each party’s prevailing attitude towards the groups.
 - Immigrants [FT_PEOPG]: Thermometer rating of immigrants, multiplied by (-1) for Republicans.
 - Rural [FT_PEOPH]: Thermometer rating of rural Americans, multiplied by (-1) for Democrats.
 - BLM [FT_PEOPI]: Thermometer rating of Black Lives Matter, multiplied by (-1) for Republicans.
 - MeToo [FT_PEOPJ]: Thermometer rating of #MeToo movement, multiplied by (-1) for Republicans.

Perceived legitimacy: The secondary outcomes include each of the individual components of the perceived legitimacy primary outcome, as described in subsection 3.1.

Trust: Trust in information received from various sources, on a scale from 1-5 (5 is “A great deal”), which we recode as a scale from 0-1 (0 is “Not at all” and 1 is “A great deal”):

- INFOTRUSTC: Trust in political information from Facebook.
- INFOTRUSTD: Trust in political information from Instagram.
- INFOTRUSTA: Trust in political information from local news.
- INFOTRUSTB: Trust in political information from national newspapers.
- INFOTRUSTF: Trust in political information from national network TV news.
- INFOTRUSTG: Trust in political information from MSNBC.
- INFOTRUSTH: Trust in political information from CNN.
- INFOTRUSTI: Trust in political information from Fox News.

Participation: In addition to the individual components of the Participation primary outcome described in subsection 3.1, we also analyze the following measures of political participation:

- Registered voter (REG): Self-reported registration.

- Validated voter turnout: For those who were successfully matched to the public voting record, whether or not they voted in the 2020 election.
- Contribution amount (CONTRIBUT): Self-reported amount of money contributed to political candidates or organizations in the month before the election (\$0, \$25, \$50, \$100, \$150, \$200, \$350, \$500, \$1000, More than \$1000, coded as \$1500).
- Contribution amount directly measured in campaign donation data for those respondents who could be matched to the data.

Local candidate preference:

- Rep vote state: Sum across state offices (Senator [VOTESENATE, VOTESENATE2], Governor [VOTEGOV], House [VOTEHOUSE]) of +1 if voted for Republican, -1 if voted for Democrat, and 0 otherwise (including did not vote), divided by the number of races.
- Inc vote state: Sum across state offices (Senator [VOTESENATE, VOTESENATE2], Governor [VOTEGOV], House [VOTEHOUSE]) of +1 if voted for incumbent, -1 if voted for challenger, and 0 otherwise (including did not vote), divided by the number of races.
- Straight-ticket voting: If voted for more than one office out of Senate, Governor, House, President; +1 if voted for all candidates of the same party, and 0 otherwise. The variable is defined as missing if did not vote for more than one office.

3.3 Auxiliary Outcomes

Auxiliary outcomes provide context or help interpretation but do not answer research questions on their own.

Satisfaction with platform:

- FBSAT: Overall, how satisfied are you with your [Facebook/Instagram] experience?

Normalized time spent on platform:

- Daily minutes spent on platform, normalized by dividing by the average time spent by all participants in the baseline period, which is June 26th – September 23 for Facebook and July 17 – September 23 for Instagram.

Changes to feed:

- Share of feed that is civic content.
- Share of feed that is civic events.

- Share of feed that is news.
- Share of feed that is hateful or intolerant.
- Share of feed that is uncivil content.
- Share of feed that is from a misinformation repeat offender page.
- Share of feed that is misinformation (content rated as false by independent third-party fact-checkers).
- Share of feed that is content from a cross-cutting friend/source (i.e. users/pages/groups with predicted (audience) ideology ≥ 0.6 for liberals, and predicted (audience) ideology ≤ 0.4 for conservatives) for FB. For this outcome, we determine the participant's ideology using Meta's internal ideology classifier. The classifier is described in (6).

3.4 Moderators

The primary analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects are reported for subgroups defined by the following variables:

- Predicted ad exposure: Prediction of log of one plus the number of political ads served to the user over the study period (from a lasso regression on baseline political ad load and many other predictors).
- PartyID: Three mutually exclusive values: (i) Democrat or lean Democrat; (ii) Independent; (iii) Republican or lean Republican. In addition, we also consider (iv) Strong Democrat and (v) Strong Republican.
- Minority: Indicator for subject who identifies as Black or Hispanic.
- Undecided (VOTE_PREELEC): Indicator for "I'm not sure" on presidential candidate preference.

In addition, we reported secondary analysis of heterogeneous effects for each primary outcome by the following variables:

- Above vs. below-median age.
- Gender.
- College graduates vs. non-college graduates.
- Urban status (urban, suburban, or rural).
- Resident of swing state.

4 Presidential Ad Data Sources

4.1 Data Source Description

We use two external data sources to label presidential ads from the subset of political ads that were in scope for this study: one from the Wesleyan Media Project (WMP) (7) and the other from OpenSecrets.org (OS) (8, 9).

First, we obtained a custom dataset from Wesleyan Media Project (WMP). Ads included here were based on a keyword search for Biden and Trump ads run between June 1st and November 3rd, 2020 using the Meta Ad Library API. After this initial pass, the dataset was extended to include all ads from the pages that appeared in the first keyword search, regardless of their explicit mention of the presidential candidates. The resulting dataset included 1.83 million ads from 5,982 pages that were *thematically* related to the presidential election. It includes ads paid for by the official campaigns as well as the political parties, known political organizations, and other pages as long as their ads contained election keywords.

The full dataset shared by WMP included the variables below. The italicized text is copied from a WMP memo that detailed the variables and the data collection process.

- `ad_id`: unique ad identifier from the Meta Ad library.
- `page_id`: unique page identifier from the Meta Ad Library.
- `pd_id`: a unique identifier for each `page_name` - disclaimer dyad.
- `sponsor_party_wmp`: Sponsor classification of party if known based on hand-coding from known FEC sponsors.
- `disclaimer`: entity funding the ad.
- `party_clf_pdid`: a classification of the sponsor party by WMP based on `sponsor_party_wmp` and text in the ad. We use this variable to determine whether an ad favored Biden or Trump.

The training of the variable ‘party_clf_pdid’ is done at the entity level on the portion of the Facebook general election dataset (September 1, 2020 - November, 4, 2020) for which their entity party information is known to Wesleyan Media Project (via the sponsor_party_wmp classification for ALL federal sponsors, not just presidential-relevant ones). We assign 80% of these entities to the training set and 20% to the test set. For each entity, to prepare text data for training, we de-duplicate their ads’ combined text fields and then concatenate them, so that all ad text from a sponsor is included into the text field. We use MultinomialNB (Multinomial Naive Bayes) as our classifier which has a performance of 0.877 for accuracy, 0.883 for weighted precision, 0.877 for weighted recall, and 0.862 for weighted F1-score. We then apply the classifier to ALL entities (this is sponsor-level classification at the page_id - disclaimer level), even those for whom the partisanship is

not known. Because we genuinely do not know the partisanship of a large number of advertisers in the dataset, there is no easy way to validate the predictions on entities whose partisanship is missing in sponsor_party_wmp, but we have provided the predictions anyway.

- Goal: a classification of the primary goal of the ad into five categories: 1) donate, 2) purchase/merchandise, 3) info (sign-up or gather user information), 4) persuade or 5) other.

WMP has also used a hand coded sample of Facebook ads to train a BERT classifier model to identify the primary goal of the ad from the five following categories: 1) donate, 2) purchase/merchandise, 3) info (sign-up or gather user information), 4) persuade or 5) other. The model was run on the text fields and ASR concatenated together. [F1 scores are 91% Donate, 66% Info, 37% Other, 83% Persuade, 93% Purchase].

Second, we downloaded data on online ad spending for Donald Trump and Joe Biden from Opensecrets.org (OS). This organization collaborates with WMP to assemble and classify the data, but reports campaign online ad spending only based on ads officially or publicly linked to the campaigns or known campaign funding organizations. This ad-level dataset includes any ads and pages funded by these organizations between December 29th, 2019, and February 28th, 2021. According to the files downloaded from the OS website, there were nearly 152,000 ads from 377 Page/Disclaimer combinations that were *financially* linked to the presidential campaigns. We defined an ad as being pro-Democratic if it was run by a sponsor that OS had identified as “supporting Biden or being anti-Trump”, and defined an ad as being pro-Republican if it was run by a sponsor that OS had identified as “supporting Trump or being anti-Biden”.

4.2 Ad Data Merge

Ads that had reached at least one user in the United States between June 26th and November 3rd, 2020 were in scope for this study. Since WMP and OS covered longer time frames, not all the ads in the dataset were relevant for the study. The top row in Supplementary Table 2 represents ads that ran in the US in the relevant time period for each of the data sources.

To merge WMP-labeled ads with the Meta Ad Library data, we used the ad_id column in the dataset directly since the id was generated by the Meta Ad Library. WMP and OS data could be merged directly to each other since they shared the pd_id variable. This approach successfully merged 57% of advertisers in the OS dataset. An additional 10% of advertisers in OS are matched to the Meta Ad Library using a concatenation of page names and disclaimers. We attribute all ads from each dyad as presidential. This leads to a higher count of ads classified as presidential in our dataset than what is reported in the Open Secrets aggregate counts of ads by page / disclaimer.

Supplementary Table 2: Ad-level Summary of Matched Political and Presidential Ads Data by Source

	Political ads (Meta Ad Library)	Presidential-themed (WMP)	Campaign finance Presidential (OS)
In scope	2,538,988	1,554,806	675,189
Seen by participants	1,025,334	592,376	213,357

Supplementary Table 3: Agreement in Presidential Ads Definitions

	Campaign finance Presidential (OS)	Not campaign finance Presidential (not OS)
Presidential-themed (WMP)	212,697	379,679
Not Presidential-themed (not WMP)	660	432,298

Note: These cells count agreement among presidential ad definitions among ads seen by study participants.

Most (95%) of the remaining unmatched advertisers in the OS dataset were not matched because they did not run ads during the study period (June 26th - November 3rd, 2020). Additionally, a manual inspection of samples suggests that advertisers and ads present in OS data but not present in the WMP set did not contain keywords clearly related to the presidential race, but OS had identified the advertiser as a political campaign funding entity. An example were ads from a page named ‘Vote Student’ that were sponsored by ‘Tech for Campaigns’: OS identifies this sponsor as a Hybrid PAC/Carey Committee that advertised against Donald Trump in 2020 yet the text of the page and sponsor would not be associated with the presidential candidates.

Finally, the ad-level data is merged with impression data for all participants between June 26th and November 3rd, 2020. We did not expect all ads in the dataset to reach all participants because of Meta’s auction-based ad delivery system. Participants were exposed to 40% of all political ads identified by Meta that were in scope for the study, 38% of ads in the WMP dataset and 31% of ads in the OS dataset. The bottom row in Supplementary Table 2 shows the unique number of ads that participants were exposed to, across Facebook and Instagram.

Supplementary Table 3 computes agreement between presidential-themed and campaign-finance related definitions of presidential ads that were in scope for the study. Unsurprisingly, most ads run by organizations tied to campaign fundraising are also considered presidential-themed based on keyword searches. In contrast, only 35% of thematically presidential ads are considered presidential based on campaign finance criteria.

5 Sample, Balance, and Attrition

Supplementary Table 4: Balance at Randomization (Baseline Survey)

Covariate	Facebook					Instagram		
	(1) Control	(2) All Ad Removal	(3) <i>p</i> -value	(4) List-Targeted Ad Removal	(5) <i>p</i> -value	(6) Control	(7) All Ad Removal	(8) <i>p</i> -value
Age (imputed)	42.299	42.444	0.427	42.456	0.388	31.248	31.230	0.888
Male	0.431	0.421	0.141	0.431	0.969	0.409	0.405	0.624
Democrat	0.525	0.524	0.804	0.523	0.778	0.695	0.693	0.753
Republican	0.346	0.346	0.986	0.347	0.906	0.210	0.212	0.722
College degree	0.484	0.471	0.040	0.480	0.561	0.549	0.549	0.959
Hispanic	0.123	0.124	0.940	0.124	0.844	0.213	0.214	0.791
White, non-hispanic	0.724	0.724	0.867	0.724	0.910	0.592	0.593	0.954
Black, non-hispanic	0.073	0.071	0.721	0.073	0.954	0.087	0.086	0.779
Lower income tercile	0.339	0.358	0.002	0.361	0.000	0.315	0.315	0.939
Middle income tercile	0.341	0.336	0.430	0.329	0.045	0.325	0.323	0.765
Voted in 2016	0.812	0.801	0.037	0.801	0.031	0.682	0.683	0.879
Swing state	0.353	0.353	0.977	0.350	0.634	0.324	0.324	0.948
Baseline use	0.993	1.019	0.008	1.013	0.036	1.002	0.992	0.336
Observations	19,462	8,736		8,708		15,209	10,716	
F-test of joint sig. (<i>p</i> -value)			0.039		0.044			1.000

Note: Columns 1, 2, and 4, respectively, present the mean of each variable in the Control, All Ad Removal, and List-Targeted Ad Removal groups in the Facebook experiment, for the sample that was randomized and completed the baseline survey. Columns 3 and 5, respectively, present *p*-values of two-sided tests of equality between the All Ad Removal and Control group and between the List-Targeted Ad Removal and Control group. Columns 6 and 7 present analogous balance for the Instagram experiment, where Column 8 presents *p*-values of two-sided tests of equality between the All Ad Removal and Control group. The All Democrat and All Republican samples include people who identified as Independents leaning Democrat or Republican.

Supplementary Table 5: Balance at Endline Survey

Covariate	Facebook					Instagram		
	(1) Control	(2) All Ad Removal	(3) <i>p</i> -value	(4) List-Targeted Ad Removal	(5) <i>p</i> -value	(6) Control	(7) All Ad Removal	(8) <i>p</i> -value
Age (imputed)	42.400	42.646	0.246	42.495	0.652	31.437	31.443	0.965
Male	0.415	0.401	0.061	0.420	0.524	0.384	0.378	0.369
Democrat	0.549	0.543	0.412	0.539	0.194	0.714	0.719	0.436
Republican	0.329	0.337	0.273	0.340	0.127	0.198	0.197	0.904
College degree	0.522	0.502	0.006	0.514	0.255	0.582	0.582	0.996
Hispanic	0.116	0.114	0.754	0.118	0.618	0.205	0.210	0.408
White, non-hispanic	0.738	0.743	0.383	0.736	0.828	0.603	0.608	0.567
Black, non-hispanic	0.065	0.066	0.892	0.067	0.580	0.079	0.075	0.315
Lower income tercile	0.320	0.338	0.012	0.343	0.002	0.300	0.302	0.734
Middle income tercile	0.345	0.343	0.743	0.335	0.156	0.327	0.330	0.651
Voted in 2016	0.828	0.817	0.044	0.815	0.019	0.701	0.703	0.748
Swing state	0.350	0.344	0.467	0.351	0.893	0.323	0.326	0.732
Baseline use	0.984	1.012	0.014	1.000	0.136	0.990	0.973	0.154
Observations	14,547	6,562		6,499		11,434	8,049	
F-test of joint sig. (p-value)			0.014		0.072			0.872

Note: Columns 1, 2, and 4, respectively, present the mean of each variable in the Control, All Ad Removal, and List-Targeted Ad Removal groups in the Facebook experiment, for the sample that completed the endline survey. Columns 3 and 5, respectively, present *p*-values of two-sided tests of equality between the All Ad Removal and Control group and between the List-Targeted Ad Removal and Control group. Columns 6 and 7 present analogous balance for the Instagram experiment, where Column 8 presents *p*-values of two-sided tests of equality between the All Ad Removal and Control group. The All Democrat and All Republican samples include people who identified as Independents leaning Democrat or Republican.


Supplementary Table 6: Attrition Tests

	(1) Control	(2) All Ad Removal	(3) <i>p</i>	(4) List-Targeted Ad Removal	(5) <i>p</i>
Facebook	0.724	0.731	0.254	0.723	0.888
Instagram	0.733	0.730	0.603		

Note: This table presents Survey 4 (endline) response rates by focal platform. Columns 3 and 5 respectively, present *p*-values of two-sided tests for differential attrition between the All Ad Removal and Control group and between the List-Targeted Ad Removal and Control group.

6 Descriptive Facts


Supplementary Figure 1: Distributions of Baseline Facebook and Instagram Use




Note: This figure presents the distributions of the baseline Facebook use (for the Facebook sample) and Instagram use (for the Instagram sample), relative to the average main sample baseline use in the same period. For this figure, we define the baseline period to be June 26th – September 23 for Facebook and July 17 – September 23 for Instagram. We compute this relative measure based on the “on-platform time spent” variable defined in subsection [3.3](#).

Supplementary Figure 2: Control Group Political Ad Impressions by Demographic Group

(a) Facebook




(b) Instagram




Note: This figure presents political ad impressions in the Control group over the study period, split by core demographics and focal platform.

Supplementary Figure 3: Political Ad Load by Party Identification

(a) Facebook




(b) Instagram




Note: This figure presents the Control group average political ad load by political party affiliation during the study period, separately for Facebook and Instagram. The Instagram sample only includes the subset of participants without linked Facebook accounts. For more details, see Section 11.

Supplementary Figure 4: Presidential Ad Load by Party Identification and Ad Affiliation, OS Coding



Note: This figure presents the Control group average ad load by party identification during the study period. Ad load and ad affiliation were coded by OpenSecrets. Note that the Instagram ad exposure data include only the subset of Instagram users without linked Facebook accounts. The Instagram sample only includes the subset of participants without linked Facebook accounts. For more details, see Section 11.

Supplementary Figure 5: Presidential Ad Load by Political Party Identification, WMP Coding



Note: This figure presents the Control group average ad load by party identification during the study period. Ad loads and ad affiliation were coded by Wesleyan Media Project. The Instagram sample only includes the subset of participants without linked Facebook accounts. For more details, see Section 11.

Supplementary Table 7: Facebook Control Group Ad Impressions by Targeting Strategy

	(1) All political ads	(2) Presidential ads	(3) Pro-Dem. presidential ads	(4) Pro-Rep. presidential ads
Removed in list-targeted ad removal	0.622	0.905	0.883	0.887
Lookalike	0.196	0.229	0.194	0.235
Inclusion	0.182	0.225	0.189	0.235
Exclusion	0.023	0.004	0.006	0.000
Customer list custom audience	0.541	0.846	0.849	0.802
Inclusion	0.272	0.352	0.301	0.424
Exclusion	0.388	0.783	0.759	0.750
Web custom audience	0.248	0.619	0.553	0.541
Inclusion	0.022	0.045	0.013	0.078
Exclusion	0.237	0.602	0.550	0.504
Not removed in list-targeted ad removal	0.378	0.095	0.117	0.113
Demographic targeting	0.220	0.119	0.179	0.104
Location	0.628	0.460	0.453	0.649
Inclusion	0.514	0.372	0.446	0.482
Exclusion	0.148	0.104	0.027	0.202
Interest	0.281	0.199	0.182	0.212
Inclusion	0.239	0.181	0.152	0.209
Exclusion	0.076	0.029	0.053	0.003
Engagement custom audience	0.058	0.046	0.051	0.042
Inclusion	0.021	0.023	0.023	0.027
Exclusion	0.038	0.023	0.028	0.016

Notes: This table presents the share of all ad impressions that were served to the Control group using different targeting strategies, by type of advertiser. Many ads are served with multiple targeting strategies, so the totals sum to more than one. The List-Targeted Ad Removal condition removed any ads targeted with lookalike audience, customer list custom audience, and/or web custom audience. Engagement custom audience is a targeting option that matches people who have engaged with the advertiser's content across Meta technologies and services. Web custom audience is a targeting option that matches people who visit the advertiser's website. Presidential, pro-Democrat and pro-Republican ads were coded by OpenSecrets.

7 Effects on Primary, Secondary, and Auxiliary Outcomes

7.1 Primary Outcomes

Supplementary Table 8: Effects of All Ad Removal on Facebook on Primary Outcomes

	(1) Treatment effect	(2) Confidence interval	(3) <i>p</i> -value	(4) <i>q</i> -value	(5) Bayes factor
Knowledge	-0.010	[-0.050, 0.031]	0.645	1.000	0.058
Affective polarization	-0.002	[-0.037, 0.032]	0.888	1.000	0.054
Issue polarization	0.012	[-0.011, 0.036]	0.302	1.000	0.055
Perceived legitimacy	-0.013	[-0.052, 0.025]	0.498	1.000	0.064
Participation	-0.001	[-0.033, 0.031]	0.959	1.000	0.052
Engagement	0.020	[0.005, 0.036]	0.010	0.158	0.101
Trump favorability	0.002	[-0.014, 0.017]	0.832	1.000	0.065
Turnout	-0.012	[-0.027, 0.002]	0.097	1.000	0.326
Trump vote	0.005	[-0.015, 0.026]	0.628	1.000	0.024

Note: This table presents average treatment effects of removing all Facebook political ads estimated using equation (1). Columns 1 and 2 present the treatment effects and standard errors. Columns 3 and 4 present the unadjusted *p*-values and sharpened False Discovery Rate-adjusted two-stage *q*-values from two-sided tests of whether the treatment effect equals zero. Column 5 presents the Bayes factors against null effects. The first seven variables are in standard deviation units, *turnout* is binary, and *Trump vote* equals 1 for people who reported voting for Trump, -1 for people who reported voting for Biden, and 0 for those who didn't vote or voted for some other candidate.

Supplementary Table 9: Effects of List-Targeted Ad Removal on Facebook on Primary Outcomes

	(1) Treatment effect	(2) Standard error	(3) <i>p</i> -value	(4) <i>q</i> -value	(5) Bayes factor
Knowledge	0.000	0.021	0.985	1.000	0.060
Affective polarization	-0.000	0.017	0.984	1.000	0.037
Issue polarization	0.016	0.012	0.178	1.000	0.037
Perceived legitimacy	-0.013	0.019	0.489	1.000	0.081
Participation	-0.023	0.016	0.155	1.000	6.165
Engagement	0.015	0.008	0.061	1.000	0.372
Trump favorability	0.009	0.008	0.286	1.000	0.017
Turnout	-0.006	0.007	0.349	1.000	0.103
Trump vote	0.027	0.010	0.007	0.158	0.087

Note: This table presents average treatment effects of removing all Facebook list-targeted political ads estimated using equation (1). Columns 1 and 2 present the treatment effects and standard errors. Columns 3 and 4 present the unadjusted *p*-values and sharpened False Discovery Rate-adjusted two-stage *q*-values from two-sided tests of whether the treatment effect equals zero. Column 5 presents the Bayes factors against null effects. The first seven variables are in standard deviation units, *turnout* is binary, and *Trump vote* equals 1 for people who reported voting for Trump, -1 for people who reported voting for Biden, and 0 for those who didn't vote or voted for some other candidate.

Supplementary Table 10: Effects of All Ad Removal on Instagram on Primary Outcomes

	(1) Treatment effect	(2) Standard error	(3) <i>p</i> -value	(4) <i>q</i> -value	(5) Bayes factor
Knowledge	-0.024	0.017	0.153	1.000	0.168
Affective polarization	0.004	0.015	0.788	1.000	0.039
Issue polarization	0.013	0.011	0.227	1.000	0.027
Perceived legitimacy	0.009	0.017	0.620	1.000	0.089
Participation	0.004	0.016	0.797	1.000	0.104
Engagement	0.004	0.010	0.688	1.000	0.129
Trump favorability	-0.009	0.007	0.190	1.000	0.032
Turnout	-0.005	0.006	0.388	1.000	0.062
Trump vote	0.008	0.009	0.373	1.000	0.026

Note: This table presents average treatment effects of removing all Instagram political ads estimated using equation (1). Columns 1 and 2 present the treatment effects and standard errors. Columns 3 and 4 present the unadjusted *p*-values and sharpened False Discovery Rate-adjusted two-stage *q*-values from two-sided tests of whether the treatment effect equals zero. Column 5 presents the Bayes factors against null effects. The first seven variables are in standard deviation units, *turnout* is binary, and *Trump vote* equals 1 for people who reported voting for Trump, -1 for people who reported voting for Biden, and 0 for those who didn't vote or voted for some other candidate.

Supplementary Table 11: Effects of Political Ad Removal on Self-Reported Voting in the Experimental Samples

(a) All Ad Removal				
Effect of political ad removal on...	Facebook		Instagram	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	All states	Swing states	All states	Swing states
Probability of voting for Trump	-0.981% (0.651%)	-0.166% (1.150%)	0.255% (0.588%)	1.060% (1.060%)
Probability of voting for Biden	-1.400% (0.680%)	-1.060% (1.130%)	-0.562% (0.605%)	-0.779% (1.070%)
Trump vote share	0.130% (0.500%)	0.664% (0.837%)	0.209% (0.473%)	0.569% (0.891%)

(b) List-Targeted Ad Removal (Facebook Only)		
	(1)	(2)
	All states	Swing states
Probability of voting for Trump	0.836% (0.638%)	0.898% (1.080%)
Probability of voting for Biden	-1.910% (0.625%)	-0.554% (0.965%)
Trump vote share	1.400% (0.509%)	1.380% (0.799%)

Note: This table presents the effects of political ad removal estimated using Equation (1). The dependent variable in the first and second rows are indicators equal to one if the participant reported voting for Trump or Biden respectively and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in the third row is equal to one if the respondent voted for Trump, zero if the respondent voted for Biden, and missing otherwise, so the effect can be interpreted as the change in Trump's two-party vote share. The swing states are Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, Iowa, Ohio, and Texas. Standard errors are in parentheses.

7.2 Secondary Outcomes

Supplementary Table 12: Effects of Ad Removal on Facebook on Secondary Outcomes

	(1) Treatment effect	(2) Standard error	(3) <i>p</i> -value	(4) <i>q</i> -value	(5) Bayes factor
Knowledge					
Election knowledge	-0.005	0.019	0.813	1.000	0.133
News knowledge	0.019	0.018	0.304	1.000	0.068
Fact knowledge	-0.024	0.014	0.096	1.000	0.063
Affective polarization					
Perceived	0.008	0.009	0.383	1.000	0.064
Trump-Biden	-0.002	0.012	0.842	1.000	0.026
Group	0.012	0.007	0.102	1.000	0.027
Political supporters	-0.017	0.016	0.279	1.000	0.082
Political candidates	-0.016	0.016	0.306	1.000	0.065
Party smartness	0.027	0.017	0.099	1.000	0.050
Perceived legitimacy					
Elections are free from foreign influence	-0.002	0.016	0.885	1.000	0.056
Adult citizens have equal opportunity to vote	-0.018	0.015	0.248	1.000	0.048
Elections are conducted without fraud	-0.017	0.017	0.297	1.000	0.205
Government does not interfere with journalists	-0.012	0.017	0.467	1.000	0.159
Government protects freedom of speech	-0.005	0.017	0.745	1.000	0.066
Voters are knowledgeable about elections	0.001	0.015	0.961	1.000	0.328
Trust					
In Facebook	0.003	0.004	0.471	1.000	0.133
In Instagram	0.002	0.004	0.513	1.000	0.072
In Newspapers	0.001	0.004	0.896	1.000	0.044
In Network TV news	-0.001	0.004	0.842	1.000	0.036
In Local news	-0.001	0.004	0.885	1.000	0.046
In MSNBC	0.001	0.004	0.730	1.000	0.039
In CNN	-0.003	0.004	0.382	1.000	0.044
In Fox	0.001	0.004	0.777	1.000	0.062
Participation					
Registered voter	-0.004	0.004	0.310	1.000	0.036
Validated voter turnout	0.008	0.009	0.368	1.000	0.132
Contributions, FEC and DIME data	-0.843	0.826	0.307	1.000	0.098
Contributions, self-reported	-2.721	2.562	0.288	1.000	0.138
Pay attention to politics	0.006	0.015	0.709	1.000	0.056
Attended a protest or rally	-0.009	0.004	0.019	1.000	0.087
Signed an online petition	-0.011	0.007	0.103	1.000	1.488
Tried to convince someone to vote	0.003	0.008	0.702	1.000	0.065
Political posts	0.011	0.007	0.119	1.000	0.048
Talked about politics	-0.004	0.006	0.466	1.000	0.534
Local candidate preference					
Republican vote	0.009	0.009	0.299	1.000	0.026
Incumbent vote	-0.013	0.019	0.475	1.000	0.101
Straight ticket voting	-0.016	0.008	0.061	1.000	0.155
Ideological position					
Pro-Republican affect	0.005	0.009	0.578	1.000	0.022
Pro-Republican issue positions	-0.001	0.008	0.918	1.000	0.025

Note: This table presents average treatment effects of removing Facebook political ads estimated using equation (1). In this table, the estimates presented pool the effects of both the intervention removing all Facebook political ads and the intervention removing list-targeted political ads. Columns 1 and 2 present the treatment effect and standard error. Effects for all knowledge, affective polarization, and ideological position outcomes are reported in standard deviation units. Perceived legitimacy outcomes are reported in the original scale of 1-4, trust outcomes are rescaled to 0-1, Republican vote and incumbent vote are reported on a -1 to +1 scale (where -1 means voting for Democrats or challengers in all races) and straight-ticket voting is binary. All participation effects are reported in original units: contributions in dollars, pay attention to politics on a 1-5 scale, and all other participation outcomes on a 0-1 scale. The variables are defined in 3.2. Columns 3 and 4 present the unadjusted *p*-value and sharpened False Discovery Rate-adjusted two-stage *q*-value from two-sided tests of whether the treatment effect equals zero. Column 5 presents the Bayes factors against null effects.

Supplementary Table 13: Effects of Ad Removal on Instagram on Secondary Outcomes

	(1) Treatment effect	(2) Standard error	(3) <i>p</i> -value	(4) <i>q</i> -value	(5) Bayes factor
Knowledge					
Election knowledge	-0.037	0.020	0.066	1.000	2.296
News knowledge	-0.025	0.019	0.186	1.000	0.128
Fact knowledge	0.006	0.016	0.721	1.000	0.085
Affective polarization					
Perceived	0.004	0.007	0.613	1.000	0.017
Trump-Biden	0.012	0.013	0.375	1.000	0.041
Group	0.009	0.009	0.315	1.000	0.016
Political supporters	0.002	0.017	0.916	1.000	0.047
Political candidates	0.020	0.017	0.248	1.000	0.092
Party smartness	-0.003	0.018	0.856	1.000	0.053
Perceived legitimacy					
Elections are free from foreign influence	-0.013	0.018	0.452	1.000	0.073
Adult citizens have equal opportunity to vote	0.017	0.017	0.330	1.000	0.043
Elections are conducted without fraud	0.011	0.019	0.579	1.000	0.077
Government does not interfere with journalists	0.016	0.019	0.380	1.000	0.228
Government protects freedom of speech	0.009	0.019	0.625	1.000	0.132
Voters are knowledgeable about elections	-0.011	0.016	0.482	1.000	0.105
Trust					
In Facebook	-0.003	0.004	0.520	1.000	0.066
In Instagram	0.001	0.004	0.750	1.000	0.075
In Newspapers	0.003	0.005	0.471	1.000	0.072
In Network TV news	0.006	0.004	0.195	1.000	0.229
In Local news	-0.004	0.005	0.392	1.000	0.060
In MSNBC	0.001	0.005	0.778	1.000	0.047
In CNN	0.005	0.004	0.244	1.000	0.768
In Fox	-0.003	0.005	0.472	1.000	0.074
Participation					
Registered voter	-0.004	0.004	0.321	1.000	0.046
Validated voter turnout	-0.002	0.010	0.849	1.000	0.150
Contributions, FEC and DIME data	0.784	0.767	0.307	1.000	0.497
Contributions, self-reported	-0.691	2.409	0.774	1.000	0.107
Pay attention to politics	-0.005	0.016	0.749	1.000	0.056
Attended a protest or rally	-0.007	0.005	0.167	1.000	0.081
Signed an online petition	0.014	0.009	0.115	1.000	0.225
Tried to convince someone to vote	-0.001	0.009	0.881	1.000	1.164
Political posts	0.014	0.009	0.107	1.000	0.061
Talked about politics	0.001	0.005	0.907	1.000	0.221
Local candidate preference					
Republican vote	0.017	0.010	0.098	1.000	0.101
Incumbent vote	-0.038	0.021	0.070	1.000	0.117
Straight ticket voting	0.015	0.010	0.149	1.000	0.188
Ideological position					
Pro-Republican affect	-0.004	0.010	0.678	1.000	0.023
Pro-Republican issue positions	0.001	0.009	0.907	1.000	0.022

Note: This table presents average treatment effects of removing all Instagram political ads estimated using equation (1). Columns 1 and 2 present the treatment effect and standard error. Effects for all knowledge, affective polarization, and ideological position outcomes are reported in standard deviation units. Perceived legitimacy outcomes are reported in the original scale of 1-4, trust outcomes are rescaled to 0-1, Republican vote and incumbent vote are reported on a -1 to +1 scale (where -1 means voting for Democrats or challengers in all races) and straight-ticket voting is binary. All participation effects are reported in original units: contributions in dollars, pay attention to politics on a 1-5 scale, and all other participation outcomes on a 0-1 scale. The variables are defined in 3.2. Columns 3 and 4 present the unadjusted *p*-value and sharpened False Discovery Rate-adjusted two-stage *q*-value from two-sided tests of whether the treatment effect equals zero. Column 5 presents the Bayes factors against null effects.

7.3 Auxiliary Outcomes

Supplementary Table 14: Effects of Ad Removal on Facebook on Auxiliary Outcomes

	(1) Treatment effect	(2) Standard error	(3) <i>p</i> -value
Satisfaction with platform	-0.061	0.021	0.004
Time spent, relative to average time spent	0.004	0.007	0.631
Issue polarization			
Women interpret innocent remarks as sexist	0.025	0.021	0.225
Sexual harassment allegations reflect problems	-0.002	0.017	0.924
Unfair treatment of Black people by the police	-0.010	0.012	0.410
Unfair treatment of Black people when voting	0.008	0.016	0.597
Unfair treatment of Black people in health services	-0.016	0.015	0.311
Unfair treatment of Black people in labor market	-0.002	0.015	0.880
Decrease civilian refugees	0.018	0.023	0.440
Repeal Affordable Care Act	-0.001	0.024	0.962
Bring back \$600 unemployment boost	0.004	0.024	0.855
Require face masks in public	-0.005	0.020	0.825
Ban Chinese apps	0.041	0.025	0.097
Reduce police funding for social services	-0.003	0.023	0.890
Group polarization			
Thermometer rating of immigrants, x (-1) for Rep.	0.012	0.009	0.166
Thermometer rating of rural Americans, x (-1) for Dem.	0.002	0.007	0.825
Thermometer rating of Black Lives Matter, x (-1) for Rep.	0.007	0.008	0.350
Thermometer rating of #MeToo movement, x (-1) for Rep.	0.000	0.008	0.964
On-platform engagement			
Civic content clicks	0.016	0.006	0.007
Civic content likes	0.020	0.005	0.000
Civic content reactions	0.018	0.005	0.000
Civic content comments	0.003	0.007	0.649
Civic content reshares	0.011	0.006	0.055
Voter Hub views	0.024	0.014	0.097
Voter Hub clicks	0.020	0.016	0.212
Political figure likes	0.032	0.006	0.000
Political figure reactions	0.023	0.007	0.000
Political figure comments	0.034	0.013	0.012
Political figure reshares	-0.004	0.009	0.684
Civic event interest	0.017	0.012	0.157
Petition clicks	-0.001	0.015	0.963
Donated to civic causes	-0.011	0.013	0.370
Has constituent badge	0.024	0.012	0.038
Share of feed			
Share of feed that is civic content	0.008	0.010	0.430
Share of feed that is news	0.008	0.010	0.373
Share of feed that is hateful or intolerant content	-0.024	0.015	0.106
Share of feed that is uncivil content	-0.029	0.012	0.015
Share of feed that is from an untrustworthy page	0.017	0.009	0.074
Share of feed that is misinformation	0.005	0.016	0.742
Share of feed that is content from a cross-cutting friend or source	0.002	0.008	0.851


Note: This table presents average treatment effects of removing Facebook political ads estimated using equation (1). In this table, the estimates presented pool the effects of both the intervention removing all Facebook political ads and the intervention removing list-targeted political ads. Columns 1 and 2 present the treatment effects and standard errors. Effects for all auxiliary outcomes are reported in standard deviation units. The variables are defined in 3.3. Column 3 presents the unadjusted *p*-values from two-sided tests of whether the treatment effect equals zero.

Supplementary Table 15: Effects of All Ad Removal on Instagram on Auxiliary Outcomes

	(1) Treatment effect	(2) Standard error	(3) <i>p</i> -value
Satisfaction with platform	0.003	0.022	0.885
Time spent, relative to average time spent	-0.014	0.006	0.021
Issue polarization			
Women interpret innocent remarks as sexist	0.002	0.018	0.919
Sexual harassment allegations reflect problems	0.042	0.016	0.007
Unfair treatment of Black people by the police	-0.006	0.009	0.476
Unfair treatment of Black people when voting	-0.010	0.013	0.428
Unfair treatment of Black people in health services	-0.001	0.012	0.959
Unfair treatment of Black people in labor market	0.008	0.013	0.522
Decrease civilian refugees	0.012	0.020	0.551
Repeal Affordable Care Act	0.023	0.022	0.293
Bring back \$600 unemployment boost	0.008	0.022	0.721
Require face masks in public	0.008	0.021	0.694
Ban Chinese apps	0.022	0.023	0.343
Reduce police funding for social services	0.017	0.021	0.414
Group polarization			
Thermometer rating of immigrants, x (-1) for Rep.	-0.006	0.008	0.455
Thermometer rating of rural Americans, x (-1) for Dem.	0.010	0.007	0.179
Thermometer rating of Black Lives Matter, x (-1) for Rep.	0.002	0.007	0.739
Thermometer rating of #MeToo movement, x (-1) for Rep.	0.013	0.007	0.066
On-platform engagement			
Civic content likes	0.004	0.006	0.484
Civic content comments	-0.003	0.011	0.803
Civic content reshares	0.006	0.007	0.440
Voter Hub views	-0.019	0.012	0.116
Voter Hub clicks	-0.031	0.015	0.034
Political figure likes	0.021	0.009	0.020
Political figure comments	0.019	0.015	0.203
Political figure reshares	0.011	0.010	0.270
Share of feed			
Share of feed that is civic content	-0.009	0.008	0.273
Share of feed that is hateful or intolerant content	-0.008	0.015	0.602
Share of feed that is uncivil content	-0.007	0.010	0.465
Share of feed that is from an untrustworthy page	0.026	0.013	0.047
Share of feed that is misinformation	0.028	0.016	0.087


Note: This table presents average treatment effects of removing all Instagram political ads estimated using equation (1). Columns 1 and 2 present the treatment effects and standard errors. Effects for all auxiliary outcomes are reported in standard deviation units. The variables are defined in 3.3. Column 3 presents the unadjusted *p*-values from two-sided tests of whether the treatment effect equals zero.

Supplementary Figure 6: Effects of Political Ad Removal on Engagement



Notes: This figure presents average treatment effects of political ad removal on all components of the *engagement* outcome estimated using Equation (1). Some outcomes are omitted, either because a feature was not available on the platform, the data was not made available, or the recorded value was zero for the entire sample. These deviations are noted in [11](#). The horizontal lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Our Facebook sample consists of 36,906 participants. Our Instagram sample consists of 25,925 participants.

Supplementary Figure 7: Effect of Political Ad Removal on Content Engagement



Note: The first panel presents the average treatment effect of the three ad removal conditions on the distinct organic content engagement actions (i.e., does not include interactions with ads) that correspond to content labeled civic by the Civic Classifier (see Supplementary Note 2) on the focal platform in the treatment period from September 24th - November 3rd. The second panel presents the average treatment effect of the three ad removal conditions on the total counts of the distinct organic content engagement actions on the focal platform. The last panel presents the difference between the effects on civic content engagement and the effects on total content engagement. By the time of the study, an account on Instagram could not include clickable links on posts outside of ads or react to a post (i.e., choosing one of the emotional-reaction emojis that are an extension of the Like Button on Facebook). The horizontal lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Our Facebook sample consists of 36,906 participants. Our Instagram sample consists of 25,925 participants.

7.4 Electoral Effects

Supplementary Table 16: Electoral Effects by Party (Facebook, Above-Median Predicted Ad Load: Validated Outcomes)

Panel (a): Control Group Ad Impressions			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Democrats	Republicans	Pooled
Share of users over study period	0.62	0.38	1.00
Political ad impressions per user over study period	248	233	242
Using OpenSecrets definition of presidential ads			
Share coded presidential	0.187	0.252	0.212
Share of presidential coded pro-party	0.930	0.836	0.894
Incremental pro-party presidential impressions	40	39	40
Incremental pro-party presidential spending	\$1.002	\$0.990	\$0.997
Using WMP definition of presidential ads			
Share coded presidential	0.642	0.616	0.632
Share of presidential coded pro-party	0.919	0.667	0.822
Incremental pro-party presidential impressions	136	51	103
Incremental pro-party presidential spending	\$3.418	\$1.280	\$2.597
Panel (b): Cost Effectiveness of Ads			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Democrats	Republicans	Pooled
	Point estimate	Point estimate	Point estimate
Net President votes per person seeing all ads vs. no ads	0.016 (0.015)	0.025 (0.018)	0.020 (0.012)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (OpenSecrets)</i>	0.016 (0.015)	0.025 (0.019)	0.021 (0.012)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (WMP)</i>	0.005 (0.004)	0.019 (0.014)	0.008 (0.005)
Turnout (percentage points) per person seeing all ads vs. no ads	0.003 (0.015)	0.032 (0.021)	0.018 (0.012)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (OpenSecrets)</i>	0.003 (0.015)	0.033 (0.021)	0.018 (0.012)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (WMP)</i>	0.001 (0.004)	0.025 (0.016)	0.007 (0.005)
Contributions (\$) per person seeing all ads vs. no ads	-0.916 (2.257)	-2.161 (2.298)	-2.094 (1.615)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (OpenSecrets)</i>	-0.912 (2.248)	-2.207 (2.348)	-2.106 (1.624)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (WMP)</i>	-0.268 (0.660)	-1.688 (1.795)	-0.806 (0.622)

Note: This table computes estimates of returns to political ad spending on Facebook. It parallels Table 1 in the main text, but it uses validated outcomes only for participants with above-median predicted ad load. The left and right sides present separate results for Democratic and Republican users, including independents who “lean” toward the respective party. Panel (a) presents data on Control group political ad impressions. Panel (b) presents point estimates and standard errors of the effects of presidential ad spending on net presidential votes, validated turnout, and validated campaign contributions. “Net President votes” refers to the candidate of the respective party in each column (net Democratic votes in the first column and net Republican votes in the second column.) The treatment effect per dollar of incremental ad spending is $\tau/(\Delta p)$, where τ is the treatment effect of ad removal on an outcome, Δ is the treatment effect on net pro-party presidential ad impressions, and $p = \$25.10$ is the ad cost per impression. The horizontal lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals.

Supplementary Table 17: Electoral Effects by Party (Facebook Full Sample: Self-Reported Survey Outcomes)

Panel (a): Control Group Ad Impressions			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Democrats	Republicans	Pooled
Share of users over study period	0.60	0.40	1.00
Political ad impressions per user over study period	139	133	137
Using OpenSecrets definition of presidential ads			
Share coded presidential	0.182	0.243	0.206
Share of presidential coded pro-party	0.927	0.832	0.889
Incremental pro-party presidential impressions	22	21	22
Incremental pro-party presidential spending	\$0.542	\$0.538	\$0.540
Using WMP definition of presidential ads			
Share coded presidential	0.630	0.602	0.619
Share of presidential coded pro-party	0.917	0.657	0.814
Incremental pro-party presidential impressions	74	27	55
Incremental pro-party presidential spending	\$1.863	\$0.674	\$1.391
Panel (b): Cost Effectiveness of Ads			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Democrats	Republicans	Pooled
	Point estimate	Point estimate	Point estimate
Net President votes per person seeing all ads vs. no ads	0.023 (0.013)	0.013 (0.017)	0.020 (0.011)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (OpenSecrets)</i>	0.041 (0.024)	0.024 (0.033)	0.037 (0.020)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (WMP)</i>	0.012 (0.007)	0.019 (0.025)	0.014 (0.008)
Turnout (percentage points) per person seeing all ads vs. no ads	0.013 (0.010)	0.009 (0.012)	0.012 (0.008)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (OpenSecrets)</i>	0.024 (0.019)	0.018 (0.022)	0.022 (0.014)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (WMP)</i>	0.007 (0.005)	0.014 (0.017)	0.008 (0.006)
Contributions (\$) per person seeing all ads vs. no ads	2.888 (3.815)	0.378 (6.662)	1.260 (3.637)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (OpenSecrets)</i>	5.230 (6.910)	0.716 (12.640)	2.323 (6.708)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (WMP)</i>	1.550 (2.048)	0.560 (9.880)	0.905 (2.614)

Note: This table computes estimates of returns to political ad spending on Facebook. It parallels Table 1 in the main text, but it but it uses data only for participants with above-median predicted ad load, and uses “Turnout” and “Contributions” measures captured from self-reported survey data, rather than validated data. The left and right sides present separate results for Democratic and Republican users, including independents who “lean” toward the respective party. Panel (a) presents data on Control group political ad impressions. Panel (b) presents point estimates and standard errors of the effects of presidential ad spending on net presidential votes, self-reported turnout, and self-reported campaign contributions. “Net President votes” refers to the candidate of the respective party in each column (net Democratic votes in the first column and net Republican votes in the second column.) The treatment effect per dollar of incremental ad spending is $\tau/(\Delta p)$, where τ is the treatment effect of ad removal on an outcome, Δ is the treatment effect on net pro-party presidential ad impressions, and $p = \$25.10$ is the ad cost per impression.

Supplementary Table 18: Electoral Effects by Party (Facebook, Above-Median Predicted Ad Load: Self-Reported Survey Outcomes)

Panel (a): Control Group Ad Impressions			
	(1) Democrats	(2) Republicans	(3) Pooled
Share of users over study period	0.62	0.38	1.00
Political ad impressions per user over study period	248	233	242
Using OpenSecrets definition of presidential ads			
Share coded presidential	0.187	0.252	0.212
Share of presidential coded pro-party	0.930	0.836	0.894
Incremental pro-party presidential impressions	40	39	40
Incremental pro-party presidential spending	\$1.002	\$0.990	\$0.997
Using WMP definition of presidential ads			
Share coded presidential	0.642	0.616	0.632
Share of presidential coded pro-party	0.919	0.667	0.822
Incremental pro-party presidential impressions	136	51	103
Incremental pro-party presidential spending	\$3.418	\$1.280	\$2.597
Panel (b): Cost Effectiveness of Ads			
	(1) Democrats Point estimate	(2) Republicans Point estimate	(3) Pooled Point estimate
Net President votes per person seeing all ads vs. no ads	0.016 (0.015)	0.025 (0.018)	0.020 (0.012)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (OpenSecrets)</i>	0.016 (0.015)	0.025 (0.019)	0.021 (0.012)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (WMP)</i>	0.005 (0.004)	0.019 (0.014)	0.008 (0.005)
Turnout (percentage points) per person seeing all ads vs. no ads	0.013 (0.011)	0.011 (0.013)	0.013 (0.008)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (OpenSecrets)</i>	0.013 (0.011)	0.011 (0.013)	0.013 (0.008)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (WMP)</i>	0.004 (0.003)	0.009 (0.010)	0.005 (0.003)
Contributions (\$) per person seeing all ads vs. no ads	4.805 (4.558)	-6.365 (9.962)	-0.408 (5.088)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (OpenSecrets)</i>	4.786 (4.540)	-6.502 (10.177)	-0.410 (5.117)
<i>per \$ incremental ad spending (WMP)</i>	1.406 (1.333)	-4.972 (7.781)	-0.157 (1.959)

Note: This table computes estimates of returns to political ad spending on Facebook. It parallels Table 1 in the main text, but it uses “Turnout” and “Contributions” measures captured from self-reported survey data, rather than validated data. The left and right sides present separate results for Democratic and Republican users, including independents who “lean” toward the respective party. Panel (a) presents data on Control group political ad impressions. Panel (b) presents point estimates and standard errors of the effects of presidential ad spending on net presidential votes, self-reported turnout, and self-reported campaign contributions. “Net President votes” refers to the candidate of the respective party in each column (net Democratic votes in the first column and net Republican votes in the second column.) The treatment effect per dollar of incremental ad spending is $\tau/(\Delta p)$, where τ is the treatment effect of ad removal on an outcome, Δ is the treatment effect on net pro-party presidential ad impressions, and $p = \$25.10$ is the ad cost per impression.

7.5 Comparison of the Effect on Vote Choice with the Literature

In Table 2 and Supplementary Table 19, we compare the effect of political ads on vote choice to previous results from other online ad experiments (10–14). In this section, we explain the calculations behind these tables.

Votes per 1,000 impressions (Table 2) We compute the effect of a thousand impressions of online political ads on vote choice and its associated standard errors as follows:

$$\text{Votes per 1,000 impressions} = \frac{1,000 \cdot \text{Rescaled ATT}}{\text{Impressions per person treated}}$$

Rescaled ATT corresponds to the effect of the political campaign on vote choice per person treated. For our paper, the *Rescaled ATT*s are the pooled Net President votes estimates presented in Table 1. For the comparison papers, each *Rescaled ATT* is computed as the reported effect of the online political campaign on vote choice per person treated multiplied by two. We multiply by two since in our paper the voting outcome is defined on a scale from -1 to 1, where -1 corresponds to a vote for Biden, 1 to a vote for Trump, and 0 to a vote for a third party or no vote at all, while the comparison papers use a scale from 0 to 1, where 1 corresponds to a vote for the party or candidate promoted by the ads and 0 otherwise. Thus, multiplying the ATTs and standard errors in the comparison papers by two ensures that all cost effectiveness values are on the same scale. This approach assumes that the treatment did not affect turnout or votes for third-party candidates, which we view as a reasonable assumption because third parties are small and these papers mostly find null effects of the treatment on turnout.

Impressions per person treated is defined as the average number of online political ads displayed on the screens of treated voters. This definition also assumes that the treatment did not affect turnout or votes for third-party candidates.

Votes per dollar (Supplementary Table 19) In columns (6) and (7) of Supplementary Table 19, we compute the cost effectiveness and associated standard error of online advertising campaigns in units of votes per dollar as follows:

$$\text{Votes per \$} = \frac{\text{Rescaled ATT}}{\text{Cost per person treated}} = \frac{\text{Rescaled ATT}}{1,000 \cdot \text{impressions per person treated} \cdot \text{CPM}}$$

The *cost per person treated* is defined as the total cost of the experiment divided by the number of treated participants whose outcomes are measured in units of votes per dollar. The *cost per mille (CPM)* is the cost an advertiser paid for one thousand impressions of a political advertisement at the time of the campaign. The CPM for each comparison paper is reported in column (5) in Supplementary Table 19.

In columns (8) and (9) of Supplementary Table 19, we compute the cost effectiveness and associated standard error of online advertising campaigns using the 2020 political advertisement CPM on Facebook ($CPM_{2020\text{ FB}} = \$25.10$):

$$\text{Votes per \$ (2020 CPM)} = \frac{\text{Rescaled ATT}}{1,000 \cdot \text{impressions per person treated} \cdot CPM_{2020\text{ FB}}}$$

Note that these estimates are a scaled version of the votes per 1,000 impressions estimates presented in Table 2:

$$\text{Votes per \$ (2020 CPM)} = \frac{\text{Votes per 1,000 impressions}}{CPM_{2020\text{ FB}}}$$

In the rest of this section, we explain how the values for impressions and cost per person treated are calculated for each comparison study.

Broockman and Green (2014) The ATT, standard error, and sample size are based on the OLS clustered standard errors and block fixed effects specification run on all subjects. The number of voters assigned to the treatment (19,377) and the impressions per person treated (36) are provided in the Treatment Delivery Subsection for Study 1; the total number of impressions is then $19,377 \cdot 36 = 697,572$. The cost per person treated is calculated by dividing an estimated cost of \$160 (the treatment lasted 3-5 days and the reported cost was approximately \$40 per day) by the number of voters assigned to the treatment (19,377). The CPM is the estimated cost of the campaign divided by the total number of impressions, multiplied by a thousand ($1,000 \cdot 160/697,572 \approx 0.23$).

Coppock et al. (2022) The ATT, standard error, and sample size are based on the Model 2 OLS specification in Table 4 of (11). The total number of impressions in the targeted ZIP codes (1.1 million) is referenced in the introduction of the paper (p. 2). The number of voters treated is computed by multiplying the voting population living in targeted ZIP codes reported in the paper by the statewide turnout rate reported by the Florida Department of State⁵ ($822,783 \times 0.626 = 515,062$). The average number of impressions per person treated is then the total number of impressions divided by the total people treated (1.1 million/515,062 ≈ 1.3). The cost per person treated is calculated by dividing the reported budget of \$60,000 by the estimated number of registered voters in targeted zip codes who turned out (515,062). The CPM is computed by dividing the total budget by the number of impressions reported and multiplying by a thousand ($1,000 \cdot 60,000/11,000,000 \approx 5.45$).

⁵The Florida 2018 General Election results can be found at:
<https://results.elections.myflorida.com/TurnoutRpt.asp?ElectionDate=11/6/2018>

Enríquez et al. (2024) The ATT, standard error, and sample size are based on the specification in column 1 of Table 2 in (12). The average number of impressions per person treated (4) is reported in the Introduction (p. 4). The number of treated voters is computed by multiplying the number of treated municipalities, the average population of the studied municipalities, the percentage of precincts within treated municipalities being targeted with ads, and the municipal turnout rate ($84 \times 135,401 \times 0.5 \times 0.64 = 3,639,579$). The cost per person treated is calculated by dividing the total cost of Borde Político's campaign of \$17,423 by the number of treated voters who turned out. The CPM is computed by dividing the total cost of the campaign by the number of total impressions, multiplied by a thousand ($1,000 \cdot 17,423/8,100,000 \approx 2.15$).

Hager (2019) The ATT, standard error, and sample size are based on the OLS specification in the "Second Vote" column of Table 1 in (13). The number of people treated is computed by multiplying the number of eligible voters in Berlin, the percentage of postal districts that were treated, and the turnout rate⁶ ($2,500,000 \cdot \frac{2}{3} \cdot 0.67 \approx 1,115,000$). The number of impressions per person treated is computed as the total number of impressions reported divided by the number of people treated ($17,000,000/1,115,000 \approx 15.25$). The author reports a cost effectiveness of €7.5 implied by the ATT. We multiply the author's reported cost effectiveness by 1.12, the average euro-dollar exchange rate during the experimental period⁷, and by the ATT (0.007) to get the cost in dollars per person treated ($7.5 \cdot 1.12 \cdot 0.007 \approx 0.059$). The cost effectiveness estimate is then the rescaled ATT divided by the cost per person treated ($2 \cdot 0.007/0.059 \approx 0.238$). The CPM is computed by dividing the total cost of the campaign (number of people treated multiplied by cost per person treated) by the number of total impressions, multiplied by a thousand ($1,000 \cdot 1,115,000 \cdot 0.059/17,000,000 \approx 3.86$).

Turitto et al. (2014) The ATT, standard error, and sample size are based on the Model 2 OLS Specification in Table 3 in (14). The number of voters treated is taken as the reported number of households treated, assuming one vote per household as the authors do in the Discussion Section. The number of impressions per person treated is computed as the total number of impressions reported divided by the number of people treated ($3,784,039/113,374 \approx 33.38$). The cost per person treated is calculated by dividing the reported budget of \$25,000 by the number of voters treated ($25,000/113,374 \approx 0.221$). The CPM is computed by dividing the total budget by the number of impressions reported, and multiplying by a thousand ($1,000 \cdot 25,000/3,784,039 \approx 6.61$). The authors report a cost effectiveness of \$19 per vote that is consistent with our adjusted estimate ($2 \cdot 1/0.106 \approx 18.85$).

⁶The results for the House of Representatives Election 2016 in Berlin can be found at: <https://www.wahlrecht.de/news/2016/abgeordnetenhauswahl-berlin-2016.html>

⁷The average euro-dollar exchange rate on September 2016 can be found at: <https://currencies.zone/historic/us-dollar/euro/september-2016>


Supplementary Table 19: Comparison to the Literature, Votes per Dollar

Paper	(1) Setting	(2) Treatment	(3) Measurement level	(4) N	(5) CPM	(6) Votes per \$	(7) Std. error	(8) Votes per \$ (2020 CPM)	(9) Std. error
This paper	2020 U.S. pres. elect., pooled (WMP)	Remove all political ads on FB	Individual	24,546	\$25.10	0.014	0.008	0.014	0.008
This paper	2020 U.S. pres. elect., pooled (OS)	Remove all political ads on FB	Individual	24,546	\$25.10	0.037	0.02	0.037	0.02
Broockman and Green (2014)	2012 non-battleground state leg. elect.	Pro-candidate FB ads	Individual	2,984	\$0.23	3.875	3.391	0.035	0.031
Coppock et al. (2022)	2018 Florida U.S. House elect.	Pro-Democrat ads on FB and IG	Precinct	853	\$5.45	-0.007	0.146	-0.015	0.317
Enrriquez et al. (2024)	2018 Mexican municipal elect.	Incumbent performance FB ads	Precinct	13,254	\$2.15	10.733	6.605	0.920	0.566
Hager (2019)	2016 Berlin state elect.	Pro-CDU FB + Google ads	Postal districts	189	\$3.86	0.238	0.170	0.037	0.026
Turitto et al. (2014)	2014 Texas Lt. Gov. Rep primary	Pro-candidate digital ad campaign	Individual	5,842	\$6.61	0.106	0.194	0.028	0.051

Notes: This table compares point estimates and standard errors of digital ad campaign cost-effectiveness from the literature. All results are in units of votes per dollar at the time of the experiment. Cost-effectiveness is calculated by dividing the ATT (effect of treatment assignment on votes) by the cost per person treated. We calculate cost-effectiveness both using the ad prices at the time of the experiment (columns 6 and 7) and using 2020 ad prices (columns 8 and 9). The first two rows are based on this paper. They show estimates for pooled Democrats and Republicans incremental pro-party impressions, where the party leaning is coded using either WMP or OS. The rest of the rows in the table provide benchmarks from other studies. Supplementary Note 7.5 details how these estimates were computed. Measurement level is the level at which the study observes outcomes. N is the number of units for which the outcome is observed. CPM is the cost per thousand impressions implied by the total cost and total impressions reported in each paper.


8 Subgroup Analysis

Supplementary Figure 8: Effects of Political Ad Removal by Predicted Ad Load



Notes: This figure presents average treatment effects of political ad removal estimated using equation (1), for three groups: participants with a predicted ad load above the 75th percentile, above the median, and below the median. Ad load predictions are from a lasso regression predicting political ad volume in the Control group. The first seven variables are in standard deviation units, *turnout* is binary, and *Trump vote* equals 1 for people who reported voting for Trump, -1 for people who reported voting for Biden, and 0 for those who didn't vote or voted for some other candidate. The horizontal lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Our Facebook sample consists of 36,906 participants, of whom 27,608 completed the endline survey. Our Instagram sample consists of 25,925 participants, of whom 19,483 completed the endline survey.

Supplementary Figure 9: Effects of Political Ad Removal by Predicted Net Democratic Ads



Note: This figure presents average treatment effects of political ad removal estimated using equation (1) in the paper for the three terciles of predicted net Democratic Presidential ad load. The 1st is the least tercile, while the 3rd is the most tercile. The net ad load predictions are from a lasso regression predicting the number of pro-Democratic Presidential ads minus the number of pro-Republican Presidential ads in the Control group, analogous to the model described in Supplementary Note C.4. Trump favorability is reported in standard deviation units, and Trump vote equals 1 for people who reported voting for Trump, -1 for people who reported voting for Biden, and 0 for those who did not vote or voted for some other candidate. The horizontal lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Our Facebook sample consists of 36,906 participants, of whom 27,608 completed the endline survey. Our Instagram sample consists of 25,925 participants, of whom 19,483 completed the endline survey.

Supplementary Table 20: Effects of Political Ad Removal by Predicted Ad Load

Panel A: Facebook (Pooled Ad Removal)


	(1) Treatment effect	(2) SE	(3) <i>p</i>	(4) <i>q</i>
Below-median predicted ad load				
Knowledge	0.0210	0.0282	0.4556	0.9810
Affective polarization	-0.0032	0.0239	0.8951	1.0000
Issue polarization	0.0454	0.0165	0.0060	0.1930
Perceived legitimacy	-0.0278	0.0264	0.2917	0.8680
Participation	-0.0214	0.0222	0.3351	0.9390
Engagement	0.0105	0.0090	0.2426	0.8440
Trump favorability	0.0163	0.0112	0.1457	0.8090
Turnout	-0.0089	0.0096	0.3541	0.9680
Trump vote	0.0354	0.0141	0.0118	0.3270
Above-median predicted ad load				
Knowledge	-0.0285	0.0172	0.0986	0.7070
Affective polarization	-0.0025	0.0147	0.8633	1.0000
Issue polarization	-0.0154	0.0108	0.1509	0.8090
Perceived legitimacy	0.0051	0.0178	0.7753	1.0000
Participation	-0.0054	0.0147	0.7134	1.0000
Engagement	0.0201	0.0088	0.0219	0.4540
Trump favorability	-0.0054	0.0064	0.3984	0.9810
Turnout	-0.0102	0.0061	0.0935	0.7070
Trump vote	-0.0033	0.0090	0.7153	1.0000
Above 75% predicted ad load				
Knowledge	-0.0416	0.0208	0.0460	0.7070
Affective polarization	-0.0127	0.0183	0.4894	0.9810
Issue polarization	0.0164	0.0134	0.2206	0.8280
Perceived legitimacy	0.0195	0.0219	0.3717	0.9810
Participation	-0.0005	0.0195	0.9778	1.0000
Engagement	0.0375	0.0129	0.0037	0.1930
Trump favorability	-0.0050	0.0084	0.5472	1.0000
Turnout	-0.0127	0.0074	0.0880	0.7070
Trump vote	-0.0175	0.0111	0.1151	0.7070

Panel B: Instagram (All Ad Removal)

	(1) Treatment effect	(2) SE	(3) <i>p</i>	(4) <i>q</i>
Below-median predicted ad load				
Knowledge	-0.0375	0.0267	0.1604	0.8090
Affective polarization	0.0063	0.0243	0.7949	1.0000
Issue polarization	0.0185	0.0171	0.2793	0.8440
Perceived legitimacy	0.0120	0.0271	0.6587	1.0000
Participation	0.0376	0.0246	0.1257	0.7150
Engagement	0.0101	0.0145	0.4863	0.9810
Trump favorability	-0.0131	0.0114	0.2520	0.8440
Turnout	-0.0174	0.0103	0.0921	0.7070
Trump vote	0.0052	0.0151	0.7285	1.0000
Above-median predicted ad load				
Knowledge	-0.0041	0.0207	0.8425	1.0000
Affective polarization	0.0045	0.0177	0.8003	1.0000
Issue polarization	0.0034	0.0131	0.7980	1.0000
Perceived legitimacy	0.0092	0.0217	0.6725	1.0000
Participation	-0.0329	0.0206	0.1097	0.7070
Engagement	-0.0003	0.0133	0.9803	1.0000
Trump favorability	-0.0065	0.0079	0.4151	0.9810
Turnout	0.0072	0.0070	0.3049	0.8740
Trump vote	0.0124	0.0112	0.2701	0.8440
Above 75% predicted ad load				
Knowledge	-0.0068	0.0253	0.7885	1.0000
Affective polarization	0.0155	0.0211	0.4639	0.9810
Issue polarization	0.0184	0.0159	0.2461	0.8440
Perceived legitimacy	0.0089	0.0264	0.7354	1.0000
Participation	0.0136	0.0259	0.6001	1.0000
Engagement	-0.0285	0.0177	0.1078	0.7070
Trump favorability	-0.0069	0.0095	0.4667	0.9810
Turnout	0.0033	0.0080	0.6831	1.0000
Trump vote	0.0254	0.0133	0.0574	0.7070

Note: This table presents local average treatment effects of political ad removal on primary outcomes estimated using equation (1), for three groups: participants with a predicted ad load above the 75th percentile, above the median, and below the median. Ad load predictions are from a lasso regression predicting political ad volume in the Control group. The first seven variables are in standard deviation units, *turnout* is binary, and *Trump vote* equals 1 for people who reported voting for Trump, -1 for people who reported voting for Biden, and 0 for those who didn't vote or voted for some other candidate. Columns 3 and 4 present the unadjusted p-values and sharpened False Discovery Rate-adjusted two-stage q-values from two-sided tests of whether the treatment effect equals zero.

Supplementary Figure 10: Effects of Political Ads by Party Identification, Among Participants with Above-Median Predicted Ad Load



Notes: This figure presents average treatment effects of political ad removal estimated using equation (1), by political party identification. The first seven variables are in standard deviation units, *turnout* is binary, and *Trump vote* equals 1 for people who reported voting for Trump, -1 for people who reported voting for Biden, and 0 for those who didn't vote or voted for some other candidate. As pre-specified, the sample is limited to users with above-median predicted ad load, using the lasso regression predicting political ad volume. The horizontal lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. The above-median predicted ad load Facebook sample consists of 24,339 participants, of whom 18,014 completed the endline survey. The above-median predicted ad load Instagram sample consists of 17,684 participants, of whom 13,171 completed the endline survey.

Supplementary Table 21: Effects of Political Ads by Party Identification, Among Participants with Above-Median Predicted Ad Load

Panel A: Facebook (Pooled Ad Removal)


	(1) Treatment effect	(2) SE	(3) <i>p</i>	(4) <i>q</i>
All Democrats				
Knowledge	-0.0255	0.0219	0.2445	1.0000
Affective polarization	-0.0002	0.0204	0.9932	1.0000
Issue polarization	-0.0059	0.0121	0.6272	1.0000
Perceived legitimacy	0.0208	0.0230	0.3662	1.0000
Participation	0.0039	0.0203	0.8465	1.0000
Engagement	0.0188	0.0125	0.1313	1.0000
Trump favorability	-0.0007	0.0078	0.9293	1.0000
Turnout	-0.0053	0.0079	0.4997	1.0000
Trump vote	0.0148	0.0112	0.1851	1.0000
Independents				
Knowledge	-0.0138	0.0633	0.8279	1.0000
Perceived legitimacy	0.0222	0.0790	0.7785	1.0000
Participation	-0.0115	0.0474	0.8081	1.0000
Engagement	0.0098	0.0241	0.6842	1.0000
Trump favorability	0.0310	0.0265	0.2421	1.0000
Turnout	-0.0511	0.0251	0.0418	1.0000
Trump vote	-0.0130	0.0367	0.7235	1.0000
All Republicans				
Knowledge	-0.0382	0.0280	0.1717	1.0000
Affective polarization	-0.0033	0.0210	0.8736	1.0000
Issue polarization	-0.0164	0.0159	0.3045	1.0000
Perceived legitimacy	-0.0205	0.0273	0.4535	1.0000
Participation	-0.0090	0.0230	0.6949	1.0000
Engagement	0.0228	0.0137	0.0969	1.0000
Trump favorability	-0.0127	0.0105	0.2294	1.0000
Turnout	-0.0084	0.0097	0.3850	1.0000
Trump vote	-0.0149	0.0149	0.3163	1.0000
Strong Democrats				
Knowledge	-0.0247	0.0316	0.4349	1.0000
Affective polarization	0.0096	0.0314	0.7589	1.0000
Issue polarization	0.0245	0.0171	0.1525	1.0000
Perceived legitimacy	0.0177	0.0355	0.6187	1.0000
Participation	-0.0415	0.0292	0.1557	1.0000
Engagement	0.0349	0.0169	0.0389	1.0000
Trump favorability	-0.0061	0.0090	0.5020	1.0000
Turnout	0.0065	0.0108	0.5475	1.0000
Trump vote	-0.0098	0.0128	0.4448	1.0000
Strong Republicans				
Knowledge	-0.0433	0.0410	0.2913	1.0000
Affective polarization	0.0490	0.0335	0.1432	1.0000
Issue polarization	0.0052	0.0224	0.8171	1.0000
Perceived legitimacy	0.0077	0.0407	0.8508	1.0000
Participation	0.0126	0.0386	0.7438	1.0000
Engagement	0.0702	0.0232	0.0026	0.3740
Trump favorability	0.0020	0.0131	0.8783	1.0000
Turnout	-0.0070	0.0122	0.5669	1.0000
Trump vote	-0.0044	0.0168	0.7921	1.0000

Panel B: Instagram (All Ad Removal)

	(1) Treatment effect	(2) SE	(3) <i>p</i>	(4) <i>q</i>
All Democrats				
Knowledge	-0.0097	0.0214	0.6503	1.0000
Affective polarization	0.0029	0.0178	0.8710	1.0000
Issue polarization	-0.0026	0.0126	0.8342	1.0000
Perceived legitimacy	-0.0005	0.0227	0.9835	1.0000
Participation	-0.0260	0.0222	0.2412	1.0000
Engagement	-0.0193	0.0151	0.2016	1.0000
Trump favorability	-0.0027	0.0065	0.6797	1.0000
Turnout	-0.0034	0.0067	0.6113	1.0000
Trump vote	0.0130	0.0100	0.1964	1.0000
Independents				
Knowledge	-0.0153	0.0733	0.8349	1.0000
Perceived legitimacy	0.0011	0.0780	0.9892	1.0000
Participation	-0.1176	0.0759	0.1217	1.0000
Engagement	0.0139	0.0317	0.6607	1.0000
Trump favorability	-0.0818	0.0349	0.0192	1.0000
Turnout	-0.0083	0.0339	0.8072	1.0000
Trump vote	-0.0420	0.0463	0.3647	1.0000
All Republicans				
Knowledge	0.0131	0.0490	0.7884	1.0000
Affective polarization	0.0164	0.0385	0.6705	1.0000
Issue polarization	0.0137	0.0254	0.5894	1.0000
Perceived legitimacy	0.0380	0.0511	0.4563	1.0000
Participation	-0.0132	0.0455	0.7714	1.0000
Engagement	0.0312	0.0291	0.2847	1.0000
Trump favorability	0.0080	0.0198	0.6855	1.0000
Turnout	0.0384	0.0161	0.0172	1.0000
Trump vote	0.0253	0.0267	0.3431	1.0000
Strong Democrats				
Knowledge	-0.0373	0.0280	0.1833	1.0000
Affective polarization	-0.0176	0.0252	0.4863	1.0000
Issue polarization	0.0077	0.0156	0.6195	1.0000
Perceived legitimacy	0.0244	0.0334	0.4653	1.0000
Participation	-0.0202	0.0319	0.5260	1.0000
Engagement	-0.0008	0.0233	0.9729	1.0000
Trump favorability	0.0019	0.0075	0.8011	1.0000
Turnout	0.0020	0.0081	0.8067	1.0000
Trump vote	-0.0005	0.0130	0.9676	1.0000
Strong Republicans				
Knowledge	0.0701	0.0779	0.3683	1.0000
Affective polarization	0.1024	0.0784	0.1918	1.0000
Issue polarization	0.0527	0.0403	0.1916	1.0000
Perceived legitimacy	-0.0082	0.0824	0.9207	1.0000
Participation	0.0420	0.0927	0.6512	1.0000
Engagement	0.0565	0.0526	0.2839	1.0000
Trump favorability	0.0270	0.0267	0.3132	1.0000
Turnout	0.0248	0.0219	0.2596	1.0000
Trump vote	0.0373	0.0282	0.1862	1.0000

Note: This table presents average treatment effects of political ad removal estimated using equation (1), by political party identification. The first seven variables are in standard deviation units, *turnout* is binary, and *Trump vote* equals 1 for people who reported voting for Trump, -1 for people who reported voting for Biden, and 0 for those who didn't vote or voted for some other candidate. As pre-specified, the sample is limited to users with above-median predicted ad load, using the lasso regression predicting political ad volume. Columns 3 and 4 present the unadjusted p-values and sharpened False Discovery Rate-adjusted two-stage q-values from two-sided tests of whether the treatment effect equals zero.

Supplementary Figure 11: Effects of Political Ads on Undecided Voters and Minorities, Among Participants with Above-Median Predicted Ad Load



Notes: This figure presents average treatment effects of political ad removal estimated using equation (1), for three groups: undecided voters, undecided voters with above-median baseline social media use (among participants with above-median predicted ad load), and Black or Hispanic voters. The first seven variables are in standard deviation units, *turnout* is binary, and *Trump vote* equals 1 for people who reported voting for Trump, -1 for people who reported voting for Biden, and 0 for those who didn't vote or voted for some other candidate. As pre-specified, the sample is limited to users with above-median predicted ad load, using the lasso regression predicting political ad volume. The horizontal lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. The Facebook sample of minorities or undecided voters with above-median predicted ad load consists of 9,182 participants, of whom 6,464 completed the endline survey. The Instagram sample of minorities or undecided voters with above-median predicted ad load consists of 7,982 participants, of whom 5,666 completed the endline survey.

Supplementary Table 22: Effects of Political Ads on Undecided Voters and Minorities, Among Participants with Above-Median Predicted Ad Load

Panel A: Facebook (Pooled Ad Removal)


	(1) Treatment effect	(2) SE	(3) <i>p</i>	(4) <i>q</i>
All undecided voters				
Knowledge	-0.0283	0.0425	0.5053	1.0000
Affective polarization	-0.0043	0.0332	0.8974	1.0000
Issue polarization	-0.0339	0.0280	0.2259	1.0000
Perceived legitimacy	0.1007	0.0436	0.0209	0.9620
Participation	0.0260	0.0303	0.3905	1.0000
Engagement	0.0239	0.0181	0.1866	1.0000
Trump favorability	-0.0223	0.0188	0.2366	1.0000
Turnout	-0.0228	0.0169	0.1784	1.0000
Trump vote	-0.0023	0.0272	0.9339	1.0000
Undecided voters with above-median baseline usage				
Knowledge	-0.0552	0.0515	0.2835	1.0000
Affective polarization	-0.0416	0.0452	0.3573	1.0000
Issue polarization	-0.0643	0.0348	0.0652	1.0000
Perceived legitimacy	0.0244	0.0499	0.6249	1.0000
Participation	0.0295	0.0408	0.4704	1.0000
Engagement	-0.0123	0.0198	0.5350	1.0000
Trump favorability	-0.0185	0.0278	0.5076	1.0000
Turnout	-0.0435	0.0216	0.0447	1.0000
Trump vote	0.0103	0.0335	0.7583	1.0000
Black or Hispanic voters				
Knowledge	-0.0214	0.0443	0.6287	1.0000
Affective polarization	-0.0401	0.0409	0.3264	1.0000
Issue polarization	-0.0018	0.0255	0.9426	1.0000
Perceived legitimacy	0.0422	0.0488	0.3870	1.0000
Participation	0.0136	0.0343	0.6908	1.0000
Engagement	0.0245	0.0168	0.1466	1.0000
Trump favorability	-0.0051	0.0163	0.7567	1.0000
Turnout	0.0102	0.0158	0.5179	1.0000
Trump vote	-0.0138	0.0211	0.5140	1.0000

Panel B: Instagram (All Ad Removal)

	(1) Treatment effect	(2) SE	(3) <i>p</i>	(4) <i>q</i>
All undecided voters				
Knowledge	0.0102	0.0499	0.8382	1.0000
Affective polarization	0.0132	0.0450	0.7695	1.0000
Issue polarization	0.0134	0.0368	0.7152	1.0000
Perceived legitimacy	0.0459	0.0543	0.3984	1.0000
Participation	-0.0685	0.0454	0.1318	1.0000
Engagement	-0.0175	0.0248	0.4801	1.0000
Trump favorability	-0.0226	0.0231	0.3284	1.0000
Turnout	0.0011	0.0237	0.9619	1.0000
Trump vote	-0.0038	0.0379	0.9211	1.0000
Undecided voters with above-median baseline usage				
Knowledge	0.0211	0.0610	0.7292	1.0000
Affective polarization	0.0424	0.0558	0.4476	1.0000
Issue polarization	-0.0186	0.0474	0.6949	1.0000
Perceived legitimacy	0.0475	0.0677	0.4833	1.0000
Participation	0.0089	0.0477	0.8526	1.0000
Engagement	0.0015	0.0316	0.9628	1.0000
Trump favorability	-0.0182	0.0274	0.5072	1.0000
Turnout	-0.0201	0.0286	0.4823	1.0000
Trump vote	0.0429	0.0488	0.3792	1.0000
Black or Hispanic voters				
Knowledge	0.0088	0.0390	0.8212	1.0000
Affective polarization	0.0292	0.0349	0.4019	1.0000
Issue polarization	-0.0290	0.0255	0.2543	1.0000
Perceived legitimacy	0.0203	0.0408	0.6197	1.0000
Participation	-0.0154	0.0382	0.6871	1.0000
Engagement	-0.0409	0.0211	0.0528	1.0000
Trump favorability	0.0001	0.0148	0.9948	1.0000
Turnout	-0.0081	0.0143	0.5691	1.0000
Trump vote	0.0108	0.0217	0.6187	1.0000

Note: This table presents average treatment effects of political ad removal estimated using equation (1), for three groups: undecided voters, undecided voters with above-median baseline social media use (among participants with above-median predicted ad load), and Black or Hispanic voters. The first seven variables are in standard deviation units, *turnout* is binary, and *Trump vote* equals 1 for people who reported voting for Trump, -1 for people who reported voting for Biden, and 0 for those who didn't vote or voted for some other candidate. As pre-specified, the sample is limited to users with above-median predicted ad load, using the lasso regression predicting political ad volume. Columns 3 and 4 present the unadjusted p-values and sharpened False Discovery Rate-adjusted two-stage q-values from two-sided tests of whether the treatment effect equals zero.

Supplementary Figure 12: Effect of Ad Removal by Median Age Bin



Notes: This figure presents average treatment effects of political ad removal estimated using equation (1), separately for users with above- and below-median age. As pre-specified, the estimates for Facebook pool the effects of both the intervention removing all political ads and the intervention removing list-targeted political ads as the treatment conditions have similar effects. The first seven variables are in standard deviation units, *turnout* is binary, and *Trump vote* equals 1 for people who reported voting for Trump, -1 for people who reported voting for Biden, and 0 for those who didn't vote or voted for some other candidate. Our Facebook sample consists of 36,906 participants, of whom 27,608 completed the endline survey. Our Instagram sample consists of 25,925 participants, of whom 19,483 completed the endline survey.

Supplementary Table 23: Effect of Ad Removal by Median Age Bin

Panel A: Facebook (Pooled Ad Removal)


	(1) Treatment effect	(2) SE	(3) <i>p</i>	(4) <i>q</i>
Above median age				
Knowledge	-0.009	0.020	0.665	1.000
Affective polarization	-0.014	0.017	0.409	1.000
Issue polarization	-0.005	0.012	0.692	1.000
Perceived legitimacy	-0.022	0.019	0.262	1.000
Participation	-0.008	0.016	0.606	1.000
Trump favorability	0.009	0.007	0.230	1.000
Turnout	-0.012	0.006	0.048	1.000
Trump vote	0.014	0.010	0.157	1.000
Engagement	0.029	0.008	0.001	0.041
Below median age				
Knowledge	0.001	0.029	0.979	1.000
Affective polarization	0.017	0.024	0.486	1.000
Issue polarization	0.043	0.016	0.008	0.432
Perceived legitimacy	-0.001	0.027	0.984	1.000
Participation	-0.022	0.023	0.340	1.000
Trump favorability	-0.002	0.012	0.858	1.000
Turnout	-0.004	0.011	0.744	1.000
Trump vote	0.015	0.015	0.322	1.000
Engagement	-0.006	0.009	0.488	1.000

Panel B: Instagram (All Ad Removal)

	(1) Treatment effect	(2) SE	(3) <i>p</i>	(4) <i>q</i>
Above median age				
Knowledge	-0.033	0.028	0.240	1.000
Affective polarization	-0.053	0.027	0.045	1.000
Issue polarization	-0.000	0.019	0.987	1.000
Perceived legitimacy	0.029	0.030	0.339	1.000
Participation	-0.006	0.028	0.844	1.000
Trump favorability	-0.008	0.012	0.488	1.000
Turnout	-0.011	0.010	0.270	1.000
Trump vote	0.004	0.016	0.779	1.000
Engagement	0.012	0.017	0.496	1.000
Below median age				
Knowledge	-0.020	0.021	0.357	1.000
Affective polarization	0.035	0.018	0.051	1.000
Issue polarization	0.021	0.013	0.106	1.000
Perceived legitimacy	-0.000	0.021	0.987	1.000
Participation	0.008	0.019	0.690	1.000
Trump favorability	-0.013	0.009	0.127	1.000
Turnout	-0.002	0.008	0.835	1.000
Trump vote	0.010	0.012	0.411	1.000
Engagement	-0.002	0.012	0.840	1.000

Note: This table presents average treatment effects of political ad removal estimated using equation (1), separately for users with above- and below-median age. As pre-specified, the estimates for Facebook pool the effects of both the intervention removing all political ads and the intervention removing list-targeted political ads as the treatment conditions have similar effects. The first seven variables are in standard deviation units, *turnout* is binary, and *Trump vote* equals 1 for people who reported voting for Trump, -1 for people who reported voting for Biden, and 0 for those who didn't vote or voted for some other candidate. Columns 3 and 4 present the unadjusted p-values and sharpened False Discovery Rate-adjusted two-stage q-values from two-sided tests of whether the treatment effect equals zero.

Supplementary Figure 13: Effect of Ad Removal by Swing State Status



Notes: This figure presents average treatment effects of political ad removal estimated using equation (1), separately for users who do and do not live in swing states. As pre-specified, the estimates for Facebook pool the effects of both the intervention removing all political ads and the intervention removing list-targeted political ads as the treatment conditions have similar effects. The first seven variables are in standard deviation units, *turnout* is binary, and *Trump vote* equals 1 for people who reported voting for Trump, -1 for people who reported voting for Biden, and 0 for those who didn't vote or voted for some other candidate. The horizontal lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Our Facebook sample consists of 36,906 participants, of whom 27,608 completed the endline survey. Our Instagram sample consists of 25,925 participants, of whom 19,483 completed the endline survey.

Supplementary Table 24: Effect of Ad Removal by Swing State Status

Panel A: Facebook (Pooled Ad Removal)


	(1) Treatment effect	(2) SE	(3) <i>p</i>	(4) <i>q</i>
Swing state				
Knowledge	-0.004	0.029	0.887	1.000
Affective polarization	-0.004	0.025	0.877	1.000
Issue polarization	0.012	0.018	0.509	1.000
Perceived legitimacy	-0.013	0.028	0.648	1.000
Participation	-0.004	0.022	0.849	1.000
Trump favorability	0.000	0.011	0.990	1.000
Turnout	0.003	0.010	0.755	1.000
Trump vote	0.010	0.014	0.459	1.000
Engagement	0.014	0.010	0.167	1.000
Not swing state				
Knowledge	-0.004	0.020	0.844	1.000
Affective polarization	-0.001	0.017	0.953	1.000
Issue polarization	0.016	0.012	0.170	1.000
Perceived legitimacy	-0.014	0.019	0.466	1.000
Participation	-0.018	0.017	0.294	1.000
Trump favorability	0.008	0.008	0.292	1.000
Turnout	-0.016	0.007	0.021	0.695
Trump vote	0.019	0.011	0.065	1.000
Engagement	0.018	0.008	0.022	0.695

Panel B: Instagram (All Ad Removal)

	(1) Treatment effect	(2) SE	(3) <i>p</i>	(4) <i>q</i>
Swing state				
Knowledge	-0.040	0.029	0.171	1.000
Affective polarization	0.026	0.025	0.313	1.000
Issue polarization	0.038	0.019	0.046	1.000
Perceived legitimacy	0.015	0.031	0.631	1.000
Participation	0.051	0.029	0.075	1.000
Trump favorability	-0.015	0.012	0.218	1.000
Turnout	-0.002	0.011	0.839	1.000
Trump vote	0.018	0.017	0.308	1.000
Engagement	-0.001	0.017	0.976	1.000
Not swing state				
Knowledge	-0.016	0.021	0.444	1.000
Affective polarization	-0.007	0.019	0.727	1.000
Issue polarization	-0.000	0.013	0.982	1.000
Perceived legitimacy	0.007	0.021	0.758	1.000
Participation	-0.023	0.019	0.238	1.000
Trump favorability	-0.006	0.008	0.492	1.000
Turnout	-0.007	0.008	0.347	1.000
Trump vote	0.003	0.011	0.807	1.000
Engagement	0.007	0.012	0.582	1.000

Note: This table presents average treatment effects of political ad removal estimated using equation (1), separately for users who do and do not live in swing states. As pre-specified, the estimates for Facebook pool the effects of both the intervention removing all political ads and the intervention removing list-targeted political ads as the treatment conditions have similar effects. The first seven variables are in standard deviation units, *turnout* is binary, and *Trump vote* equals 1 for people who reported voting for Trump, -1 for people who reported voting for Biden, and 0 for those who didn't vote or voted for some other candidate. Columns 3 and 4 present the unadjusted p-values and sharpened False Discovery Rate-adjusted two-stage q-values from two-sided tests of whether the treatment effect equals zero.

Supplementary Figure 14: Effect of Ad Removal by College Degree



Notes: This figure presents average treatment effects of political ad removal estimated using equation (1), separately for users who are and are not college graduates. As pre-specified, the estimates for Facebook pool the effects of both the intervention removing all political ads and the intervention removing list-targeted political ads as the treatment conditions have similar effects. The first seven variables are in standard deviation units, *turnout* is binary, and *Trump vote* equals 1 for people who reported voting for Trump, -1 for people who reported voting for Biden, and 0 for those who didn't vote or voted for some other candidate. The horizontal lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Our Facebook sample consists of 36,906 participants, of whom 27,608 completed the endline survey. Our Instagram sample consists of 25,925 participants, of whom 19,483 completed the endline survey.

Supplementary Table 25: Effect of Ad Removal by College Degree

Panel A: Facebook (Pooled Ad Removal)


	(1) Treatment effect	(2) SE	(3) <i>p</i>	(4) <i>q</i>
College degree				
Knowledge	0.031	0.020	0.119	1.000
Affective polarization	-0.016	0.016	0.309	1.000
Issue polarization	0.017	0.013	0.180	1.000
Perceived legitimacy	0.003	0.019	0.868	1.000
Participation	-0.011	0.017	0.533	1.000
Trump favorability	0.009	0.007	0.239	1.000
Turnout	-0.014	0.005	0.013	0.535
Trump vote	0.023	0.010	0.024	0.695
Engagement	0.020	0.009	0.021	0.695
Less than college degree				
Knowledge	-0.021	0.023	0.348	1.000
Affective polarization	0.008	0.020	0.681	1.000
Issue polarization	0.013	0.014	0.334	1.000
Perceived legitimacy	-0.020	0.022	0.361	1.000
Participation	-0.017	0.019	0.370	1.000
Trump favorability	0.003	0.009	0.777	1.000
Turnout	-0.005	0.008	0.517	1.000
Trump vote	0.012	0.012	0.289	1.000
Engagement	0.014	0.008	0.085	1.000

Panel B: Instagram (All Ad Removal)

	(1) Treatment effect	(2) SE	(3) <i>p</i>	(4) <i>q</i>
College degree				
Knowledge	-0.010	0.019	0.582	1.000
Affective polarization	-0.016	0.015	0.305	1.000
Issue polarization	-0.001	0.012	0.953	1.000
Perceived legitimacy	0.016	0.021	0.440	1.000
Participation	-0.017	0.020	0.404	1.000
Trump favorability	-0.001	0.007	0.889	1.000
Turnout	0.007	0.006	0.213	1.000
Trump vote	0.010	0.011	0.349	1.000
Engagement	0.006	0.013	0.648	1.000
Less than college degree				
Knowledge	-0.033	0.025	0.189	1.000
Affective polarization	0.019	0.023	0.399	1.000
Issue polarization	0.022	0.016	0.176	1.000
Perceived legitimacy	0.001	0.025	0.963	1.000
Participation	0.015	0.023	0.516	1.000
Trump favorability	-0.015	0.011	0.154	1.000
Turnout	-0.013	0.010	0.182	1.000
Trump vote	0.005	0.014	0.717	1.000
Engagement	0.004	0.013	0.765	1.000

Note: This table presents average treatment effects of political ad removal estimated using equation (1), separately for users who are and are not college graduates. As pre-specified, the estimates for Facebook pool the effects of both the intervention removing all political ads and the intervention removing list-targeted political ads as the treatment conditions have similar effects. The first seven variables are in standard deviation units, *turnout* is binary, and *Trump vote* equals 1 for people who reported voting for Trump, -1 for people who reported voting for Biden, and 0 for those who didn't vote or voted for some other candidate. Columns 3 and 4 present the unadjusted p-values and sharpened False Discovery Rate-adjusted two-stage q-values from two-sided tests of whether the treatment effect equals zero.

Supplementary Figure 15: Effect of Ad Removal by Gender



Notes: This figure presents average treatment effects of political ad removal estimated using equation (1), separately for users who identify as male and users who identify as female. As pre-specified, the estimates for Facebook pool the effects of both the intervention removing all political ads and the intervention removing list-targeted political ads as the treatment conditions have similar effects. The first seven variables are in standard deviation units, *turnout* is binary, and *Trump vote* equals 1 for people who reported voting for Trump, -1 for people who reported voting for Biden, and 0 for those who didn't vote or voted for some other candidate. The horizontal lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Our Facebook sample consists of 36,906 participants, of whom 27,608 completed the endline survey. Our Instagram sample consists of 25,925 participants, of whom 19,483 completed the endline survey.

Supplementary Table 26: Effect of Ad Removal by Gender

Panel A: Facebook (Pooled Ad Removal)


	(1) Treatment effect	(2) SE	(3) <i>p</i>	(4) <i>q</i>
Female				
Knowledge	-0.006	0.021	0.794	1.000
Affective polarization	0.003	0.019	0.881	1.000
Issue polarization	-0.000	0.012	0.979	1.000
Perceived legitimacy	-0.009	0.021	0.667	1.000
Participation	-0.013	0.018	0.468	1.000
Trump favorability	-0.001	0.008	0.869	1.000
Turnout	0.004	0.008	0.614	1.000
Trump vote	-0.002	0.011	0.858	1.000
Engagement	0.032	0.009	0.000	0.027
Male				
Knowledge	-0.005	0.025	0.845	1.000
Affective polarization	-0.008	0.020	0.700	1.000
Issue polarization	0.028	0.015	0.071	1.000
Perceived legitimacy	-0.016	0.024	0.516	1.000
Participation	-0.015	0.020	0.455	1.000
Trump favorability	0.011	0.010	0.256	1.000
Turnout	-0.024	0.008	0.005	0.294
Trump vote	0.033	0.013	0.012	0.535
Engagement	-0.001	0.009	0.939	1.000

Panel B: Instagram (All Ad Removal)

	(1) Treatment effect	(2) SE	(3) <i>p</i>	(4) <i>q</i>
Female				
Knowledge	-0.033	0.022	0.127	1.000
Affective polarization	0.013	0.019	0.481	1.000
Issue polarization	0.017	0.014	0.214	1.000
Perceived legitimacy	0.008	0.022	0.717	1.000
Participation	-0.026	0.020	0.202	1.000
Trump favorability	-0.017	0.009	0.047	1.000
Turnout	-0.018	0.008	0.026	0.695
Trump vote	0.009	0.012	0.473	1.000
Engagement	-0.008	0.014	0.562	1.000
Male				
Knowledge	-0.014	0.027	0.604	1.000
Affective polarization	-0.012	0.024	0.610	1.000
Issue polarization	0.008	0.018	0.672	1.000
Perceived legitimacy	0.011	0.028	0.705	1.000
Participation	0.042	0.026	0.104	1.000
Trump favorability	0.003	0.011	0.764	1.000
Turnout	0.012	0.010	0.210	1.000
Trump vote	0.011	0.015	0.450	1.000
Engagement	0.022	0.014	0.101	1.000

Note: This table presents average treatment effects of political ad removal estimated using equation (1), separately for users who identify as male and users who identify as female. As pre-specified, the estimates for Facebook pool the effects of both the intervention removing all political ads and the intervention removing list-targeted political ads as the treatment conditions have similar effects. The first seven variables are in standard deviation units, *turnout* is binary, and *Trump vote* equals 1 for people who reported voting for Trump, -1 for people who reported voting for Biden, and 0 for those who didn't vote or voted for some other candidate. Columns 3 and 4 present the unadjusted p-values and sharpened False Discovery Rate-adjusted two-stage q-values from two-sided tests of whether the treatment effect equals zero.

Supplementary Figure 16: Effect of Ad Removal by Urban/Rural Status



Notes: This figure presents average treatment effects of political ad removal estimated using equation (1), separately for users who live in urban, suburban, and rural areas. As pre-specified, the estimates for Facebook pool the effects of both the intervention removing all political ads and the intervention removing list-targeted political ads as the treatment conditions have similar effects. The first seven variables are in standard deviation units, *turnout* is binary, and *Trump vote* equals 1 for people who reported voting for Trump, -1 for people who reported voting for Biden, and 0 for those who didn't vote or voted for some other candidate. The horizontal lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. Our Facebook sample consists of 36,906 participants, of whom 27,608 completed the endline survey. Our Instagram sample consists of 25,925 participants, of whom 19,483 completed the endline survey.

Supplementary Table 27: Effect of Ad Removal by Urban/Rural Status

Panel A: Facebook (Pooled Ad Removal)

	(1) Treatment effect	(2) SE	(3) <i>p</i>	(4) <i>q</i>
Urban				
Knowledge	0.033	0.032	0.295	1.000
Affective polarization	-0.025	0.027	0.362	1.000
Issue polarization	0.012	0.018	0.510	1.000
Perceived legitimacy	-0.017	0.030	0.575	1.000
Participation	-0.012	0.026	0.639	1.000
Trump favorability	0.021	0.013	0.100	1.000
Turnout	-0.020	0.011	0.073	1.000
Trump vote	0.033	0.016	0.040	1.000
Engagement	-0.010	0.011	0.364	1.000
Suburban				
Knowledge	-0.014	0.021	0.524	1.000
Affective polarization	0.017	0.019	0.355	1.000
Issue polarization	0.019	0.013	0.136	1.000
Perceived legitimacy	-0.013	0.021	0.547	1.000
Participation	-0.005	0.018	0.774	1.000
Trump favorability	-0.002	0.008	0.829	1.000
Turnout	-0.002	0.007	0.836	1.000
Trump vote	0.017	0.011	0.130	1.000
Engagement	0.040	0.009	0.000	0.001
Rural				
Knowledge	-0.039	0.044	0.376	1.000
Affective polarization	-0.023	0.032	0.485	1.000
Issue polarization	0.004	0.027	0.879	1.000
Perceived legitimacy	-0.017	0.042	0.675	1.000
Participation	-0.030	0.033	0.354	1.000
Trump favorability	0.004	0.015	0.771	1.000
Turnout	-0.017	0.015	0.251	1.000
Trump vote	-0.018	0.021	0.379	1.000
Engagement	-0.012	0.016	0.438	1.000

Panel B: Instagram (All Ad Removal)

	(1) Treatment effect	(2) SE	(3) <i>p</i>	(4) <i>q</i>
Urban				
Knowledge	0.005	0.027	0.848	1.000
Affective polarization	0.010	0.024	0.679	1.000
Issue polarization	0.011	0.017	0.508	1.000
Perceived legitimacy	0.031	0.029	0.284	1.000
Participation	-0.011	0.027	0.680	1.000
Trump favorability	-0.006	0.011	0.583	1.000
Turnout	-0.002	0.011	0.885	1.000
Trump vote	0.017	0.015	0.248	1.000
Engagement	0.001	0.016	0.944	1.000
Suburban				
Knowledge	-0.045	0.023	0.050	1.000
Affective polarization	-0.008	0.021	0.684	1.000
Issue polarization	0.004	0.015	0.810	1.000
Perceived legitimacy	-0.005	0.024	0.825	1.000
Participation	0.006	0.021	0.788	1.000
Trump favorability	-0.010	0.010	0.278	1.000
Turnout	-0.007	0.008	0.375	1.000
Trump vote	0.002	0.013	0.868	1.000
Engagement	-0.002	0.013	0.882	1.000
Rural				
Knowledge	0.023	0.056	0.676	1.000
Affective polarization	0.058	0.054	0.280	1.000
Issue polarization	0.062	0.038	0.106	1.000
Perceived legitimacy	0.001	0.063	0.982	1.000
Participation	0.029	0.053	0.579	1.000
Trump favorability	-0.027	0.021	0.201	1.000
Turnout	0.009	0.022	0.698	1.000
Trump vote	0.003	0.030	0.914	1.000
Engagement	0.049	0.038	0.194	1.000

Note: This table presents average treatment effects of political ad removal estimated using equation (1), separately for users who live in urban, suburban, and rural areas. As pre-specified, the estimates for Facebook pool the effects of both the intervention removing all political ads and the intervention removing list-targeted political ads as the treatment conditions have similar effects. The first seven variables are in standard deviation units, *turnout* is binary, and *Trump vote* equals 1 for people who reported voting for Trump, -1 for people who reported voting for Biden, and 0 for those who didn't vote or voted for some other candidate. Columns 3 and 4 present the unadjusted p-values and sharpened False Discovery Rate-adjusted two-stage q-values from two-sided tests of whether the treatment effect equals zero.

9 U.S. 2020 Facebook and Instagram Election Study

9.1 Research Process

The *U.S. 2020 Facebook and Instagram Election Study* was designed to address three intertwined concerns related to scientific understanding of the impact of social media on democratic processes. First, in the aftermath of the 2016 U.S. elections, there was a widely recognized need to understand the impact of social media platforms on U.S. elections. Second, research conducted solely by employees of these same platforms could encounter skepticism from the mass public and policy community. At the same time, outside independent researchers not employed by the platforms faced legal and fiduciary challenges in securing access to the data and research pipelines to conduct the types of necessary rigorous scientific analyses to answer questions about the impact of social media platforms on elections.

The *U.S. 2020 Facebook and Instagram Election Study* is an attempted solution to this bundle of challenges. The project represents a novel form of collaboration between a team of researchers at Meta and an independent set of external researchers.⁸ The costs associated with the research (e.g., participant fees, recruitment, data collection, etc.) were paid by Meta. The independent academic team members received no form of financial or any other compensation (e.g., support for student assistants, course buyouts, research funds) from Meta for their participation in the project.

Professors Natalie Jomini Stroud of the University of Texas at Austin and Joshua A. Tucker of New York University, at the time Chairs of the North American Regional (Stroud) and Electoral Integrity (Tucker) Social Science One Advisory Committees, selected and co-chaired a team of 15 additional external academic researchers (that is, researchers not employed by Meta). As part of the agreement, Meta did not have veto power over the academics selected for the team. The original members of the academic team were selected based on their prior involvement with Social Science One and their expertise in social media and politics. Additional researchers were brought on as needed based on their substantive and methodological expertise.

Chad Kiewiet de Jonge was the Meta research manager who oversaw day-to-day management of the research project at Meta. Annie Franco and Winter Mason co-led the Meta research team.

Once assembled, the team of academics met beginning in March of 2020 to first brainstorm research ideas within the project's mandate of studying Facebook and Instagram's impact in the context of the 2020 elections and then to develop ideas for specific paper proposals. Concurrently, the team of Meta researchers began working with the independent academic team to provide feedback on research proposals, including the feasibility of possible designs and procedures for collecting the necessary data. As a result of this process, four general areas of inquiry were selected to form the scope of project: (1) dis/mis/information, knowledge, and (mis)perception; (2) political polarization; (3) political participation, both online and offline,

⁸At the time the project began in the spring of 2020, the company involved was called Facebook. For the sake of simplicity, we refer to the company by its current name, Meta, in the rest of the supplementary information.

and including vote choice and turnout; and (4) attitudes and beliefs about democratic norms and the legitimacy of democratic institutions.

The next step in the project involved identifying specific paper topics within these general scope conditions. Based on their research interests, a subset of independent academic researchers served as “core authors” of each paper and were given control rights over final versions of the pre-analysis plans and papers.⁹ Both the independent academic researchers and the Meta researchers worked together to design the pre-analysis plans.¹⁰ The core authors for this paper are Matthew Gentzkow and Hunt Allcott.

Data collection was carried out by Meta and NORC, an independent survey research organization at the University of Chicago.¹¹ Meta recruited most participants (see Supplementary Note 12 for details) and collected on-platform data, while NORC carried out all surveys associated with the project, collected and appended all supplemental data outside of the Facebook/Instagram on-platform data, and recruited additional survey panelists. The independent academic research team did not contact any human subjects as part of the research efforts. In the rare cases where members of the academic team – who had been publicly announced – were messaged by study participants, the messages were passed to NORC to respond.

At the data analysis stage, the Meta team produced, and the independent academics reviewed and approved, pipeline code used to produce the data tables needed for this project from raw platform data (e.g., number of followers) and data created for other internal Meta purposes (e.g., predictions of ideology of U.S. Facebook users) that were employed in the analysis. The Meta researchers and, in some instances, the independent academics, carried out the initial analyses as detailed in the pre-analysis plan and as deemed necessary by the full research team for mutually agreed upon research-relevant analyses. The independent academics’ role in the analysis was to contribute to and monitor the results of data analyses conducted by the Meta research team, including: reviewing and, in some cases, writing code; inspecting de-identified samples or aggregated outputs through screen sharing; and, when possible, replicating the analyses within Meta’s secure data-sharing Researcher Platform using data that had been stripped of any individually-identifying information. Cases where the data required for an analysis could not be shared with the academic team in a de-identified manner are disclosed and explained in the relevant papers or supplementary information.

Drafts of papers were written by the independent academic research team members, with feedback from the Meta academic researchers but with final control rights resting with the specified core academic authors.

A full description of the roles and responsibilities of the independent academic research

⁹By *control rights*, we mean that in the event of disagreements between members of the research team, the core authors would have the final say in resolving these disagreements.

¹⁰Pre-analysis plans were registered at the Open Science Foundation on September 23, 2020 and updated on May 8, 2023, at: <https://osf.io/nq7x8>.

¹¹NORC was selected following a competitive bidding process involving other online survey research firms. To be clear, employees of NORC who implemented the data collection process were not members of the independent academic research team. More details about NORC can be found at: <https://www.norc.org/Pages/default.aspx>.

team, the Meta researchers, and NORC can be found at the Open Science Foundation.¹²

9.2 Research Transparency and Integrity

One of our primary goals in designing the project was to build in transparency concerning the research process given the constraints under which we were operating. With this in mind, we adopted the following five conventions to guide the research process.

First, none of the independent academic researchers nor their institutions received financial compensation (e.g., support for student assistants, course buyouts, research funds) from Meta for their participation in the project.

Second, all of the papers resulting from the project, including this one, were preregistered at the Open Science Foundation. The pre-registrations were embargoed during the time of the study, but are now public.¹³ A list of deviations from and clarifications of the pre-analysis plan can be found in Supplementary Note 11.

Third, for every paper, a set of core authors with control rights over the final content of the paper were specified in the pre-analysis plan. These core authors consist only of independent academic researchers (i.e., not employees of Meta). The core authors with control rights for this paper are Hunt Allcott, Matthew Gentzkow, and Ro’ee Levy.

Fourth, Meta publicly agreed that there would be no pre-publication approval of papers for publication on the basis of their findings. At the time the PAPs were proposed – but before any data analysis was conducted – Meta conducted legal, privacy, and feasibility reviews of the studies. Meta was entitled to review papers prior to publication, but could only request changes to protect confidential or personally identifiable information.¹⁴ For this article, Meta did not request any changes following the pre-publication review.

Finally, we appointed a rapporteur for the project – Professor Michael Wagner of the University of Wisconsin, Madison – who was neither a paid employee of Meta nor a member of the independent academic research team. The rapporteur was given access to all participants, allowed to join project-related meetings, and had access to project documents. The rapporteur will not be a co-author on any of the papers resulting from the study, but the expectation is that the rapporteur will publish both academic and popular press articles assessing the research process itself.

10 Ethical Considerations

Researchers involved in the project considered a number of ethical concerns related to the research and designed the studies to minimize potential harms to the respondents involved in

¹²<https://osf.io/7wpgd>.

¹³Pre-registrations for the entire project, including supplementary materials to the individual analysis plans, can be found at <https://osf.io/nq7x8>.

¹⁴For more information, visit: <https://about.fb.com/news/2020/08/research-impact-of-facebook-and-instagram-on-us-election/>.

them, as well as mitigate any broader social harms.

10.1 Impact on Individual Participants

All experimental treatments involve withholding components of Facebook or Instagram that have been identified in the academic literature as having potentially negative effects (e.g., ranking algorithms, content from untrustworthy sources, targeted ads, or even Facebook or Instagram use itself). Individual-level participation in the experimental analyses and surveys was compensated and required informed consent. We believe that the societal benefits of the study (i.e., the knowledge about Facebook’s and Instagram’s impact in the election that will be generated) outweigh its potential harms to respondents, which will not be larger than what individuals experience in their ordinary life. Accordingly, Meta sought review from and was granted approval to conduct the experimental studies by the NORC Institutional Review Board (Protocol number 20.08.10, Project number 8870). Academic collaborators worked with their respective university IRBs to ensure compliance with Human Subjects Research regulations in their authorship of papers, including analysis of aggregated, de-identified data collected by Meta and NORC.

10.2 Impact on Election

As a mitigation strategy to minimize unanticipated negative effects, we implemented a stopping rule, inspired by clinical trials, which would have ended a treatment if we detected that it was generating changes in specific variables relevant to individual welfare that were much larger than expected. This stopping rule was applied to all experimental conditions of the study (which included people who were asked to stop using the platform entirely, as well as people who experienced different versions of the presentation of posts in their feeds). The stopping rule was pre-registered at the Open Science Foundation; here we provide a brief summary of the stopping rule document.¹⁵

For any given treatment, we would have stopped the treatment and re-assigned users to the same feed experience as the control (or asked to reactivate their Facebook or Instagram account for those who had been encouraged to deactivate their accounts) if any of the following conditions had been met:

- Treatment reduced turnout intention by significantly more than five percentage points (relative to control).
- Treatment reduced registration rates by significantly more than five percentage points (relative to control).
- (For non-ads-related experiments that changed the content of what users saw on their feeds) Treatment increased exposure to untrustworthy content (as a proportion of News

¹⁵The full document can be found at: <https://osf.io/4gyfa/>.

Feed content), defined as content by Pages and Groups (or including a link to a Domain) on Facebook or Users on Instagram with two or more lifetime misinformation strikes, by significantly more than ten percentage points (relative to control).

- (For non-ads-related experiments that changed the content of what users saw on their feeds) Treatment increased exposure to content rated “False” by one of Meta’s independent fact-checking partners, or copies of such content as determined by text, image, and video matching algorithms, by significantly more than ten percentage points (relative to control).

Checks for these stopping rules were carried out on October 26, 2020. The estimated effects for all of these outcome variables were well below the thresholds that would trigger the stopping rule. Based on that evidence, all of the experimental treatments ran until the original pre-registered dates.

An additional concern related to running experimental studies during an election period is the downstream risk of inadvertently impacting the outcome of an election. In order to mitigate against this possibility, we calculated the largest possible impact on an election outcome we could expect from our study as part of the process of designing the size of our treatments. As the study was designed, the number of people recruited into any of the treatment groups would have been at most 0.044% of the citizen voting-age population in the U.S. (i.e., citizens who are eligible to vote). Participants were distributed randomly across the U.S., with some oversampling of people in swing states. As shown in Table 1, under the largest effect scenario (i.e., that in which our interventions have the same effect as mobilization or persuasion campaigns), we would expect at most a change of 49 votes (in either direction) in the largest state or 1 vote (in either direction) in the largest congressional district;¹⁶ and an increase in turnout of at most 1,175 votes in the largest state and 35 votes in the largest congressional district.

10.3 Professional Ethics Advice

Meta retained the services of *Ethical Resolve*, a data ethics firm that was consulted by both Meta and academic researchers at various stages of the project prior to implementation of the research to evaluate whether it met long-running traditions of research ethics as well as emerging norms and best practices for conducting digital research.¹⁷

10.4 Re-identification Risk

As an extra precaution against the possibility of participants being identifiable from their data, the following variables were coarsened in the survey data.

¹⁶To be clear, there were no experiments included in the study that we expected to benefit any particular candidate; these are simply the largest effects we could expect to occur *in either direction* based on prior research.

¹⁷<https://ethicalresolve.com/>.

- INCOME (18 categories) → INCOME (3 categories: less than \$49,999, \$50,000 to \$99,999, \$100,000 or more); see Wave 1.
- EDUCAT (14 categories) → EDUC5 (5 categories: less than high school, high school diploma, vocational degree / some college, college degree, graduate degree); see Wave 1.
- HISPAN (8 categories), RACE_1 (15 categories) → RACETHNICITY (6 categories: White, non-Hispanic; Black, non-Hispanic; Other, non-Hispanic; Hispanic; 2+ non-Hispanic; Asian, non-Hispanic); see Wave 1.
- ZIP (41,692 categories) → IS_SWING_STATE (2 categories based on Cook Political Report); see Wave 1.
- ZIP (41,692 categories) → IS_SWING_CD (2 categories based on Cook Political Report); see Wave 1.
- RELIGION (12 categories) → RELIGION (4 categories: Protestant, Roman Catholic, Mormon, Eastern or Greek Orthodox & not born-again; Protestant, Roman Catholic, Mormon, Eastern or Greek Orthodox & born-again; Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, Something else; Atheist, Agnostic, Nothing in particular); see Wave 5.

11 Pre-Analysis Plan Deviations and Clarifications

The pre-analysis plan (PAP) is available from <https://osf.io/8m36y>.

This section reports deviations and clarifications related to the data and analysis. There were also some small changes to the experimental design as carried out relative to what was expected in the PAP, including the exact amount of subject payments and the precise timing of surveys.

Deviations Our analysis deviates from what was pre-registered in the following ways.

- The PAP suggested that we would present descriptive evidence on ad exposures for both the Facebook and Instagram samples. Due to a data processing error, the ad metadata we originally joined to the Instagram sample was incorrect. By the time this error was discovered, it was no longer possible to join corrected metadata for the full Instagram sample because links to de-identified platform identifiers had been severed to preserve privacy. We were also able to recover corrected metadata for the 13 percent of Instagram participants who did not have linked Facebook accounts, as data for these users had been stored separately for another project in the 2020 Election Study. We used this dataset to create Tables 3b, 4b, and 5b. This issue does not affect any other figure or table. Our experimental estimates are not affected as these do not use ad exposure data. Figure 1 is not affected as this figure does not rely on joining external ad data.
- The PAP incorrectly indicated that we would report the distribution of baseline Facebook and Instagram use in minutes per day. However, Meta views time-on-platform (in units of minutes) as sensitive business information, and they are not making available Facebook and Instagram use in units of minutes. Meta has made available user-level Facebook and Instagram use after normalizing by the baseline sample average. Thus, Figure 1 instead reports the distribution in normalized units, as described in the figure’s footnote.
- For the balance check tables, the PAP indicated that we would report a continuous income variable. However, for confidentiality reasons, we only have three income bins. Thus, we report tests of equality of shares of participants in each bin. Furthermore, the balance check table shell in the PAP failed to include indicators for voting in 2016 and residence in a swing state, which we had promised to include on page 11 of the PAP. Supplementary Tables 4 and 5 thus include those two variables.
- The PAP indicated that we would look at (i) polarization of attitudes toward protest and (ii) polarization of attitudes toward partisan violence. We omit these because the questions needed to construct these variables were not included in the endline survey due to space constraints.
- The PAP indicated that we would do a secondary analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects in which we “estimate flexible heterogeneous treatment effects as a function of the full set of primary and secondary moderator variables using a more flexible approach

that selects moderators based on the data.” This analysis was not implemented due to time constraints.

- The PAP indicated that the *news knowledge* variable would be the “share correct” on questions about news events, as if the response options were only that the event did or did not happen. However, the response options also included “probably did happen” and “probably did not happen.” Similarly, the PAP indicated that the *fact knowledge* variable would be based on the “share of claims the subject believes to be true,” as if the response options were only that the claims were true or untrue. However, the response options included “not very accurate,” “somewhat accurate,” and “very accurate.” For both variables, we thus code responses on a 1-4 scale, as described in subsection 3.1.
- The PAP indicated that “urban vs. rural” would be a secondary moderator. However, the relevant variable also included a “suburban” category. We thus report effects for three categories: urban, suburban, and rural.
- Relative to the PAP, we had to modify the construction of the *engagement* variable in the following ways. First, engagement with Voter Hub includes only clicks and views because likes, reactions, comments, and shares were not recorded. Second, use of “Share You Voted” feature is not included because the product was not available in 2020. Third, creation of and going to civic events, contacting politicians using Facebook Messenger, engagement with Town Hall, and sharing petitions are always zero in our sample, so we do not estimate treatment effects. These variables are also excluded from the auxiliary outcomes reported in Section 7.3.
- The PAP stated that the “local candidate preference” outcomes would be the sum across races. We instead use the average across races to properly account for the fact that the number of races varies across respondents.
- The PAP stated that we would report the share of the feed that is civic events as an auxiliary outcome variable. We omit this because this variable was not recorded.
- There were two mistakes in PAP figure shells. The figure “Distribution of Political Ad Volume” in the PAP mistakenly included legends for the treatment groups, even though this figure should display the political ad volume for the control groups as the figure notes state. The figure “Political Ad Volume by User Ideology” in the PAP mistakenly mentions that the figure refers to the baseline period, but the figure should present the political ad volume for the Control group in the treatment period when ads were removed. These mistakes were addressed in the figures presented in Section 6.
- Figure 4 in the PAP shows the distribution of ads according to the share of males, average age, party alignment, and share of Blacks or Hispanics. In Figure 2 we do not show the subfigure focusing on Blacks or Hispanics because Meta does not collect data on the race/ethnicity of ad viewers.

Supplementary Figure 17: Image Shown to Recruit Participants on FB or IG



Clarifications

- The PAP specified that “If treatment conditions have similar effects, we will combine treatment groups for the heterogeneous effects and secondary outcomes tests.” Since the Facebook All Ad Removal and List-Targeted Ad Removal conditions were substantively and statistically similar, we do combine those two groups.
- The PAP stated, “We will use two-sided tests with $p < 0.05$ as our measure of statistical significance for all tests ... To control for multiple hypothesis testing, we compute primary p -values using a Benjamini-Hochberg sharpened False Discovery Rate (FDR) adjustment.” Benjamini-Hochberg (*I*) refer to the FDR-adjusted statistics they compute as q -values rather than p -values, so we adopt this language in the paper. We clarify that the statistical significance threshold we adopt is based on the FDR-adjusted values (i.e., $q < 0.05$). We describe results as “marginally significant” if they have q -values between about 0.05 and 0.15. We also present confidence intervals, with the caveat that these are not FDR-adjusted.

12 Consent

At the top of their Facebook feed, randomly selected participants saw a recruitment message asking them if they would like to share their opinion as shown in Figure 17. Those clicking “Start Survey” were directed to a consent form.

Participants gave their consent to participate in the on-platform experiments using an IRB-approved consent form, as follows:

Do You Want to Participate in a Research Study About the US Election in November?

Your participation in this research will help researchers at New York University, The University of Texas at Austin, and other academic institutions, as well as Facebook, understand more about

how people's experience with Facebook and Instagram affects their opinions and behaviors on elections.

How it Works

Over the next four months, you'll be asked to fill out a short survey each month. This monthly survey will take about 15 minutes, for a total of 60 minutes over four months. Our partner, NORC at the University of Chicago, will administer this research.

During this time, your [Facebook/Instagram] experience may be different than what you're used to. For example, you might:

- See more or fewer ads in specific categories such as retail, entertainment, or politics
- See more or fewer posts in [News Feed / your feed] related to specific topics
- See more content from some [friends/connections] and less content from other [friends/connections]
- See more or less content about voting and elections

You'll be paid at least \$30 for participating in this study and completing all four surveys, including \$5 for each of the first two surveys and \$10 for each of the final two surveys.

- You will receive your reward as an electronic gift card, delivered within 1 day of completing each survey
- You can only take each survey once
- If you do not complete the first survey, you will be removed from this study

If you choose to participate in this study, your survey responses will be linked with your Facebook and Instagram activity data from the 2020 calendar year.

Benefits, Alternatives, and Risks

There are no benefits to participating in this research, nor are there risks greater than those encountered in everyday life, including risks related to the loss of confidentiality. You can learn more about how we're keeping your information safe in the Data Collection and Your Privacy section below. You can choose not to participate in this study.

Data Collection and Your Privacy If You Choose to Participate in the Study

- NORC will join your survey responses to publicly available third-party data like if you've voted or made a political contribution, if this data is available

- Facebook will combine this data with your activity on Facebook and Instagram from the 2020 calendar year, collectively called Combined Data
- This Combined Data will only be used for research purposes and will not be used to show you ads
- This Combined Data will be shared with our academic partners and, if legally required, with the Institutional Review Board (IRB) that reviewed this study
- All access to this Combined Data will be monitored and logged
- Once this study is over, de-identified data (i.e. data where identifiers such as your name and other information that could reasonably be linked to you are removed) will be stored and shared for future research on elections, to validate the findings of this study, or if required by law for an IRB inquiry

You can decide to stop participating in this study at any time, for any reason, and without consequences. You may withdraw by visiting the study website hosted by our survey administrator, NORC at the University of Chicago, at 2020erp.norc.org

If you have any questions related to this research, you can email NORC at erpStudy@norc.org, or call toll-free at (866) 270-2602 between 9:00 AM - 10:00 PM ET.

If you are a research participant and have questions about your rights, or have concerns or complaints about this research, you can email the NORC Institutional Review Board (IRB) at surveyhelp@norc.org or call (866) 856 - 6672 between 9:00 AM and 10:00 PM ET. Please note that by contacting or providing information to NORC IRB, NORC IRB may obtain information about you, including any personal information that you share. Even though NORC IRB is affiliated with Facebook as this research study's IRB, Facebook's Data Policy does not apply to any information about you shared with NORC IRB when you initiate contact.

If you join this study, you affirm that you are at least 18 years of age and live in the United States. Once you join this study, you'll be sent off [Facebook/Instagram] to a site hosted by our study administrator, NORC, to complete a 5-minute enrollment form.

13 Questionnaires

13.1 Wave 1 Survey



Client	Facebook
Project Name	ERP 2020
Project Number	8870
Survey length (median)	10 minute survey
Population	CONSENTED FB/IG USERS
Main	N=309,243
MODE	CAWI WEB ONLY
Language	English/Spanish
Sample Source	Facebook Instagram recruited sample
Incentive	\$0
Survey description	WAVE 1 ENROLLMENT Election and Politics Study 2020
Eligibility Rate	100%

LANGSWITCH.

Welcome to the 2020 Election Research Project
Bienvenidos al Proyecto de Investigación Electoral 2020

Let's get started with an easy question.
Empecemos con una pregunta fácil.

This survey is currently available in English and Spanish. Which language would you prefer to use to share your opinions?

Esta encuesta está actualmente disponible en inglés y en español. ¿Qué idioma prefiere usar para compartir sus opiniones?

1. English/Inglés
2. Spanish/Español

DISPLAY – OPTINTRO.

Thank you for enrolling in the **2020 Election Research Project!**
¡Gracias por inscribirse en el **Proyecto de Investigación Electoral 2020!**

This study is going to ask about your opinions, and will help researchers at New York University, The University of Texas at Austin, and other academic institutions, as well as Facebook, understand more about how people's experience with Facebook and Instagram affects their attitudes and behaviors concerning elections.

Este estudio va a pedir sus opiniones, y ayudará a los investigadores de la Universidad de Nueva York, la Universidad de Texas en Austin, y otras instituciones académicas, así como Facebook, a entender más acerca de cómo la experiencia de la gente con Facebook e Instagram afecta sus actitudes y comportamientos en relación con las elecciones.

After you complete the enrollment today, we will be sending you four more surveys between September and December. You'll be paid at least \$30 for participating in this study and completing all four surveys.

Después de que complete la inscripción hoy, le enviaremos cuatro encuestas más entre septiembre y diciembre. Se le pagará al menos 30 dólares por participar en este estudio y completar las cuatro encuestas.

Let's get started! We ask for your help today to tell us about yourself.
¡Empecemos! Le pedimos su ayuda hoy para que nos hable de usted.

GENDER.

How do you describe yourself?
¿Cómo se describe a sí mismo?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Male
2. Female
3. I identify in some other way

1. Hombre
2. Mujer
3. Me identifico de otra manera

[FORCE RESPONSE: "Please tell us your age range. We require this information for your responses to be counted"/ "Por favor díganos su rango de edad. Esta información es necesaria para contar sus respuestas."]

AGE2.

Which of the following categories includes your current age?

¿Cuál de las siguientes categorías incluye su edad actual?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. 17 or younger
2. 18 to 24
3. 25 to 34
4. 35 to 44
5. 45 to 54
6. 55 to 64
7. 65+

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. 17 años o menos
2. 18 a 24
3. 25 a 34
4. 35 a 44
5. 45 a 54
6. 55 a 64
7. 65+

[IF AGE2<18, TERMINATE AND SET QUAL=2]

[custom prompt: "Information about any possible Hispanic ethnicity is very important. We greatly appreciate your response to this question."]

[custom prompt: "Información sobre cualquier posible etnia hispana es muy importante. Realmente apreciamos su respuesta a esta pregunta."]

HISPAN.

This question is about Hispanic ethnicity. Are you of Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino descent?

Esta pregunta se refiere a la etnia hispana. ¿Es usted de ascendencia española, hispana o latina?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. No, I am not
2. Yes, Mexican, Mexican-American, Chicano
3. Yes, Puerto Rican
4. Yes, Cuban
5. Yes, Central American
6. Yes, South American
7. Yes, Caribbean
8. Yes, Other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino

1. No, no soy
 2. Sí, Mexicano/a, Mexico-americano/a, Chicano/a
 3. Sí, Puertorriqueño/a
 4. Sí, Cubano/a
 5. Sí, Centroamericano/a
 6. Sí, Sudamericano/a
 7. Sí, Caribeño/a
 8. Sí, otro Español/a, Hispano/a, Latino/a
-

RACE_1.

Please indicate what you consider your racial background to be. We greatly appreciate your help. The categories we use may not fully describe you, but they do match those used by the Census Bureau. It helps us to know how similar the group of participants is to the U.S. population.

Por favor, indique lo que considere que es su origen racial. Estamos muy agradecidos por su ayuda. Las categorías que utilizamos puede que no lo describan completamente a usted, pero sí que coinciden con las utilizadas por la Oficina del Censo. Nos ayuda a saber cuán similar es el grupo de participantes a la población de EE.UU.

Please check one or more categories below to indicate what race or races you consider yourself to be.

Por favor marque una o más de las siguientes categorías para indicar a qué raza o razas usted se considera pertenecer.

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1 White
- 2 Black or African American
- 3 American Indian or Alaska Native – *Type in name of enrolled or principal tribe.* [TEXTBOX]
- 4 Asian Indian
- 5 Chinese
- 6 Filipino
- 7 Japanese
- 8 Korean
- 9 Vietnamese
- 10 Other Asian – *Type in race* [TEXTBOX]
- 11 Native Hawaiian
- 12 Guamanian or Chamorro
- 13 Samoan

14 Other Pacific Islander – *Type in race* [TEXTBOX]

15 Some other race –*Type in race* [TEXTBOX]

1 Blanca

2 Negra o Afroamericana

3Indígena de las américas o nativa de Alaska –*Ingrese el nombre de la tribu en la cual está inscripto/a o tribu principal.* [TEXTBOX]

4 India Asiática

5 China

6 Filipina

7 Japonesa

8 Coreana

9 Vietnamita

10 Otra asiática –*Escriba la raza*[TEXTBOX]

02 Nativa de Hawái

12 Guameña o Chamorra

13 Samoana

14 Otra de las islas del Pacífico – *Escriba la raza* [TEXTBOX]

15 Otra raza – *Escriba la raza* [TEXTBOX]

EDUCAT.

What is the highest level of school you have completed?

¿Cuál es el nivel escolar más alto que usted ha completado?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. No formal education
2. 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th grade
3. 5th or 6th grade
4. 7th or 8th grade
5. 9th grade
6. 10th grade
7. 11th grade
8. 12th grade no diploma
9. High school graduate – high school diploma or the equivalent (GED)
10. Some college, no degree
11. Associate degree
12. Bachelor's degree
13. Master's degree
14. Professional or Doctorate degree

1. Educación informal
2. 1º, 2º, 3º, ó 4º grado
3. 5º ó 6º grado
4. 7º ó 8º grado
5. 9º grado
6. 10º grado

7. 11º grado
8. 12º grado SIN DIPLOMA
9. Graduado de escuela secundaria – diploma de secundaria o su equivalente (GED)
10. Un poco de universidad, ningún título
11. Título de asociado
12. Licenciatura
13. Maestría
14. Título profesional o doctorado

INCOME.

The next question is about the total income of YOUR HOUSEHOLD for 2019. Please include your own income PLUS the income of all members living in your household (including cohabiting partners and armed forces members living at home). Please count income BEFORE TAXES and from all sources (such as wages, salaries, tips, net income from a business, interest, dividends, child support, alimony, and Social Security, public assistance, pensions, or retirement benefits).

La siguiente pregunta es sobre los ingresos totales de SU HOGAR en 2019. Por favor incluya sus propios ingresos MÁS los ingresos de todos los miembros que residen en su hogar (incluyendo a parejas cohabitantes y miembros de las fuerzas armadas que vivan en su hogar). Por favor cuente los ingresos ANTES DE LOS IMPUESTOS y de todas las fuentes (como sueldos, salarios, propinas, ingresos netos de un negocio, intereses, dividendos, manutención de hijos, pensión alimenticia, y Seguridad Social, asistencia pública, pensiones o prestaciones por jubilación).

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Less than \$5,000
 2. \$5,000 to \$9,999
 3. \$10,000 to \$14,999
 4. \$15,000 to \$19,999
 5. \$20,000 to \$24,999
 6. \$25,000 to \$29,999
 7. \$30,000 to \$34,999
 8. \$35,000 to \$39,999
 9. \$40,000 to \$49,999
 10. \$50,000 to \$59,999
 11. \$60,000 to \$74,999
 12. \$75,000 to \$84,999
 13. \$85,000 to \$99,999
 14. \$100,000 to \$124,999
 15. \$125,000 to \$149,999
 16. \$150,000 to \$174,999
 17. \$175,000 to \$199,999
 18. \$200,000 or more
-
1. Menos de \$5,000
 2. \$5,000 a \$9,999
 3. \$10,000 a \$14,999
 4. \$15,000 a \$19,999
 5. \$20,000 a \$24,999
 6. \$25,000 a \$29,999

7. \$30,000 a \$34,999
8. \$35,000 a \$39,999
9. \$40,000 a \$49,999
10. \$50,000 a \$59,999
11. \$60,000 a \$74,999
12. \$75,000 a \$84,999
13. \$85,000 a \$99,999
14. \$100,000 a \$124,999
15. \$125,000 a \$149,999
16. \$150,000 a \$174,999
17. \$175,000 a \$199,999
18. \$200,000 o más

ZIP.

What is your ZIP Code?

¿Cuál es su código postal?

IDEO1.

How would you rate yourself on this scale?

¿Cómo se calificaría usted mismo en esta escala?

IF RND_01=0; SHOW 1-2-3-4-5

IF RND_01=1; SHOW 5-4-3-2-1:

ROTATE RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Very liberal
2. Somewhat liberal
3. Middle of the road
4. Somewhat conservative
5. Very conservative

ROTATE RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Muy liberal
2. Algo liberal
3. A la mitad del camino
4. Algo conservador
5. Muy conservador

PID.

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an independent, or what?

En términos generales, ¿suele pensar en sí mismo como demócrata, republicano, independiente, o qué?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Democrat

2. Republican
3. Independent
4. Something else, please specify: [TEXTBOX]

1. Demócrata
2. Republicano/a
3. Independiente
4. Algo más, por favor especifique: [TEXTBOX]

[SHOW IF PID=1]

PIDSTRENGTH_D.

Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?

¿Se llamaría a sí mismo fuertemente demócrata, no muy fuertemente demócrata?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Strong Democrat
 2. Not very strong Democrat
-
1. Completamente demócrata
 2. No tan demócrata

[SHOW IF PID=2]

PIDSTRENGTH_R.

Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?

¿Se llamaría a sí mismo fuertemente republicano o no muy fuertemente republicano?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Strong Republican
 2. Not very strong Republican
-
1. Completamente republicano
 2. No tan republicano

[SHOW IF PID=3, 4, 77, 98, 99]

PIDLEAN.

Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?

¿Se considera más cercano al Partido Republicano o al Partido Demócrata?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Closer to the Republican Party
2. Closer to the Democratic Party
3. Neither

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Más cercano/a al Partido Republicano
 2. Más cercano/a al Partido Demócrata
 3. Ninguno de los dos
-

VOTE16.

In 2016 Hillary Clinton ran on the Democratic ticket against Donald Trump for the Republicans. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in that election?

En 2016 Hillary Clinton se presentó en la candidatura Demócrata contra Donald Trump para los Republicanos. ¿Recuerda con seguridad si votó o no en esa elección?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Yes, voted
2. No, didn't vote

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Sí, voté
 2. No, no voté
-

[SHOW IF VOTE16=1]

CAND16.

Which candidate did you vote for?

¿Por qué candidato votó?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Hillary Clinton
2. Donald Trump
3. Other

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Hillary Clinton
 2. Donald Trump
 3. Otro
-

[SHOW IF P_PLATFORM=2]

FBACCT_EVER.

Have you ever used Facebook?

¿Alguna vez ha usado Facebook?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Yes
2. No

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Sí
2. No

[SHOW IF P_PLATFORM=1 OR FBACCT_EVER=1]

FBACCT_MULTIPLE.

How many Facebook accounts do you currently have?

¿Cuántas cuentas de Facebook tiene actualmente?

RESPONSES:

1. 1 account
2. 2 or more accounts
3. None

RESPONSES:

1. 1 cuenta
 2. 2 o más cuentas
 3. Ninguna
-

[SHOW IF FBACCT_MULTIPLE=1]

FBACCT_ACTIVE_ONE.

In the past 30 days, have you used your Facebook account?

En los últimos 30 días, ¿ha usado su cuenta de Facebook?

RESPONSES:

1. Yes
2. No

RESPONSES:

1. Sí
 2. No
-

[SHOW IF FBACCT_MULTIPLE=2]

FBACCT_ACTIVE_MULTIPLE.

In the past 30 days, how many Facebook accounts have you used?

En los últimos 30 días, ¿cuántas cuentas de Facebook ha usado?

RESPONSES:

1. 1
2. 2
3. 3
4. 4
5. 5
6. 6 or more accounts
7. None

RESPONSES:

1. 1
2. 2

3. 3
4. 4
5. 5
6. 6 o más cuentas
7. Ninguna

[SHOW IF P_PLATFORM=1]
INSTACCT_EVER.

Have you ever used Instagram?
¿Ha usado alguna vez Instagram?

RESPONSES:

1. Yes
2. No

RESPONSES:

1. Sí
2. No

[SHOW IF P_PLATFORM=2 OR INSTACCT_EVER=1]
INSTACCT_MULTIPLE.

How many Instagram accounts do you currently have?
¿Cuántas cuentas Instagram tiene actualmente?

RESPONSES:

1. 1 account
2. 2 or more accounts
3. None

RESPONSES:

1. 1 cuenta
2. 2 o más cuentas
3. Ninguna

[SHOW IF INSTACCT_MULTIPLE=1]
INSTACCT_ACTIVE_ONE.

In the past 30 days, have you used your Instagram account?
En los últimos 30 días, ¿ha utilizado su cuenta Instagram?

RESPONSES:

1. Yes
2. No

RESPONSES:

1. Sí
 2. No
-

[SHOW IF INSTACCT_MULTIPLE=2]
INSTACCT_ACTIVE_MULTIPLE.

In the past 30 days, how many Instagram accounts have you used?
En los últimos 30 días, ¿cuántas cuentas de Instagram ha utilizado?

RESPONSES:

1. 1
2. 2
3. 3
4. 4
5. 5
6. 6 or more accounts
7. None

RESPONSES:

1. 1
2. 2
3. 3
4. 4
5. 5
6. 6 o más cuentas
7. Ninguna

[DISPLAY_CONTACT]

So that we can send you rewards and our election surveys, we will be asking you for contact information. We will never share your information with third parties for marketing purposes or mailing lists.

Para poder enviarle los premios y nuestras encuestas electorales, le pediremos información de contacto. Nunca compartiremos su información con terceros para fines de marketing o listas de correo.

Let us explain why we need your email address. For you to participate in the 2020 Election Research Project, we need to be able to send you survey invitations and your rewards to an email address. Please provide your email address to participate in the study. We will use your email address only for the 2020 Election Research Project, and not for any other purposes.

Déjenos explicarle por qué necesitamos su dirección de correo electrónico. Para que usted participe en el Proyecto de Investigación Electoral 2020, necesitamos poder enviarle invitaciones a encuestas y sus premios a una dirección de correo electrónico. Por favor, proporcione su dirección de correo electrónico para participar en el estudio. Utilizaremos su dirección de correo electrónico solo par el Proyecto de Investigación Electoral 2020, y para ningún otro propósito.

We hope you will reconsider and will decide to provide your email address. Please enter your email address to make sure your voice is heard in the 2020 Election Research Project. We look forward to hearing about your opinions!

Esperamos que lo reconsidere y decida proporcionar su dirección de correo electrónico. Por favor, introduzca su dirección de correo electrónico para asegurarse de que su voz se oiga en el Proyecto de Investigación Electoral 2020. ¡Esperamos escuchar sus opiniones!

EMAIL1.

Please provide your name and an email address that we can use for sending you survey invitations and to receive your rewards.

Por favor proporcione su nombre y una dirección de correo electrónico que podamos usar para enviarle invitaciones a encuestas e información sobre sus premios.

First Name: [TEXTBOX] Last Name: [TEXTBOX]
Primer Nombre: [TEXTBOX] Apellido: [TEXTBOX]

Email Address: [TEXT BOX]
Dirección de correo electrónico: [TEXT BOX]

[MUST SELECT EMAIL_2=1]

EMAIL1_2.

Just to confirm: is this email correct?

Sólo para confirmar: ¿este correo electrónico es correcto?

EMAIL_2. [Pipe in response to EMAIL]

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Yes
 2. No
 1. Sí
 2. No
-

PHONE. What will be the best contact phone number for you?

¿Cuál es el mejor número de teléfono para ponernos en contacto con usted?

Phone: [NUMBOX]

I don't want to provide my phone number

Teléfono:

No quiero dar mi número de teléfono

PHONE1_TYPE. Is this a landline phone or a cell phone?

¿Es este un teléfono fijo o un teléfono móvil?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Landline
2. Cell

1. Fijo
2. Celular

[SHOW IF PHONE=SHOWN AND PHONE1_TYPE=2]

TXTALERT.

The surveys in this study will only be available for a short time. If you'd like, we can send SMS text invitations and reminders to your cell phone.

Las encuestas de este estudio sólo estarán disponibles por un corto tiempo. Si lo desea, podemos enviarle invitaciones de texto SMS y recordatorios a su teléfono celular.

Can we send you text invitations, reminders, and notifications?

¿Podemos enviarle mensajes de texto con invitaciones, recordatorios y notificaciones?

By providing this number, you allow NORC to text you using an automated text system. Standard messaging and data rates may apply. We will only use your phone number for these research studies and will not share, sell or otherwise use this number unless you give us permission to do. You can reply STOP to our text messages to opt out at any time.

Al proporcionarnos este número, usted permite al NORC enviarle mensajes de texto mediante un sistema de mensajes automatizado. Pueden aplicarse tarifas estándar de mensajería y datos. Solo usaremos su número de teléfono para estos estudios de investigación y no lo compartiremos, venderemos o usaremos de otra manera a menos que usted nos dé permiso para hacerlo. Puede responder STOP a nuestros mensajes de texto para optar por no participar en cualquier momento.

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Yes
2. No
3. I don't have a cell phone

1. Sí
2. No
3. No tengo teléfono celular

[IF CAWI and selecting TXTALERT=1]

[TEXT_PHONE_CAWI]

We will be using the below number to send you SMS texts. Please review and change if necessary.

Usaremos el siguiente número para enviarle un mensaje de texto. Por favor, revíselo y modifíquelo si es necesario.

[FOR ANY CELL PHONE OR UNKNOWN TEL TYPE (IF PHONE=SHOWN AND PHONE1_TYPE=2,77,98,99)]

AUTOTEL

Do you authorize NORC to call you using an automated telephone dialing system for the following phone numbers you have just given to us?

Please note that we will only use your phone number for this study and will not share, sell or otherwise use these numbers without your prior consent. This feature simply allows our phone researchers to get connected to you faster rather than having to manually punch in the number for your cell. Once connected, an actual person will be speaking to you. So, this is not robocalling, which auto dials numbers with a prerecorded voice message.

¿Autoriza a NORC a llamarle usando un sistema de marcación telefónica automática para los siguientes números de teléfono que nos acaba de dar?

Por favor tenga en cuenta que sólo utilizaremos su número de teléfono para este estudio y no compartiremos, venderemos ni utilizaremos de ninguna otra forma estos números sin su consentimiento previo. Esta función simplemente permite a nuestros investigadores telefónicos conectarse a usted más rápido en lugar de tener que marcar manualmente el número de su celular. Una vez conectado, una persona real le hablará. Por lo tanto, esto no es robocalling, que marca automáticamente los números con un mensaje de voz pregrabado.

DISPLAY PHONE NUMBER

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Yes
2. No
1. Sí
2. No

[SHOW IF CAWI-ONLY]
QFINAL3.

We are almost done.

Ya casi terminamos.

Which emoji best represents how you feel about completing the four surveys we are going to send you over the next few months?

¿Qué emoji representa mejor cómo se siente acerca de completar las cuatro encuestas que le enviaremos en los próximos meses?

FLIP RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. 😊
2. 😐
3. 😞
4. 😓
5. 😞

END.

Those are all the questions we have. The survey is now complete. Thank you! Please keep an eye out for an email in the next couple of days that will give you important additional information you need to continue with the rest of the study and start earning rewards. We will come back to you for the next survey in early September.

Estas son todas las preguntas que tenemos. La encuesta ya está completa. ¡Gracias! Por favor, esté atento a un correo electrónico en los próximos días que le dará información adicional importante que necesita para continuar con el resto del estudio y empezar a ganar premios. Volveremos a usted para la próxima encuesta a principios de septiembre.

[DISPLAY IF SAMPLE_GROUP = 1,2,3,4] As a member of the 2020 Election Research Project, you may be selected to participate in an additional study to learn more about the apps you use and sites you visit.
[DISPLAY IF SAMPLE_GROUP = 1,2,3,4] Como miembro del Proyecto de Investigación Electoral de 2020, es posible que sea seleccionado/a para participar en un estudio adicional para obtener más información sobre las aplicaciones que usted utiliza y los sitios que usted visita.

[DISPLAY IF SAMPLE_GROUP = 1,2,3,4] In the coming weeks, you may receive an invitation from NORC at erpStudy@norc.org to enroll in the 2020 Election Research Project Online Behavior Study. This study will help us understand more about how people are using the internet. Participants in the ERP Online Behavior Study can earn up to \$90 for participation during the three month study.

[DISPLAY IF SAMPLE_GROUP = 1,2,3,4] En las próximas semanas, puede recibir una invitación de NORC en erpStudy@norc.org para inscribirse en el Estudio de Comportamiento en Línea del Proyecto de Investigación Electoral 2020. Este estudio nos ayudará a comprender mejor cómo las personas usan el Internet. Los participantes del Estudio de Comportamiento en Línea del Proyecto de Investigación Electoral pueden ganar hasta \$90 por participar durante los tres meses del estudio.

[DISPLAY IF SAMPLE_GROUP = 1,2,3,4] Please be on the lookout for additional details about the study!

[DISPLAY IF SAMPLE_GROUP = 1,2,3,4] ¡Por favor, esté atento a los detalles adicionales sobre el estudio!

You can close your browser window now.

Ya puede cerrar la ventana del navegador.

13.2 Wave 2 Survey



Client	Facebook
Project Name	ERC 2020 Wave 2
Project Number	8870
Survey length (median)	25 minute survey
Population	CONSENTED FB/IG USERS, AmeriSpeak and ABS
Main	N=309,243 for FB/IG, n=11,000 for AmeriSpeak, n=9,300 for ABS
MODE	CAWI/CATI for ABS/AmeriSpeak, CAWI only for FB/IG
Language	English/Spanish
Sample Source	Facebook Instagram recruited sample, AmeriSpeak panel, ABS sample
Incentive	\$5 regular/\$10 late for FB/IG, \$10 for ABS, \$10 for AmeriSpeak
Survey description	Election and Politics Study 2020 Wave 2
Eligibility Rate	100%

Standard sample preloads

<u>Variable Name</u>	<u>Include on Preload Testing- only page?</u>	<u>Variable Type</u>	<u>Variable Label</u>
PANEL_TYPE	Y	Numeric	1 AmeriSpeak 2 Next Generation 3 GenF Extended (not in use) 4 AmeriSpeak Teen Panel 20 Lucid 21 SSI 22 ABS 23 FB/IG 50 Household 13-17 51 Household < 13 52 Household Adult

LANGSWITCH.

Welcome to the 2020 Election Research Project
Bienvenidos al Proyecto de Investigación Electoral 2020

Let's get started with an easy question.
Empecemos con una pregunta fácil.

This survey is currently available in English and Spanish. Which language would you prefer to use to share your opinions?

Esta encuesta está actualmente disponible en inglés y en español. ¿Qué idioma prefiere usar para compartir sus opiniones?

1. English/Inglés
2. Spanish/Español

[SHOW IF PANEL_TYPE=1,22,23]
DISPLAY – OPTINTRO.

[SHOW IF PANEL_TYPE=1,22

We're asking a small group of people what they think.

Estamos preguntando a un pequeño grupo de personas lo que piensan.

Your participation will help researchers at New York University, The University of Texas at Austin, and other academic institutions, as well as Facebook, understand more about how people's experience with Facebook and Instagram affects their opinions and behaviors concerning elections.

Su participación ayudará a los investigadores de la Universidad de Nueva York, la Universidad de Texas en Austin, y otras instituciones académicas, así como Facebook, a entender más acerca de cómo la experiencia de la gente con Facebook e Instagram afecta sus actitudes y comportamientos en relación con las elecciones.

We need all kinds of people to participate in the survey – both people who use social media and people who do not use social media.

Necesitamos que todo tipo de personas participe en la encuesta -- tanto la gente que usan las redes sociales como la gente que no use redes sociales.

We ask you to fill out this survey that will take about 20 minutes. Over the next three months, you'll be asked to take a short survey each month that will take about 15 minutes, for a total of about an hour of your time.]

Le pedimos que complete esta encuesta que le llevará unos 20 minutos. Durante los próximos tres meses, se le pedirá que haga una breve encuesta cada mes que le tomará unos 15 minutos, para un total de una hora de su tiempo.

[SHOW IF PANEL_TYPE=23

Thank you for your participation in the 2020 Election Research Project (ERP Study). Your participation helps researchers at New York University, The University of Texas at Austin, and other academic institutions, in partnership with Facebook, to learn more about the role of social media in elections in the United States.

Gracias por su participación en el Proyecto de Investigación Electoral 2020 (Estudio ERP). Su participación ayuda a los investigadores de la Universidad de Nueva York, la Universidad de Texas en Austin y otras instituciones académicas, en colaboración con Facebook, a aprender más sobre el papel de las redes sociales en las elecciones en los Estados Unidos.

We ask you to fill out this survey that will take about 20 minutes. After you complete the survey today, we will be sending you three more surveys between October and December. You'll be paid \$5 for your participation in this survey and an additional \$25 for completing the three follow up surveys.

Le pedimos que complete esta encuesta que le tomará unos 20 minutos. Después de que complete la encuesta hoy, le enviaremos tres encuestas más entre octubre y diciembre. Se le pagará 5 dólares por su participación en esta encuesta y 25 dólares adicionales por completar las tres encuestas de seguimiento.

Once this study is over, de-identified data will be stored and shared by Facebook for future research on elections, to validate the findings of this study, or if required by law for an inquiry by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) that reviewed this study.

Una vez que este estudio termine, los datos desidentificados serán almacenados y compartidos por Facebook para futuras investigaciones sobre las elecciones, para validar los resultados de este estudio, o si la ley lo requiere para una investigación de la Junta de Revisión Institucional (IRB) que revisó este estudio.

There are no benefits to participating in this research, nor are there risks greater than those encountered in everyday life, including risks related to the loss of confidentiality. Your participation is completely voluntary.]

No hay beneficios por participar en esta investigación, ni tampoco hay riesgos mayores que los que se encuentran en la vida cotidiana, incluyendo los riesgos relacionados con la pérdida de confidencialidad. Su participación es completamente voluntaria.]

[[SHOW IF PANEL TYPE=1]

You'll be paid [INCENTWCOMMA] for participating in this and you will receive a bonus of 15,000 AmeriPoints after completing all four surveys.

Se le pagará [INCENTWCOMMA] por participar en esto y recibirá un bono de 15,000 AmeriPoints después de completar las cuatro encuestas.

[SHOW IF PANEL TYPE=22]

You'll be paid \$40 for participating in this study by completing all four surveys, including \$10 after completing each survey.

Se le pagarán 40 dólares por participar en este estudio al completar las cuatro encuestas, incluyendo 10 dólares después de completar cada encuesta.

Once this study is over, de-identified data will be stored and shared by Facebook for future research on elections, to validate the findings of this study, or if required by law for an inquiry by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) that reviewed this study.

Una vez que este estudio termine, los datos desidentificados serán almacenados y compartidos por Facebook para futuras investigaciones sobre las elecciones, para validar los resultados de este estudio o, si la ley lo requiere, para una investigación de la Junta de Revisión Institucional (IRB) que revisó este estudio.

There are no benefits to participating in this research, nor are there risks greater than those encountered in everyday life, including risks related to the loss of confidentiality. Your participation is completely voluntary.

No hay beneficios por participar en esta investigación, ni tampoco hay riesgos mayores que los que se encuentran en la vida cotidiana, incluyendo los riesgos relacionados con la pérdida de la confidencialidad. Su participación es completamente voluntaria.

[\[SHOW IF PANEL TYPE=1\]](#)

You may withdraw at any time by emailing support@amerispeak.org or calling toll-free (888) 326-9424. Puede retirarse en cualquier momento enviando un correo electrónico a ayuda@amerispeak.org o llamando al número gratuito (888) 326-9424.

[\[SHOW IF PANEL TYPE=22\]](#)

You may withdraw at any time by visiting 2020erp.norc.org, by emailing erpSurvey@norc.org or by calling toll-free (877) 839-1505.

Puede retirarse en cualquier momento visitando 2020erp.norc.org, enviando un correo electrónico a erpSurvey@norc.org o llamando al teléfono gratuito (877) 839-1505.

[\[SHOW IF PANEL TYPE=23\]](#)

You may withdraw at any time by visiting 2020erp.norc.org, by emailing erpStudy@norc.org or by calling toll-free (866) 270-2602

Puede retirarse en cualquier momento visitando 2020erp.norc.org, enviando un correo electrónico a erpStudy@norc.org o llamando al teléfono gratuito (866) 270-2602

Let's get started! We ask for your help today to tell us about yourself.

¡Empecemos! Le pedimos su ayuda hoy para que nos hable de usted.

[\[SHOW IF PANEL_TYPE=22\]](#)

GENDER.

How do you describe yourself?

¿Cómo se describe a sí mismo?

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Male
 2. Female
 3. I identify in some other way
-
1. Hombre
 2. Mujer
 3. Me identifico de alguna otra manera

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Male
 2. Female
 3. You identify in some other way
-
1. Hombre
 2. Mujer
 3. Se identifica de alguna otra manera

[SHOW IF PANEL_TYPE=22,23]

DOB

What is your date of birth?

¿Cuál es su fecha de nacimiento?

We ask for your date of birth so that we can group your responses with others who are about your age.

If you do not feel comfortable providing your full birthday, please provide the year.

Le preguntamos su fecha de nacimiento para agrupar sus respuestas con las de personas de aproximadamente su misma edad.

Si no se siente cómodo dando su cumpleaños completo, por favor proporciona el año.

__ __ / __ __ / __ __ __ __
M M D D Y Y Y Y
Mes(mm) / Dia(DD) / Año(AAAA)

[IF PANEL_TYPE=23 AND DOB_YYYY > 2002 AFTER PROMPT, TERMINATE AND SET QUAL=2]

[SHOW IF PANEL_TYPE=22 AND DOB_YYYY>2002]

AGE2.

Which of the following categories includes your current age?

¿Cuál de las siguientes categorías incluye su edad actual?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. 17 or younger
2. 18 to 24
3. 25 to 34
4. 35 to 44
5. 45 to 54
6. 55 to 64
7. 65+

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

17 años o menos

1. 18 a 24
2. 25 a 34

3. 35 a 44
4. 45 a 54
5. 55 a 64
6. 65+

[IF AGE2=1,77,98,99, TERMINATE AND SET QUAL=2]

TERMSORRY.

[SHOW IF PANEL_TYPE=22,23]

Thank you for your interest in our study about the upcoming election. At this time, it does not appear that you are a match to join this study.

Gracias por su interés en nuestro estudio sobre las próximas elecciones. En este momento, no parece que usted sea compatible para unirse a este estudio.

[SHOW IF PANEL_TYPE=22]

HISPAN.

This question is about Hispanic ethnicity. Are you of Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino descent?

Esta pregunta se refiere a la etnia hispana. ¿Es usted de ascendencia española, hispana o latina?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. [CAWI: No, I am not [CATI: No, you are not]
 2. Yes, Mexican, Mexican-American, Chicano
 3. Yes, Puerto Rican
 4. Yes, Cuban
 5. Yes, Central American
 6. Yes, South American
 7. Yes, Caribbean
 8. Yes, Other Spanish/Hispanic/Latino
-
1. [CAWI: No, no soy [CATI: No, no lo eres]
 2. Sí, Mexicano/a, Mexico-americano/a, Chicano/a
 3. Sí, Puertorriqueño/a
 4. Sí, Cubano/a
 5. Sí, Centroamericano/a
 6. Sí, Sudamericano/a
 7. Sí, Caribeño/a
 8. Sí, otro Español/a, Hispano/a, Latino/a

[SHOW IF PANEL_TYPE=22]

RACE_1.

Please indicate what you consider your racial background to be. We greatly appreciate your help. The categories we use may not fully describe you, but they do match those used by the Census Bureau. It helps us to know how similar the group of participants is to the U.S. population.

Por favor, indique lo que considere que es su origen racial. Estamos muy agradecidos por su ayuda. Las categorías que utilizamos puede que no lo describan completamente a usted, pero sí que coinciden con las utilizadas por la Oficina del Censo. Nos ayuda a saber cuán similar es el grupo de participantes a la población de EE.UU.

[CAWI: Please check one or more categories below to indicate][CATI: Please tell me] what race or races you consider yourself to be.

[CAWI: Por favor marque una o más de las siguientes categorías para indicar][CATI: Por favor, dígame]a qué raza o razas usted se considera pertenecer.

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1 White
- 2 Black or African American
- 3 American Indian or Alaska Native – *Type in name of enrolled or principal tribe* [TEXTBOX]
- 4 Asian Indian
- 5 Chinese
- 6 Filipino
- 7 Japanese
- 8 Korean
- 9 Vietnamese
- 10 Other Asian – *Type in race* [TEXTBOX]
- 11 Native Hawaiian
- 12 Guamanian or Chamorro
- 13 Samoan
- 14 Other Pacific Islander – *Type in race* [TEXTBOX]
- 15 Some other race – *Type in race* [TEXTBOX]

- 1 Blanca
- 2 Negra o Afroamericana
- 3 Indígena de las Américas o nativa de Alaska – *Ingrese el nombre de la tribu en la cual está inscripto/a o tribu principal.* [TEXTBOX]
- 4 India Asiática
- 5 China
- 6 Filipina
- 7 Japonesa
- 8 Coreana
- 9 Vietnamita
- 10 Otra asiática – *Escriba la raza* [TEXTBOX]
- 02 Nativa de Hawái
- 12 Guameña o Chamorra
- 13 Samoana
- 14 Otra de las islas del Pacífico – *Escriba la raza* [TEXTBOX]

15 Otra raza – *Escriba la raza* [TEXTBOX]

[SHOW IF PANEL_TYPE=22]

EDUCAT.

What is the highest level of school you have completed?

¿Cuál es el nivel escolar más alto que usted ha completado?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. No formal education
2. 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th grade
3. 5th or 6th grade
4. 7th or 8th grade
5. 9th grade
6. 10th grade
7. 11th grade
8. 12th grade no diploma
9. High school graduate – high school diploma or the equivalent (GED)
10. Some college, no degree
11. Associate degree
12. Bachelor's degree
13. Master's degree
14. Professional or Doctorate degree

1. Educación informal
 2. 1º, 2º, 3º, ó 4º grado
 3. 5º ó 6º grado
 4. 7º ó 8º grado
 5. 9º grado
 6. 10º grado
 7. 11º grado
 8. 12º grado SIN DIPLOMA
 9. Graduado de escuela secundaria – diploma de secundaria o su equivalente (GED)
 10. Un poco de universidad, ningún título
 11. Título de asociado
 12. Licenciatura
 13. Maestría
 14. Título profesional o doctorado
-

[SHOW IF PANEL_TYPE=22]

INCOME.

The next question is about the total income of your household for 2019. Please include your own income plus the income of all members living in your household (including cohabiting partners and armed forces members living at home). Please count income before taxes and from all sources (such as

wages, salaries, tips, net income from a business, interest, dividends, child support, alimony, and Social Security, public assistance, pensions, or retirement benefits).

La siguiente pregunta es sobre los ingresos totales de su hogar en 2019. Por favor incluya sus propios ingresos más los ingresos de todos los miembros que residen en su hogar (incluyendo a parejas cohabitantes y miembros de las fuerzas armadas que vivan en su hogar). Por favor cuente los ingresos antes de los impuestos y de todas las fuentes (como sueldos, salarios, propinas, ingresos netos de un negocio, intereses, dividendos, manutención de hijos, pensión alimenticia, y Seguridad Social, asistencia pública, pensiones o prestaciones por jubilación).

[CATI:

What was the total income of your household in 2019?

¿Cuál fue el ingreso total de su hogar en 2019?]

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Less than \$5,000
2. \$5,000 to \$9,999
3. \$10,000 to \$14,999
4. \$15,000 to \$19,999
5. \$20,000 to \$24,999
6. \$25,000 to \$29,999
7. \$30,000 to \$34,999
8. \$35,000 to \$39,999
9. \$40,000 to \$49,999
10. \$50,000 to \$59,999
11. \$60,000 to \$74,999
12. \$75,000 to \$84,999
13. \$85,000 to \$99,999
14. \$100,000 to \$124,999
15. \$125,000 to \$149,999
16. \$150,000 to \$174,999
17. \$175,000 to \$199,999
18. \$200,000 or more

1. Menos de \$5,000
2. \$5,000 a \$9,999
3. \$10,000 a \$14,999
4. \$15,000 a \$19,999
5. \$20,000 a \$24,999
6. \$25,000 a \$29,999
7. \$30,000 a \$34,999
8. \$35,000 a \$39,999
9. \$40,000 a \$49,999
10. \$50,000 a \$59,999
11. \$60,000 a \$74,999
12. \$75,000 a \$84,999
13. \$85,000 a \$99,999
14. \$100,000 a \$124,999
15. \$125,000 a \$149,999

- 16. \$150,000 a \$174,999
- 17. \$175,000 a \$199,999
- 18. \$200,000 o más

[SHOW IF PANEL_TYPE=22]

ZIP.

What is your ZIP Code?

¿Cuál es su código postal?

[SHOW IF PANEL_TYPE=1,22]

IDEO1.

How would you rate yourself on this scale?

¿Cómo se calificaría usted mismo en esta escala?

IF RND_01=0; SHOW 1-2-3-4-5

IF RND_01=1; SHOW 5-4-3-2-1:

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Very liberal
- 2. Somewhat liberal
- 3. Middle of the road
- 4. Somewhat conservative
- 5. Very conservative

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Muy liberal
 - 2. Algo liberal
 - 3. A mitad de camino
 - 4. Algo conservador
 - 5. Muy conservador
-

[SHOW IF PANEL_TYPE=1,22]

PID.

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an independent, or what?

En términos generales, ¿suele pensar en sí mismo como demócrata, republicano, independiente, o qué?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Democrat
- 2. Republican
- 3. Independent
- 4. Something else, please specify: [TEXTBOX]

1. Demócrata
2. Republicano/a
3. Independiente
4. Algo más, por favor especifique: [TEXTBOX]

[SHOW IF PID=1]

PIDSTRENGTH_D.

Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?

¿Se llamaría a sí mismo fuertemente demócrata, no muy fuertemente demócrata?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Strong Democrat
2. Not very strong Democrat

1. Fuertemente demócrata
2. No tan demócrata

[SHOW IF PID=2]

PIDSTRENGTH_R.

Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?

¿Se llamaría a sí mismo fuertemente republicano o no muy fuertemente republicano?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Strong Republican
2. Not very strong Republican

1. Fuertemente republicano
2. No tan republicano

[SHOW IF PID=3, 4, 77, 98, 99]

PIDLEAN.

Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?

¿Se considera más cercano al Partido Republicano o al Partido Demócrata?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Closer to the Republican Party
2. Closer to the Democratic Party
3. Neither

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Más cercano/a al Partido Republicano

2. Más cercano/a al Partido Demócrata
 3. Ninguno de los dos
-

[SHOW IF PANEL_TYPE=1,22]

VOTE16.

In 2016 Hillary Clinton ran on the Democratic ticket against Donald Trump for the Republicans. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted in that election?

En 2016 Hillary Clinton se presentó en la candidatura demócrata contra Donald Trump para los republicanos. ¿Recuerda con seguridad si votó o no en esa elección?

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Yes, voted
2. No, didn't vote

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Sí, voté
2. No, no voté

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. YES, VOTED
2. NO, DIDN'T VOTE

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. SI, VOTÉ
 2. NO, NO VOTÉ
-

[SHOW IF VOTE16=1]

CAND16.

Which candidate did you vote for?

¿Por qué candidato votó?

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Hillary Clinton
2. Donald Trump
3. Other

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Hillary Clinton
2. Donald Trump
3. Otro

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. HILLARY CLINTON

2. DONALD TRUMP
3. OTHER

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. HILLARY CLINTON
2. DONALD TRUMP
3. OTRO

[SHOW IF PANEL_TYPE=1,22]

FBACCT_EVER.

Have you ever used Facebook?

¿Alguna vez ha usado Facebook?

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Yes
2. No
1. Sí
2. No

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. YES
2. NO
1. SÍ
2. NO

[SHOW IF FBACCT_EVER=1]

FBACCT_MULTIPLE.

How many Facebook accounts do you currently have?

¿Cuántas cuentas de Facebook tiene actualmente?

RESPONSES:

1. 1 account
2. 2 or more accounts
3. None
1. 1 cuenta
2. 2 o más cuentas
3. Ninguna

[SHOW IF FBACCT_MULTIPLE=1]

FBACCT_ACTIVE_ONE.

In the past 30 days, have you used your Facebook account?
En los últimos 30 días, ¿ha usado su cuenta de Facebook?

CAWI RESPONSES:

1. Yes
2. No
1. Sí
2. No

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. YES
2. NO
1. SÍ
2. NO

[SHOW IF FBACCT_MULTIPLE=2]

FBACCT_ACTIVE_MULTIPLE.

In the past 30 days, how many Facebook accounts have you used?
En los últimos 30 días, ¿cuántas cuentas de Facebook ha usado?

RESPONSES:

1. 1
2. 2
3. 3
4. 4
5. 5
6. 6 or more accounts
7. None
1. 1
2. 2
3. 3
4. 4
5. 5
6. 6 o más cuentas
7. Ninguna

[SHOW IF PANEL_TYPE=1,22]

INSTACCT_EVER.

Have you ever used Instagram?
¿Ha usado alguna vez Instagram?

CAWI RESPONSES:

1. Yes
2. No

1. Sí
2. No

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. YES
2. NO
1. Sí
2. NO

[SHOW IF INSTACCT_EVER=1]

INSTACCT_MULTIPLE.

How many Instagram accounts do you currently have?

¿Cuántas cuentas de Instagram tiene actualmente?

RESPONSES:

1. 1 account
2. 2 or more accounts
3. None
1. 1 cuenta
2. 2 o más cuentas
3. Ninguna

[SHOW IF INSTACCT_MULTIPLE=1]

INSTACCT_ACTIVE_ONE.

In the past 30 days, have you used your Instagram account?

En los últimos 30 días, ¿ha utilizado su cuenta Instagram?

CAWI RESPONSES:

1. Yes
2. No
1. Sí
2. No

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. YES
2. NO
1. Sí
2. NO

[SHOW IF INSTACCT_MULTIPLE=2]

INSTACCT_ACTIVE_MULTIPLE.

In the past 30 days, how many Instagram accounts have you used?
En los últimos 30 días, ¿cuántas cuentas de Instagram ha utilizado?

RESPONSES:

1. 1
 2. 2
 3. 3
 4. 4
 5. 5
 6. 6 or more accounts
 7. None
1. 1
 2. 2
 3. 3
 4. 4
 5. 5
 6. 6 o más cuentas
 7. Ninguna

CREATE DOV_FB_USER
IF FBACCT_ACTIVE_ONE=1 OR FBACCT_ACTIVE_MULTIPLE=1-6, DOV_FB_USER=1
ELSE DOV_FB_USER=0.

CREATE DOV_IG_USER
IF INSTACCT_ACTIVE_ONE=1 OR INSTACCT_ACTIVE_MULTIPLE=1-6, DOV_IG_USER=1
ELSE DOV_IG_USER=0.

SHOW DOV_FB_USER AND DOV_IG_USER ON TESTING ONLY SCREEN

DISPLAY_MEDIA.
[INSERT IF PANEL_TYPE=1,22: Now][INSERT IF PANEL_TYPE=23: First] we have some questions about
your media use.
[INSERT IF PANEL_TYPE=1,22: Ahora][INSERT IF PANEL_TYPE=23: Primero] tenemos algunas preguntas
sobre su uso de los medios.

POLINFO_SOURCE.
How often in the past week have you gotten political information from the following sources?
¿Con qué frecuencia en la última semana ha obtenido información política de las siguientes fuentes?

[CATI: TI INSTRUCTIONS: Read response options out loud as: "A-B-C", "C-B-S", "N-B-C", "Fox", "M-S-N-B-C", "C-N-N", "N-P-R".]

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

- A. National network TV news like ABC, CBS, or NBC
 - B. Print newspapers
 - C. Online news websites
 - D. Local TV news
 - E. Facebook
 - F. Instagram
 - G. Twitter
 - H. FOX News
 - I. MSNBC
 - J. CNN
 - K. Talk radio programs like Sean Hannity or Rush Limbaugh
 - L. Public radio/NPR
 - M. Friends and family
 - N. YouTube
- A. Noticias de televisión nacional como ABC, CBS, or NBC
- B. Periódico impreso
- C. Sitios web de noticias en línea
- D. Noticias de la televisión local
- E. Facebook
- F. Instagram
- G. Twitter
- H. Noticias FOX
- I. MSNBC
- J. CNN
- K. Los programas de radio como Sean Hannity o Rush Limbaugh
- L. Radio público/NPR
- M. Amigos y familiares
- N. YouTube

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4

IF RND_01=1 4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Every day
 - 2. Several times
 - 3. Once
 - 4. Never
1. Todos los días
2. Varias veces
3. Una vez
4. Nunca

INFOTRUST_SOURCE.

How much do you think political information from each of these sources can be trusted?

¿Cuánto cree usted que se puede confiar en la información política de cada una de estas fuentes?

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

- A. Local news
- B. National newspapers
- C. Facebook
- D. Instagram
- E. Twitter
- F. National network TV news like ABC, CBS, or NBC
- G. MSNBC
- H. CNN
- I. FOX News
- A. Noticias locales
- B. Periódicos nacionales
- C. Facebook
- D. Instagram
- E. Twitter
- F. Noticias de televisión nacional como ABC, CBS, o NBC
- G. MSNBC
- H. CNN
- I. Noticias FOX

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_01=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Not at all
- 2. A little
- 3. A moderate amount
- 4. A lot
- 5. A great deal

- 1. Nada
- 2. Un poco
- 3. Algo
- 4. Mucho
- 5. Muchísimo

DISPLAY_POL.

Next [IF CAWI:we, IF CATI:I] have some questions about your interest in politics.

A continuación [IF CAWI:tenemos, IF CATI:tengo] algunas preguntas sobre su interés en la política.

POLINT.

How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics?

¿Con qué frecuencia presta atención a los asuntos del gobierno y de la política?

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_01=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Always
- 2. Most of the time

3. About half the time
4. Some of the time
5. Never
1. Siempre
2. La mayoría del tiempo
3. Casi la mitad del tiempo
4. Algunas veces
5. Nunca

POLPART.

During the past month, have you done any of the following?

Durante el pasado mes , ¿ha hecho algo de lo siguiente?

[CAWI - remove bold] *Select all that apply.*

[CAWI - remove bold] *Seleccione todos los que correspondan.*

[CATI] **SELECT ALL THAT APPLY.**

[CATI] **SELECCIONE TODOS LOS QUE CORRESPONDAN.**

RESPONSE OPTIONS, RANDOMIZE:

1. Attended a protest or rally
2. Contributed money to a political candidate or organization
3. Signed an online petition
4. Tried to convince someone how to vote (online or in-person)
5. Wrote and posted political messages online
6. Talked about politics with someone you know
7. None of the above [ANCHOR]
1. Asistió a una protesta o a un mitin
2. Contribuyó dinero a un candidato u organización política
3. Firmó una petición en línea
4. Trató de convencer a alguien de cómo votar (en línea o en persona)
5. Escribió y publicó mensajes políticos en línea
6. Habló de política con alguien que conoce
7. Ninguno de los anteriores [ANCHOR]

EPE1.

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

¿Está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes declaraciones?

[CAWI: I][CATI: You] feel confident that [CAWI: I][CATI: you] can find the truth about political issues.

[CAWI: Me siento][CATI: Se siente] seguro de que [CAWI: puedo][CATI: puede] encontrar la verdad sobre los asuntos políticos.

[CATI] **IF R SAYS AGREE:** Is that agree strongly or agree somewhat?

[CATI] **IF R SAYS DISAGREE:** Is that disagree strongly or disagree somewhat?

[CATI] IF R SAYS AGREE: ¿Está completamente de acuerdo o algo de acuerdo?
[CATI] IF R SAYS DISAGREE: ¿Está completamente en desacuerdo o algo en desacuerdo?

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_01=1 5,4,3,2,1

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Agree strongly
2. Agree somewhat
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree somewhat
5. Disagree strongly
1. Completamente de acuerdo
2. Algo de acuerdo
3. Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo
4. Algo en desacuerdo
5. Completamente en desacuerdo

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_01=1 5,4,3,2,1

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. AGREE STRONGLY
2. AGREE SOMEWHAT
3. NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
4. DISAGREE SOMEWHAT
5. DISAGREE STRONGLY
1. COMPLETAMENTE DE ACUERDO
2. ALGO DE ACUERDO
3. NI DE ACUERDO NI EN DESACUERDO
4. ALGO EN DESACUERDO
5. COMPLETAMENTE EN DESACUERDO

EPE2.

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

¿Está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes declaraciones?

If [CAWI: I][CATI: you] wanted to, [CAWI: I][CATI: you] could figure out the facts behind most political disputes.

Si [CAWI: yo][CATI: usted] quisiera, [CAWI: yo][CATI: usted] podría averiguar los hechos detrás de la mayoría de las disputas políticas.

[CATI] IF R SAYS AGREE: Is that agree strongly or agree somewhat?

[CATI] IF R SAYS DISAGREE: Is that disagree strongly or disagree somewhat?

[CATI] IF R SAYS AGREE: ¿Está completamente de acuerdo o algo de acuerdo?

[CATI] IF R SAYS DISAGREE: ¿Está completamente en desacuerdo o algo en desacuerdo?

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_01=1 5,4,3,2,1

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Agree strongly
2. Agree somewhat
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree somewhat
5. Disagree strongly
1. Completamente de acuerdo
2. Algo de acuerdo
3. Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo
4. Algo en desacuerdo
5. Completamente en desacuerdo

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. AGREE STRONGLY
2. AGREE SOMEWHAT
3. NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
4. DISAGREE SOMEWHAT
5. DISAGREE STRONGLY
1. COMPLETAMENTE DE ACUERDO
2. ALGO DE ACUERDO
3. NI DE ACUERDO NI EN DESACUERDO
4. ALGO EN DESACUERDO
5. COMPLETAMENTE EN DESACUERDO

DISPLAY_ELECT.

Now, [IF CAWI:we, IF CATI:] have several questions about the election this November.

Ahora, [IF CAWI:tenemos, IF CATI:tengo] varias preguntas sobre la elección de noviembre.

VOTE_LIKELY.

How likely are you to vote in the general election this November?

¿Qué probabilidad hay de que vote en las elecciones generales de noviembre?

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4

IF RND_01=1 4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Definitely will vote
 2. Probably will vote
 3. Probably will not vote
 4. Definitely will not vote
 1. Definitivamente votará
 2. Probablemente votará
 3. Probablemente no votará
 4. Definitivamente no votará
-

reg.

Are you now registered to vote, or are you not registered? [CATI: If you are not sure, you can say that too.]

¿Está usted registrado para votar o actualmente no está registrado? [CATI: Si no está seguro, también puede decir eso.]

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Registered
2. Not registered
77. Not sure
1. Registrado
2. No registrado
77. No estoy seguro

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. REGISTERED
2. NOT REGISTERED
77. NOT SURE
1. REGISTRADO
2. NO REGISTRADO
77. NO ESTOY SEGURO

VOTE_PREELEC.

We'd like to ask you about the election for President to be held on November 3, in which [SHOW IF RND_00=0: Joe Biden is running against Donald Trump; SHOW IF RND_00=1: Donald Trump is running against Joe Biden]. Which candidate do you prefer for President of the United States?

Ahora nos gustaría preguntarle sobre la elección para Presidente que se celebrará el 3 de noviembre, en la que [SHOW IF RND_00=0: Joe Biden se está postulando contra Donald Trump; SHOW IF RND_00=1: Donald Trump se está postulando contra Joe Biden]. ¿Qué candidato prefiere para Presidente de los Estados Unidos?

SHOW IF RND_00=0:

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Joe Biden (Democrat)
2. Donald Trump (Republican)
3. Jo Jorgensen (Libertarian)
4. Howie Hawkins (Green)
5. Other candidate, please specify: [TEXTBOX]
77. Not sure
1. Joe Biden (demócrata)
2. Donald Trump (republicano)
3. Jo Jorgensen (libertario)
4. Howie Hawkins (verde)
5. Otro candidato, por favor especifique: [TEXTBOX]
77. No estoy seguro

SHOW IF RND_00=1:

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

2. Donald Trump (Republican)
 1. Joe Biden (Democrat)
 3. Jo Jorgensen (Libertarian)
 4. Howie Hawkins (Green)
 5. Other candidate, please specify: [TEXTBOX]
 77. Not sure
 2. Donald Trump (republicano)
 1. Joe Biden (demócrata)
 3. Jo Jorgensen (libertario)
 4. Howie Hawkins (verde)
 5. Otro candidato, por favor especifique: [TEXTBOX]
 77. No estoy seguro
-

APPROVAL.

How much do you approve or disapprove of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as president?

¿Cuánto aprueba o desaprueba la manera en que Donald Trump está haciendo su trabajo como presidente?

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_01=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Strongly approve
 2. Somewhat approve
 3. Neither approve nor disapprove
 4. Somewhat disapprove
 5. Strongly disapprove
 1. Aprueba totalmente
 2. Aprueba de alguna manera
 3. Ni aprueba ni desaprueba
 4. Desaprueba de alguna manera
 5. Desaprueba totalmente
-

DISPLAY_PERCEPT.

The next set of questions asks about your perceptions of various people and groups.

El siguiente serie de preguntas se refiere a sus percepciones de varias personas y grupos.

FT_PEOPLEGROUPS.

Please rate the person or group on a thermometer that runs from 0 to 100 degrees. Rating above 50 means that you feel favorable and warm toward the person or group. Rating below 50 means that you feel unfavorable and cool toward the person or group.

Por favor califique a la persona o grupo usando un termómetro que va de 0 a 100 grados. Una calificación por encima de 50 significa que tiene sentimientos favorables y positivos hacia esa persona o grupo. Una calificación por debajo de 50 significa que tiene sentimientos desfavorables y frío hacia la persona o grupo.

[CAWI: Click on the line for the indicator to appear, then slide the indicator on the scale where it best reflects your answer.

Haga clic en la línea para que aparezca el indicador, luego deslice el indicador por la escala para indicar dónde se refleja mejor su respuesta.]

SHOW IF RND_00=0:

- A. Joe Biden [SLIDER SCALE]
- B. Donald Trump [SLIDER SCALE]
- C. People who support Democrats [SLIDER SCALE]
- D. People who support Republicans [SLIDER SCALE]
- E. Democrats running for office [SLIDER SCALE]
- F. Republicans running for office [SLIDER SCALE]
- G. Undocumented immigrants [SLIDER SCALE]
- H. Rural Americans [SLIDER SCALE]
- I. Black Lives Matter [SLIDER SCALE]
- J. #MeToo Movement [SLIDER SCALE]
- A. Joe Biden [SLIDER SCALE]
- B. Donald Trump [SLIDER SCALE]
- C. Las personas que apoyan a los demócratas [SLIDER SCALE]
- D. Las personas que apoyan a los republicanos [SLIDER SCALE]
- E. Los Demócratas que se presentan a las elecciones [SLIDER SCALE]
- F. Los Republicanos que se presentan a las elecciones [SLIDER SCALE]
- G. Inmigrantes indocumentados [SLIDER SCALE]
- H. Los americanos rurales [SLIDER SCALE]
- I. Movimiento Black Lives Matter [SLIDER SCALE]
- J. Movimiento #YoTambién [SLIDER SCALE]

SHOW IF RND_00=1:

- B. Donald Trump [SLIDER SCALE]
- A. Joe Biden [SLIDER SCALE]
- D. People who support Republicans [SLIDER SCALE]
- C. People who support Democrats [SLIDER SCALE]
- F. Republicans running for office [SLIDER SCALE]
- E. Democrats running for office [SLIDER SCALE]
- H. Rural Americans [SLIDER SCALE]
- G. Undocumented immigrants [SLIDER SCALE]
- I. Black Lives Matter [SLIDER SCALE]
- J. #MeToo Movement [SLIDER SCALE]
- B. Donald Trump [SLIDER SCALE]
- A. Joe Biden [SLIDER SCALE]
- D. Las personas que apoyan a los Republicanos [SLIDER SCALE]
- C. Las personas que apoyan a los Demócratas [SLIDER SCALE]
- F. Los republicanos que se presentan a las elecciones [SLIDER SCALE]

- E. Los demócratas que se presentan a las elecciones [SLIDER SCALE]
- H. Los americanos rurales [SLIDER SCALE]
- G. Inmigrantes indocumentados [SLIDER SCALE]
- I. Movimiento Black Lives Matter [SLIDER SCALE]
- J. Movimiento #YoTambién [SLIDER SCALE]

[IF RND_00=0, SHOW DEMSMART BEFORE REPSMART. IF RND_00=1, SHOW REPSMART BEFORE DEMSMART]

DEMSMART.

In general, how smart are people who support Democrats?

En general, ¿cuán inteligentes son las personas que apoyan a los demócratas?

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_01=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Extremely
- 2. Very
- 3. Somewhat
- 4. A little
- 5. Not at all
- 1. Extremadamente
- 2. Muy
- 3. Algo
- 4. No muy
- 5. Nada en absoluto

REPSMART.

In general, how smart are people who support Republicans?

En general, ¿cuán inteligentes son las personas que apoyan a los republicanos?

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_01=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Extremely
- 2. Very
- 3. Somewhat
- 4. A little
- 5. Not at all
- 1. Extremadamente
- 2. Muy
- 3. Algo
- 4. No muy
- 5. Nada en absoluto

IDEOLOGY_GROUP.

How would you rate each of the following individuals and groups?

¿Cómo calificaría a cada uno de los siguientes individuos y grupos?

SHOW IF RND_00=0:

GRID ITEMS:

- A. Yourself
- B. Democrats running for office
- C. Republicans running for office
- D. People who support Democrats
- E. People who support Republicans
- F. [SHOW IF P_FB_USER=1 OR DOV_FB_USER=1: People you see on Facebook who support Democrats]
- G. [SHOW IF P_FB_USER=1 OR DOV_FB_USER=1: People you see on Facebook who support Republicans]
- H. [SHOW IF P_IG_USER=1 OR DOV_IG_USER=1: People you see on Instagram who support Democrats]
- I. [SHOW IF P_IG_USER=1 OR DOV_IG_USER=1: People you see on Instagram who support Republicans]
 - A. Usted mismo
 - B. Los demócratas que se presentan a las elecciones
 - C. Los republicanos que se presentan a las elecciones
 - D. Las personas que apoyan a los demócratas
 - E. Las personas que apoyan a los republicanos
 - F. [SHOW IF P_FB_USER=1 OR DOV_FB_USER=1: La gente que se ve en Facebook que apoya a los demócratas]
 - G. [SHOW IF P_FB_USER=1 OR DOV_FB_USER=1: La gente que se ve en Facebook que apoya a los republicanos]
 - H. [SHOW IF P_IG_USER=1 OR DOV_IG_USER=1: La gente que se ve en Instagram que apoya a los demócratas]
 - I. [SHOW IF P_IG_USER=1 OR DOV_IG_USER=1: La gente que se ve en Instagram que apoya a los republicanos]

SHOW IF RND_00=1:

GRID ITEMS:

- A. Yourself
- C. Republicans running for office
- B. Democrats running for office
- E. People who support Republicans
- D. People who support Democrats
- G. [SHOW IF P_FB_USER=1 OR DOV_FB_USER=1: People you see on Facebook who support Republicans]
- F. [SHOW IF P_FB_USER=1 OR DOV_FB_USER=1: People you see on Facebook who support Democrats]
- I. [SHOW IF P_IG_USER=1 OR DOV_IG_USER=1: People you see on Instagram who support Republicans]

H. [SHOW IF P_IG_USER=1 OR DOV_IG_USER=1: People you see on Instagram who support Democrats]
 A. Usted mismo
 C. Los republicanos que se presentan a las elecciones
 B. Los demócratas que se presentan a las elecciones
 E. Las personas que apoyan a los republicanos
 D. Las personas que apoyan a los demócratas
 G. [SHOW IF P_FB_USER=1 OR DOV_FB_USER=1: La gente que se ve en Facebook que apoya a los republicanos]
 F. [SHOW IF P_FB_USER=1 OR DOV_FB_USER=1: La gente que se ve en Facebook que apoya a los demócratas]
 I. [SHOW IF P_IG_USER=1 OR DOV_IG_USER=1: La gente que se ve en Instagram que apoya a los republicanos]
 H. [SHOW IF P_IG_USER=1 OR DOV_IG_USER=1: La gente que se ve en Instagram que apoya a los demócratas]

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4,5,6,7

IF RND_01=1 7,6,5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Very Liberal
2. Liberal
3. Somewhat Liberal
4. Middle of the road
5. Somewhat conservative
6. Conservative
7. Very conservative
1. Muy liberal
2. Liberal
3. Algo liberal
4. Moderado(a)
5. Algo conservador(a)
6. Conservador(a)
7. Muy conservador(a)

[SHOW IF (P_FB_USER=1 OR DOV_FB_USER=1) AND (NOT P_SAMPLE_GROUP=2, 3, OR 4)]

NETDIVFF_GROUP.

Think about your friends and family.

Piense en sus amigos y familia.

[CAWI: [SHOW IF RND_00=0: How many are Democrats, and how many are Republicans?;

SHOW IF RND_00=1: How many are Republicans, and how many are Democrats?]

[SHOW IF RND_00=0: ¿Cuántos son demócratas y cuántos republicanos?;

SHOW IF RND_00=1: ¿Cuántos son republicanos y cuántos son demócratas?]

Your best guess is fine.]

Su mejor suposición está bien.]

[CATI: IF NEEDED: Your best guess is fine.]
[CATI: IF NEEDED: Su mejor suposición está bien.]

SHOW IF RND_00=0:

GRID ITEMS:

- A. How many of your friends and family are Democrats?
- B. How many of your friends and family are Republicans?
- A. ¿Cuántos de sus amigos y familiares son demócratas?
- B. ¿Cuántos de sus amigos y familiares son republicanos?

SHOW IF RND_00=1:

GRID ITEMS:

- B. How many of your friends and family are Republicans?
- A. How many of your friends and family are Democrats?
- B. ¿Cuántos de sus amigos y familiares son republicanos?
- A. ¿Cuántos de sus amigos y familiares son demócratas?

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_01=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. None or almost none
- 2. A few
- 3. About half
- 4. A lot
- 5. All or nearly all
- 1. Ninguno o casi ninguno
- 2. Unos cuantos
- 3. Alrededor de la mitad
- 4. Muchos
- 5. Todos o casi todos

[SHOW IF (P_FB_USER=1 OR DOV_FB_USER=1) AND (NOT P_SAMPLE_GROUP=2, 3, OR 4)]

NETDIVFB_GROUP.

Now think about your Facebook "friends."

Ahora piensa en sus "amigos" de Facebook.

[CAWI: Among your "friends" on Facebook, [SHOW IF RND_00=0: how many are Democrats, and how many are Republicans?; SHOW IF RND_00=1: how many are Republicans, and how many are Democrats?]

[SHOW IF RND_00=0: ¿cuántos son demócratas y cuántos republicanos?;

SHOW IF RND_00=1: ¿cuántos son republicanos y cuántos son demócratas?]

Your best guess is fine.]

Su mejor suposición está bien.]

[CATI: IF NEEDED: Your best guess is fine.]

[CATI: IF NEEDED: Su mejor suposición está bien.]

SHOW IF RND_00=0:

GRID ITEMS:

- A. How many of your Facebook friends are Democrats?
- B. How many of your Facebook friends are Republicans?
- A. ¿Cuántos de sus amigos de Facebook son demócratas?
- B. ¿Cuántos de sus amigos de Facebook son republicanos?

SHOW IF RND_00=1:

GRID ITEMS:

- B. How many of your Facebook friends are Republicans?
- A. How many of your Facebook friends are Democrats?
- B. ¿Cuántos de sus amigos de Facebook son republicanos?
- A. ¿Cuántos de sus amigos de Facebook son demócratas?

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_01=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. None or almost none
- 2. A few
- 3. About half
- 4. A lot
- 5. All or nearly all
- 1. Ninguno o casi ninguno
- 2. Unos cuantos
- 3. Alrededor de la mitad
- 4. Muchos
- 5. Todos o casi todos

DISPLAY_ISSUE.

Now, [IF CAWI:we, IF CATI:I] have questions about several issues facing the country.

Ahora, [IF CAWI:tenemos, IF CATI:tengo] preguntas sobre varios asuntos que enfrenta el país.

ECONOMY.

Compared to one year ago, is the nation's economy now better, the same, or worse?

Comparada con la de hace un año, ¿la economía de la nación está ahora mejor, igual o peor?

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_01=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Much better
- 2. Somewhat better
- 3. The same
- 4. Somewhat worse
- 5. Much worse
- 1. Mucho mejor

2. Algo mejor
3. Igual
4. Algo peor
5. Mucho peor

BLACKWHITE_ISSUE.

In general in our country these days, would you say that [SHOW IF RND_01=0: black people are treated less fairly than white people, white people are treated less fairly than black people; SHOW IF RND_01=1: white people are treated less fairly than black people, black people are treated less fairly than white people], or both are treated about equally in each of the following situations?

¿En general, en nuestro país en estos días, ¿diría usted que [SHOW IF RND_01=0: las personas negras son tratadas menos justamente que las personas blancas, las personas blancas son tratadas menos justamente que las personas negras; SHOW IF RND_01=1: las personas blancas son tratadas menos justamente que las personas negras, las personas negras son tratadas menos justamente que las personas blancas] o ambas son tratadas más o menos por igual en cada una de las siguientes situaciones?

GRID ITEMS, RANODMIZE:

- A. In dealing with the police
- B. When voting in elections
- C. When seeking medical treatment
- D. In hiring, pay, and promotions
- A. En el trato con la policía
- B. Cuando se vota en las elecciones
- C. Cuando se busca tratamiento medico
- D. En la contratación, el pago y los ascensos

SHOW IF RND_01=0:

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Black people are treated much less fairly than white people
2. Black people are treated somewhat less fairly than white people
3. Both are treated about equally
4. White people are treated somewhat less fairly than black people
5. White people are treated much less fairly than black people
1. Los negros son tratados mucho menos justamente que los blancos
2. Los negros son tratados de manera algo menos justa que los blancos
3. Ambos son tratados casi por igual
4. Los blancos son tratados de manera algo menos justa que los negros
5. Los blancos son tratados mucho menos justamente que los negros

SHOW IF RND_01=1:

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

5. White people are treated much less fairly than black people
4. White people are treated somewhat less fairly than black people
3. Both are treated about equally
2. Black people are treated somewhat less fairly than white people

1. Black people are treated much less fairly than white people
 5. Los blancos son tratados mucho menos justamente que los negros
 4. Los blancos son tratados de manera algo menos justa que los negros
 3. Ambos son tratados casi por igual
 2. Los negros son tratados de manera algo menos justa que los blancos
 1. Los negros son tratados mucho menos justamente que los blancos
-

SEXISM1_2.

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

¿Está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes declaraciones?

[CATI] IF R SAYS AGREE: Is that agree strongly or agree somewhat?

[CATI] IF R SAYS DISAGREE: Is that disagree strongly or disagree somewhat?

[CATI] IF R SAYS AGREE: ¿Está completamente de acuerdo o algo de acuerdo?

[CATI] IF R SAYS DISAGREE: ¿Está fuertemente en desacuerdo o algo en desacuerdo?

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

- A. Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist.
- B. Recent allegations of sexual harassment and assault reflect widespread problems in society.
- A. Muchas mujeres malinterpretan comentarios o actos inocentes como sexistas.
- B. Las recientes denuncias de acoso y agresión sexual reflejan problemas generalizados en la sociedad.

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_01=1 5,4,3,2,1

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Agree strongly
2. Agree somewhat
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree somewhat
5. Disagree strongly
1. Fuertemente de acuerdo
2. Algo de acuerdo
3. Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo
4. Algo en desacuerdo
5. Fuertemente en desacuerdo

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_01=1 5,4,3,2,1

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. AGREE STRONGLY
2. AGREE SOMEWHAT
3. NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
4. DISAGREE SOMEWHAT
5. DISAGREE STRONGLY
1. FUERTEMENTE DE ACUERDO
2. ALGO DE ACUERDO

3. NI DE ACUERDO NI EN DESACUERDO
4. ALGO EN DESACUERDO
5. FUERTEMENTE EN DESACUERDO

USDEMOC_TRAIT.

How well does the United States meet the following standards?

¿Qué tan bien cumple los Estados Unidos con las siguientes normas?

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

- A. Government does not interfere with journalists or news organizations
- B. Government protects individuals' right to engage in unpopular speech or expression
- C. Elections are free from foreign influence
- D. All adult citizens have equal opportunity to vote
- E. Elections are conducted without fraud
- F. Voters are knowledgeable about candidates and issues
- A. El gobierno no interfiere con los periodistas o las organizaciones de noticias
- B. El gobierno protege el derecho de las personas a participar en discursos o expresiones impopulares
- C. Las elecciones están libres de influencia extranjera
- D. Todos los ciudadanos adultos tienen la misma oportunidad de votar
- E. Las elecciones se llevan a cabo sin fraude
- F. Los votantes son conocedores de los candidatos y de las cuestiones

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4

IF RND_01=1 4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. The U.S. does not meet this standard
2. The U.S. partly meets this standard
3. The U.S. mostly meets this standard
4. The U.S. fully meets this standard
1. Los EE.UU. no cumplen con este estándar
2. Los EE.UU. cumplen en parte con este estándar
3. Los EE.UU. en su mayoría cumplen con este estándar
4. Los EE.UU. cumplen plenamente con este estándar

KNOWLEDGE_PRE.

The next set of questions helps us learn what types of information are commonly known to the public. Please answer these questions on your own without asking anyone or looking up the answers. Many people don't know the answers to these questions, but [IF CAWI: we'd; IF CATI: I'd] be grateful if you would please answer every question even if you're not sure what the right answer is.

It is important to us that you do not use outside sources like the Internet to search for the correct answer. Will you answer the following questions without help from outside sources?

El siguiente serie de preguntas nos ayuda a saber qué tipo de información es comúnmente conocida por el público. Por favor, conteste estas preguntas por su cuenta sin preguntar a nadie o buscar las

respuestas. Mucha gente no conoce las respuestas a estas preguntas, pero le [IF CAWI: agradeceríamos; IF CATI: agradecería] que por favor respondiera a cada pregunta aunque no esté seguro de cuál es la respuesta correcta.

Es importante para nosotros que usted no utilice fuentes externas como Internet para buscar la respuesta correcta. ¿Responderá a las siguientes preguntas sin ayuda de fuentes externas?

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Yes
2. No
1. Sí
2. No

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. YES
2. NO
1. Sí
2. NO

KNOW_HOUSE.

Which party has a majority of seats in the U.S. House of Representatives?

¿Qué partido tiene la mayoría de los escaños en la Cámara de Representantes?

RESPONSE OPTIONS, RANDOMIZE:

1. Democrats
2. Republicans
3. Neither [ANCHOR]
1. Demócratas
2. Republicanos
3. Ninguno [ANCHOR]

KNOW_SENATE.

Which party has a majority of seats in the U.S. Senate?

¿Qué partido tiene la mayoría de los escaños en el Senado de los Estados Unidos?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Democrats
2. Republicans
3. Neither
1. Demócratas
2. Republicanos
3. Ninguno

DIGLITERACY_TERM.

How familiar are you with the following computer- and internet-related items? [CAWI: Please indicate your understanding of the following items:]

¿Qué tan familiarizado está usted con los siguientes artículos relacionados con la computadora e Internet? [CAWI: Por favor, indique si entiende los siguientes elementos:]

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

- A. Viral
- B. PDF
- C. Selfie
- D. Wiki
- E. Hashtag
- F. Emoji
- G. Privacy settings
- H. Proxy pod

- A. Viral
- B. PDF
- C. Selfie
- D. Wiki
- E. Hashtag
- F. Emoji
- G. Configuración de la privacidad
- H. Proxy pod

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_01=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Full understanding
- 2. A lot of understanding
- 3. Some understanding
- 4. Little understanding
- 5. No understanding
- 1. Entendimiento total
- 2. Mucho entendimiento
- 3. Algo de entendimiento
- 4. Poco entendimiento
- 5. No entiendo

DISPLAY_SELF.

Lastly, [CAWI: we'd][CATI: I'd] like to ask you a few questions about yourself.

Finalmente, [CAWI: nos][CATI: me] gustaría hacerle algunas preguntas sobre usted.

EMOT.

Please tell [CAWI: us][CATI: me] how much of the time during the past 4 weeks you felt...

Por favor, [CAWI: díganos][CATI: dígame] cuánto tiempo durante las últimas 4 semanas se sintió...

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

- A. Happy
- B. Depressed
- C. Anxious

- A. Feliz
- B. Deprimido
- C. Ansioso

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_01=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. All the time
- 2. Often
- 3. Sometimes
- 4. Rarely
- 5. Never
- 1. Todo el tiempo
- 2. A menudo
- 3. A veces
- 4. Raramente
- 5. Nunca

[SHOW IF P_SAMPLE_GROUP=3,4]

DEACTIVATION.

When you agreed to participate in this study, you said you'd be willing to deactivate your [INSERT IF P_SAMPLE_GROUP=3: Facebook][INSERT IF P_SAMPLE_GROUP=4: Instagram] account for 1 to 6 weeks, at a rate of \$25 per week, starting on September 22. During your assigned deactivation period, you can continue to use messenger and WhatsApp [INSERT IF P_SAMPLE_GROUP=3: and log into apps and websites with Facebook]. When the deactivation period starts, we'll automatically deactivate your account, and you'll need to avoid logging back into [INSERT IF P_SAMPLE_GROUP=3: Facebook][INSERT IF P_SAMPLE_GROUP=4: Instagram] for the rest of the period. When you reactivate your account, it will be just as you left it.

Cuando aceptó participar en este estudio, dijo que estaría dispuesto a desactivar su cuenta de [INSERT IF P_SAMPLE_GROUP=3: Facebook][INSERT IF P_SAMPLE_GROUP=4: Instagram] durante 1 a 6 semanas, a cambio de 25 dólares por semana, a partir del 22 de septiembre. Durante el período de desactivación asignado, puede seguir utilizando el mensajero y WhatsApp [INSERT IF P_SAMPLE_GROUP=3: e iniciar sesión en aplicaciones y sitios web con Facebook]. Cuando comience el período de desactivación, desactivaremos automáticamente su cuenta y deberá evitar volver a iniciar sesión en su [INSERT IF P_SAMPLE_GROUP=3: Facebook][INSERT IF P_SAMPLE_GROUP=4: Instagram] durante el resto del período. Cuando usted reactive su cuenta, estará tal como la dejó.

You will be randomly assigned to deactivate your [INSERT IF P_SAMPLE_GROUP=3: Facebook][INSERT IF P_SAMPLE_GROUP=4: Instagram] for either:

- 1 week, until September 29, for \$25

OR

- 6 weeks, until November 3, for \$150

Se le asignará al azar desactivar su [INSERT IF P_SAMPLE_GROUP=3: Facebook][INSERT IF P_SAMPLE_GROUP=4: Instagram] para:

- 1 semana, hasta el 29 de septiembre por \$25
- O
- 6 semanas hasta el 3 de noviembre, por \$150

In both cases you will be paid in mid November and you will be asked to take three surveys for additional payment between October and December. If you are still willing to deactivate for both 1 week or 6 weeks, choose "Yes, Join Study." If not, you will still be paid for this survey but will no longer be part of the study.

En ambos casos se le pagará a mediados de noviembre y se le pedirá que realice tres encuestas para recibir un pago adicional entre octubre y diciembre. Si todavía está dispuesto a desactivar tanto por 1 o 6 semanas, elija "Sí, unirse al estudio". Si no, todavía le pagaremos por esta encuesta pero ya no formará parte del estudio.

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Yes, Join Study
2. No, End Study

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Sí, unirse al estudio
 2. No, terminar el estudio
-

13.3 Wave 4 Survey



Client	Facebook
Project Name	Election Research Project W4
Project Number	8870
Survey length (median)	15 minute survey
Population	Age 18+
Pretest	N/A
Main	N= 184,955
MODE	CAWI/CATI-fied web
Language	English/Spanish
Sample Source	AmeriSpeak + IG/FB sourced + ABS (from W2 completes)
Incentive	AmeriSpeak (PANEL_TYPE=1): 5,000 ABS (PANEL_TYPE=22): \$10 Facebook/Instagram (PANEL_TYPE=23): \$20
Survey description	Election and Politics Study 2020 Wave 4
Eligibility Rate	100%

This survey will use the following RND_xx variables:

Note, these are randomized in the script (NOT preloads)

RND_xx	Associated survey Qs
RND_00	VOTE_POSTELEC, FT_PEOPLEGROUPS, DEMSMART, REPSMART, IDEOLOGY_GROUP, NETDIVFF_GROUP, NETDIVFB_GROUP
RND_01	POLINFO_SOURCE, TURNOUT_POSTELEC, USDEMOC_TRAIT, SPECKNOWEVENT, MISINFO
RND_02	INFOTRUST_SOURCE, POLINT, EPE1, EPE2, EPE3, APPROVAL, DEMSMART, REPSMART, NETDIVFF_GROUP, NETDIVFB_GROUP, IMMIGPOLICY, HEALTHPOLICY, UNEMPLOYMENTPOLICY, COVIDPOLICY, FOREIGNPOLICY, POLICEPOLICY, ECONOMY, BLACKWHITE_ISSUE, SEXISM1_2, EMOT
RND_03	IDEOLOGY_GROUP
RND_04	SPECKNOWPOLICY
RND_05	
RND_06	

LANGSWITCH.

Welcome Back to the 2020 Election Research Project
Bienvenidos al Proyecto de Investigación Electoral 2020

Thanks for your participation in the earlier survey in the beginning of September.
Gracias por su participación en la encuesta anterior a principios de septiembre.

Let's get started with an easy question.
Empecemos con una pregunta fácil.

This survey is currently available in English and Spanish. Which language would you prefer to use to share your opinions?

Esta encuesta está actualmente disponible en inglés y en español. ¿Qué idioma prefiere usar para compartir sus opiniones?

1. English/Inglés
2. Spanish/Español

If LANGSWITCH=1, 77, 98, 99 continue in English

IF LANGSWITCH=2, switch to Spanish language version of the survey

PROGRAMMING NOTE: FOR ALL PROMPTS: We would really like your answer to this question.]
PROGRAMMING NOTE: FOR ALL PROMPTS: Realmente nos gustaría una respuesta a esta pregunta.]

PROGRAMMING NOTE: IN CAWI MODE, HIDE BACK BUTTON IN APROD
CATI MODE MUST HAVE BACK BUTTON

[SHOW IF PANEL_TYPE=1,22,23]
DISPLAY – OPTINTRO.

We ask you to fill out this survey that will take about 20 minutes. After you complete the survey today, we will be sending you one more survey in early December.

Le pedimos que complete esta encuesta que le tomará unos 20 minutos. Después de que complete la encuesta hoy, le enviaremos una encuesta más a principios de diciembre.

Your participation helps researchers at New York University, The University of Texas at Austin, and other academic institutions, in partnership with Facebook, to learn more about the role of social media in elections in the United States.

Su participación ayuda a los investigadores de la Universidad de Nueva York, la Universidad de Texas en Austin y otras instituciones académicas, en colaboración con Facebook, a aprender más sobre el papel de las redes sociales en las elecciones en los Estados Unidos.

Once this study is over, de-identified data will be stored and shared by Facebook for future research on elections, to validate the findings of this study, or if required by law for an inquiry by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) that reviewed this study.

Una vez que este estudio termine, los datos desidentificados serán almacenados y compartidos por Facebook para futuras investigaciones sobre las elecciones, para validar los resultados de este estudio, o si la ley lo requiere, para una auditoría de la Junta de Revisión Institucional (IRB), la cual revisó este estudio.

There are no benefits to participating in this research, nor are there risks greater than those encountered in everyday life, including risks related to the loss of confidentiality. Your participation is completely voluntary.

No hay beneficios por participar en esta investigación, ni tampoco hay riesgos mayores que los que se encuentran en la vida cotidiana, incluyendo riesgos relacionados con la pérdida de confidencialidad. Su participación es completamente voluntaria.

[SHOW IF PANEL TYPE=1]

You may withdraw at any time by emailing support@amerispeak.org or calling toll-free (888) 326-9424. Puede retirarse en cualquier momento enviando un correo electrónico a ayuda@amerispeak.org o llamando al número gratuito (888) 326-9424.

[SHOW IF PANEL TYPE=22]

You may withdraw at any time by visiting 2020erp.norc.org, by emailing erpSurvey@norc.org or by calling toll-free (877) 839-1505. Puede retirarse en cualquier momento visitando 2020erp.norc.org, enviando un correo electrónico a erpSurvey@norc.org o llamando al teléfono gratuito (877) 839-1505.

[SHOW IF PANEL TYPE=23]

You may withdraw at any time by visiting 2020erp.norc.org, by emailing erpStudy@norc.org or by calling toll-free (866) 270-2602. Puede retirarse en cualquier momento visitando 2020erp.norc.org, enviando un correo electrónico a erpStudy@norc.org o llamando al teléfono gratuito (866) 270-2602.

Let's get started! We ask for your help today to tell us about yourself.
¡Empecemos! Le pedimos su ayuda hoy para que nos hable de usted.

DISPLAY_MED.

First we have some questions about your media use.
Primero tenemos algunas preguntas sobre su uso de los medios de comunicación.

[GRID; 5,5,4; SP]

POLINFO_SO.

How often in the past week have you gotten political information from the following sources?
¿Con qué frecuencia en la última semana ha obtenido información política de las siguientes fuentes?

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

- A. National network TV news like ABC, CBS, or NBC
- B. Print newspapers
- C. Online news websites
- D. Local TV news
- E. Facebook
- F. Instagram
- G. Twitter
- H. FOX News
- I. MSNBC
- J. CNN
- K. Talk radio programs like Sean Hannity or Rush Limbaugh
- L. Public radio/NPR
- M. Friends and family
- N. YouTube
- A. Noticias de televisión nacional como ABC, CBS, o NBC
- B. Periódico impreso
- C. Sitios web de noticias en línea
- D. Noticias de la televisión local
- E. Facebook
- F. Instagram
- G. Twitter
- H. Noticias FOX
- I. MSNBC
- J. CNN
- K. Los programas de radio como Sean Hannity o Rush Limbaugh
- L. Radio público/NPR
- M. Amigos y familiares
- N. YouTube

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4

IF RND_01=1 4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Every day
- 2. Several times
- 3. Once
- 4. Never
- 1. Todos los días
- 2. Varias veces
- 3. Una vez
- 4. Nunca

[GRID; 5,4; SP]

INFOTRUST.

How much do you think political information from each of these sources can be trusted?

¿Cuánto cree usted que se puede confiar en la información política de cada una de estas fuentes?

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

- A. Local news
- B. National newspapers
- C. Facebook
- D. Instagram
- E. Twitter
- F. National network TV news like ABC, CBS, or NBC
- G. MSNBC
- H. CNN
- I. FOX News
- A. Noticias locales
- B. Periódicos nacionales
- C. Facebook
- D. Instagram
- E. Twitter
- F. Noticias de televisión nacional como ABC, CBS, o NBC
- G. MSNBC
- H. CNN
- I. Noticias FOX

IF RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Not at all
- 2. A little
- 3. A moderate amount
- 4. A lot
- 5. A great deal
- 1. Nada
- 2. Un poco
- 3. Algo
- 4. Mucho
- 5. Muchísimo

DISPLAY_POL.

Next we have some questions about your interest in politics.

A continuación tenemos algunas preguntas sobre su interés en la política.

POLINT.

How often do you pay attention to what's going on in government and politics?

¿Con qué frecuencia presta atención a los asuntos del gobierno y de la política?

IF RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Always
 2. Most of the time
 3. About half the time
 4. Some of the time
 5. Never
 1. Siempre
 2. La mayoría del tiempo
 3. Casi la mitad del tiempo
 4. Algunas veces
 5. Nunca
-

POLPART.

During the past month, have you done any of the following?
Durante el pasado mes , ¿ha hecho algo de lo siguiente?

Select all that apply.

Seleccione todos los que correspondan.

RESPONSE OPTIONS, RANDOMIZE:

1. Attended a protest or rally
 2. Contributed money to a political candidate or organization
 3. Signed an online petition
 4. Tried to convince someone how to vote (online or in-person)
 5. Wrote and posted political messages online
 6. Talked about politics with someone you know
 7. None of the above
 1. Asistió a una protesta o a un mitin
 2. Contribuyó dinero a un candidato u organización política
 3. Firmó una petición en línea
 4. Trató de convencer a alguien de cómo votar (en línea o en persona)
 5. Escribió y publicó mensajes políticos en línea
 6. Habló de política con alguien que conoce
 7. Ninguno de los anteriores
-

[SHOW IF POLPART=2]

CONTRIBUT.

How much money did you contribute to political candidates or organizations in the last month? Choose the amount that is closest.

¿Cuánto dinero contribuyó a los candidatos u organizaciones políticas en el último mes? Seleccione la cantidad que más se acerque.

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. \$0
2. \$25
3. \$50
4. \$100
5. \$150
6. \$200
7. \$350
8. \$500
9. \$1000
10. More than \$1000

1. \$0
 2. \$25
 3. \$50
 4. \$100
 5. \$150
 6. \$200
 7. \$350
 8. \$500
 9. \$1000
 10. Más de \$1000
-

EPE1.

Do you agree or disagree with the following statement?

¿Está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con la siguiente declaración?

[CAWI: I][CATI: You] feel confident that [CAWI: I][CATI: you] can find the truth about political issues.

[CAWI: Me siento][CATI: Se siente] seguro de que [CAWI: puedo][CATI: puede] encontrar la verdad sobre los asuntos políticos.

[CATI] IF R SAYS AGREE: Is that agree strongly or agree somewhat?

[CATI] IF R SAYS DISAGREE: Is that disagree strongly or disagree somewhat?

[CATI] IF R SAYS AGREE: ¿Está completamente de acuerdo o algo de acuerdo?

[CATI] IF R SAYS DISAGREE: ¿Está completamente en desacuerdo o algo en desacuerdo?

IF RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Agree strongly
2. Agree somewhat
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree somewhat
5. Disagree strongly
1. Completamente de acuerdo

2. Algo de acuerdo
3. Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo
4. Algo en desacuerdo
5. Completamente en desacuerdo

IF RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. AGREE STRONGLY
 2. AGREE SOMEWHAT
 3. NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
 4. DISAGREE SOMEWHAT
 5. DISAGREE STRONGLY
 1. COMPLETAMENTE DE ACUERDO
 2. ALGO DE ACUERDO
 3. NI DE ACUERDO NI EN DESACUERDO
 4. ALGO EN DESACUERDO
 5. COMPLETAMENTE EN DESACUERDO
-

EPE2.

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

¿Está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes declaraciones?

If [CAWI: I][CATI: you] wanted to, [CAWI: I][CATI: you] could figure out the facts behind most political disputes.

Si [CAWI: yo][CATI: usted] quisiera, [CAWI: yo][CATI: usted] podría averiguar los hechos detrás de la mayoría de las disputas políticas.

[CATI] IF R SAYS AGREE: Is that agree strongly or agree somewhat?

[CATI] IF R SAYS DISAGREE: Is that disagree strongly or disagree somewhat?

[CATI] IF R SAYS AGREE: ¿Está completamente de acuerdo o algo de acuerdo?

[CATI] IF R SAYS DISAGREE: ¿Está completamente en desacuerdo o algo en desacuerdo?

IF RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Agree strongly
2. Agree somewhat
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree somewhat
5. Disagree strongly
1. Completamente de acuerdo
2. Algo de acuerdo

3. Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo
4. Algo en desacuerdo
5. Completamente en desacuerdo

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. AGREE STRONGLY
 2. AGREE SOMEWHAT
 3. NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
 4. DISAGREE SOMEWHAT
 5. DISAGREE STRONGLY
 1. COMPLETAMENTE DE ACUERDO
 2. ALGO DE ACUERDO
 3. NI DE ACUERDO NI EN DESACUERDO
 4. ALGO EN DESACUERDO
 5. COMPLETAMENTE EN DESACUERDO
-

EPE3.

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

¿Está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes declaraciones?

People like [CAWI: me][CATI: you] don't have any say in what the government does.

La gente como [CAWI: yo][CATI: usted] no tiene voz en lo que hace el gobierno.

IF RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Agree strongly
2. Agree somewhat
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree somewhat
5. Disagree strongly
1. Completamente de acuerdo
2. Algo de acuerdo
3. Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo
4. Algo en desacuerdo
5. Completamente en desacuerdo

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. AGREE STRONGLY
2. AGREE SOMEWHAT
3. NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
4. DISAGREE SOMEWHAT
5. DISAGREE STRONGLY

1. COMPLETAMENTE DE ACUERDO
 2. ALGO DE ACUERDO
 3. NI DE ACUERDO NI EN DESACUERDO
 4. ALGO EN DESACUERDO
 5. COMPLETAMENTE EN DESACUERDO
-

DISPLAY_PRES.

Next, we have several questions about the election for President.

A continuación, tenemos varias preguntas sobre la elección para presidente.

TURNOUT.

In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they weren't registered, they were sick, or they just didn't have time.

Al hablar con la gente sobre las elecciones, a menudo nos encontramos con que muchas personas no pudieron votar porque no estaban registradas, estaban enfermas o simplemente no tenían tiempo.

Which of the following statements best describes you:

Cuál de las siguientes declaraciones lo/a describe mejor:

RND_01=0 1,2,3,4

RND_01=1 4,3,2,1

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. I did not vote in the 2020 presidential election
 2. I thought about voting this time, but didn't
 3. I usually vote, but didn't this time
 4. I am sure I voted in the 2020 presidential election
1. No voté en las elecciones presidenciales de 2020
 2. Pensé en votar esta vez, pero no lo hice
 3. Normalmente voto, pero esta vez no lo hice
 4. Estoy seguro de que voté en las elecciones presidenciales de 2020

RND_01=0 1,2,3,4

RND_01=1 4,3,2,1

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. You did not vote in the 2020 presidential election
 2. You thought about voting this time, but didn't
 3. You usually vote, but didn't this time
 4. You are sure you voted in the 2020 presidential election
1. No votó en las elecciones presidenciales de 2020
 2. Pensó en votar esta vez, pero no lo hizo
 3. Normalmente vota, pero esta vez no lo hizo
 4. Está seguro/a de que votó en las elecciones presidenciales de 2020

[SHOW IF TURNOUT=4]

HOWVOTED.

Which one of the following best describes how you voted?

¿Cuál de las siguientes declaraciones describe mejor cómo votó?

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Definitely voted in person at a polling place before election day
2. Definitely voted in person at a polling place on election day
3. Definitely voted before election day by mailing in my ballot or depositing my mail ballot into a drop box
4. Definitely voted on election day by mailing in my ballot or depositing my mail ballot into a drop box
5. Definitely voted in some other way
77. Not completely sure whether I voted or not

1. Definitivamente voté en persona en un lugar de votación antes el día de la elección
2. Definitivamente voté en persona en un lugar de votación en el día de la elección
3. Definitivamente voté antes del día de la elección enviando mi boleta o depositando mi boleta en un buzón
4. Definitivamente voté en el día de la elección enviando mi boleta o depositando mi boleta en un buzón
5. Definitivamente voté de alguna otra manera
77. No estoy completamente seguro de si voté o no

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Definitely voted in person at a polling place before election day
2. Definitely voted in person at a polling place on election day
3. Definitely voted before election day by mailing in your ballot or depositing your mail ballot into a drop box
4. Definitely voted on election day by mailing in your ballot or depositing your ballot into a drop box
5. Definitely voted in some other way
77. Not completely sure whether you voted or not

1. Definitivamente votó en persona en un lugar de votación antes el día de la elección
2. Definitivamente votó en persona en un lugar de votación en el día de la elección
3. Definitivamente votó antes del día de la elección enviando su boleta o depositando su boleta en un buzón
4. Definitivamente votó en el día de la elección enviando su boleta o depositando su boleta en un buzón
5. Definitivamente votó de alguna otra manera
77. No está completamente seguro de si votó o no

[SHOW IF TURNOUT=4]

VOTE_POST.

For whom did you vote for President of the United States?

¿Por quién votó usted para Presidente de los Estados Unidos?

SHOW IF RND_00=0:

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Joe Biden (Democrat)
2. Donald Trump (Republican)
3. Jo Jorgensen (Libertarian)
4. Howie Hawkins (Green)
5. Other candidate, please specify:
6. [CAWI I][CATI You] didn't vote in this race
77. Not sure

1. Joe Biden (demócrata)
2. Donald Trump (republicano)
3. Jo Jorgensen (libertario)
4. Howie Hawkins (verde)
5. Otro candidato, por favor especifique:
6. [CAWI Yo no voté][CATI Usted no votó] en esta elección
77. No estoy seguro

SHOW IF RND_00=1:

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

2. Donald Trump (Republican)
1. Joe Biden (Democrat)
3. Jo Jorgensen (Libertarian)
4. Howie Hawkins (Green)
5. Other candidate, please specify:
6. [CAWI I][CATI You] didn't vote in this race
77. Not sure

2. Donald Trump (republicano)
1. Joe Biden (demócrata)
3. Jo Jorgensen (libertario)
4. Howie Hawkins (verde)
5. Otro candidato, por favor especifique:
6. [CAWI Yo no voté][CATI Usted no votó] en esta elección
77. No estoy seguro

[SHOW IF TURNOUT=4 AND P_SCMPGN=1]

[INSERT IF S_STATE=GA]

Your state has 2 senate seats up for election in 2020. Please let us know who you voted for in each race.
Su estado tiene dos escaños en el Senado para las elecciones de 2020. Por favor, díganos por quién votó en la contienda por cada uno de los escaños.

[SHOW ALL]

VOTESENATE.

For whom did you vote for U.S. Senator?

¿Por quién votó usted para Senador de los EE.UU.?

RESPONSE OPTIONS, RANDOMIZE:

1. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE1 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE1] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO1]
2. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE2 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE2] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO2]
3. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE3 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE3] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO3]
4. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE4 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE4] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO4]
5. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE5 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE5] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO5]
6. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE6 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE6] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO6]
7. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE7 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE7] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO7]
8. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE8 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE8] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO8]
9. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE9 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE9] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO9]
10. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE10 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE10] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO10]
11. Other, please specify:
12. [CAWI I][CATI You] didn't vote in this race
1. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS1 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS1] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO1]
2. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS2 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS2] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO2]
3. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS3 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS3] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO3]
4. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS4 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS4] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO4]
5. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS5 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS5] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO5]
6. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS6 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS6] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO6]
7. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS7 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS7] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO7]
8. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS8 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS8] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO8]
9. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS9 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS9] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO9]
10. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS10 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS10] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO10]
11. Otro, por favor especifique:
12. [CAWI Yo no voté][CATI Usted no votó] en esta carrera

[INSERT IF S_STATE=GA]

VOTESENATE2

For whom did you vote for U.S. Senator?

¿Por quién votó usted para Senador de los EE.UU.?

1. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE12 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE12] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO12]
 2. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE22 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE22] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO22]
 3. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE32 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE32] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO32]
 4. Other, please specify:
 5. [CAWI I][CATI You] didn't vote in this race
 1. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS12 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS12] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO12]
 2. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS22 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS22] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO22]
 3. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS32 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS32] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO32]
 4. Otro, por favor especifique:
 5. [CAWI Yo no voté][CATI Usted no votó] en esta carrera
-

[SHOW IF TURNOUT=4 AND P_GCMPGN=1]

VOTEGOV.

For whom did you vote for Governor?

¿Por quién votó usted para Gobernador?

RESPONSE OPTIONS, RANDOMIZE:

1. [SHOW IF P_GCANDE1 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_GCANDE1] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_GCPRO1]
2. [SHOW IF P_GCANDE2 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_GCANDE2] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_GCPRO2]
3. [SHOW IF P_GCANDE3 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_GCANDE3] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_GCPRO3]
4. [SHOW IF P_GCANDE4 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_GCANDE4] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_GCPRO4]
5. Other, please specify:
6. [CAWI I][CATI You] didn't vote in this race
1. [SHOW IF P_GCANDS1 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_GCANDS1] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_GCPRO1]
2. [SHOW IF P_GCANDS2 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_GCANDS2] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_GCPRO2]

3. [SHOW IF P_GCANDS3 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_GCANDS3] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_GCPRO3]
4. [SHOW IF P_GCANDS4 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_GCANDS4] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_GCPRO4]5.
5. Otro, por favor especifique:
6.[CAWI Yo no voté][CATI Usted no votó] en esta carrera
-

[SHOW IF TURNOUT=4]

VOTEHOUSE.

For whom did you vote for U.S. House?

¿Por quién votó usted para la Cámara de Representantes de los EE.UU.?

RESPONSE OPTIONS, RANDOMIZE:

1. A Democratic candidate
 2. A Republican candidate
 3. Other, please specify:
 4. [CAWI I][CATI You] didn't vote in this race
1. Un candidato demócrata
 2. Un candidato republicano
 3. Otro, por favor especifique:
 4. [CAWI Yo no voté][CATI Usted no votó] en esta carrera
-

APPROVAL.

How much do you [INSERT IF RND_02=0 approve or disapprove][INSERT IF RND_02=1 disapprove or approve] of the way Donald Trump is handling his job as president?

¿Qué tanto [INSERT IF RND_02=0 aprueba o desaprueba][INSERT IF RND_02=1 desaprueba o aprueba] la manera en que Donald Trump está haciendo su trabajo como presidente?

IF RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Strongly approve
 2. Somewhat approve
 3. Neither approve nor disapprove
 4. Somewhat disapprove
 5. Strongly disapprove
1. Aprueba totalmente
 2. Aprueba de alguna manera
 3. Ni aprueba ni desaprueba
 4. Desaprueba de alguna manera
 5. Desaprueba totalmente

INTRO_2.

The next set of questions asks about your perceptions of various people and groups.

La siguiente serie de preguntas se refiere a sus percepciones sobre varias personas y grupos.

[CAWI: HORIZONTAL SCALE; SP; LABEL ENDPOINTS 0 AND 100; 6,4]

[CATI: NUMBOXES; VALIDATION BETWEEN 0 AND 100; 6,4]

FT_PEOP.

Please rate the person or group on a thermometer that runs from 0 to 100 degrees. Rating above 50 means that you feel favorable and warm toward the person or group. Rating below 50 means that you feel unfavorable and cool toward the person or group.

Por favor califique a la persona o grupo usando un termómetro que va de 0 a 100 grados. Una calificación por encima de 50 significa que tiene sentimientos favorables y positivos hacia esa persona o grupo. Una calificación por debajo de 50 significa que tiene sentimientos desfavorables y frío hacia la persona o grupo.

Click on the line for the indicator to appear, then slide the indicator on the scale where it best reflects your answer.

Haga clic en la línea para que aparezca el indicador, luego deslice el indicador por la escala para indicar dónde se refleja mejor su respuesta.

SHOW IF RND_00=0:

- A. Joe Biden
- B. Donald Trump
- C. People who support Democrats
- D. People who support Republicans
- E. Democrats running for office
- F. Republicans running for office
- G. Undocumented immigrants
- H. Rural Americans
- I. Black Lives Matter
- J. #MeToo Movement
- A. Joe Biden
- B. Donald Trump
- C. Las personas que apoyan a los demócratas
- D. Las personas que apoyan a los republicanos
- E. Los Demócratas que se presentan a las elecciones
- F. Los Republicanos que se presentan a las elecciones
- G. Inmigrantes indocumentados
- H. Los americanos rurales
- I. Movimiento Black Lives Matter
- J. Movimiento #YoTambién

SHOW IF RND_00=1:

- B. Donald Trump
 - A. Joe Biden
 - D. People who support Republicans
 - C. People who support Democrats
 - F. Republicans running for office
 - E. Democrats running for office
 - H. Rural Americans
 - G. Undocumented immigrants
 - I. Black Lives Matter
 - J. #MeToo Movement
 - B. Donald Trump
 - A. Joe Biden
 - D. Las personas que apoyan a los Republicanos
 - C. Las personas que apoyan a los Demócratas
 - F. Los republicanos que se presentan a las elecciones
 - E. Los demócratas que se presentan a las elecciones
 - H. Los americanos rurales
 - G. Inmigrantes indocumentados
 - I. Movimiento Black Lives Matter
 - J. Movimiento #YoTambién
-

[IF RND_00=0, SHOW DEMSMART BEFORE REPSMART. IF RND_00=1, SHOW REPSMART BEFORE DEMSMART]

DEMSMART.

In general, how smart are people who support Democrats?

En general, ¿qué tan inteligentes son las personas que apoyan a los demócratas?

IF RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Extremely
 - 2. Very
 - 3. Somewhat
 - 4. A little
 - 5. Not at all
 - 1. Extremadamente
 - 2. Muy
 - 3. Algo
 - 4. No muy
 - 5. Nada en absoluto
-

REPSMART.

In general, how smart are people who support Republicans?

En general, ¿qué tan inteligentes son las personas que apoyan a los republicanos?

IF RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Extremely
 2. Very
 3. Somewhat
 4. A little
 5. Not at all
 1. Extremadamente
 2. Muy
 3. Algo
 4. No muy
 5. Nada en absoluto
-

[GRID; 5,4; SP]

IDEO_GR.

How would you rate each of the following individuals and groups?

¿Cómo calificaría a cada uno de los siguientes individuos y grupos?

SHOW IF RND_00=0:

GRID ITEMS:

- A. Yourself
- B. Democrats running for office
- C. Republicans running for office
- D. People who support Democrats
- E. People who support Republicans
- F. [SHOW IF P_FB_USER=1: People you see on Facebook who support Democrats]
- G. [SHOW IF P_FB_USER=1: People you see on Facebook who support Republicans]
- H. [SHOW IF P_IG_USER=1: People you see on Instagram who support Democrats]
- I. [SHOW IF P_IG_USER=1: People you see on Instagram who support Republicans]
- A. Usted mismo
- B. Los demócratas que se presentan a las elecciones
- C. Los republicanos que se presentan a las elecciones
- D. Las personas que apoyan a los demócratas
- E. Las personas que apoyan a los republicanos
- F. [SHOW IF P_FB_USER=1: La gente que usted ve en Facebook que apoya a los demócratas]
- G. [SHOW IF P_FB_USER=1: La gente que usted ve en Facebook que apoya a los republicanos]
- H. [SHOW IF P_IG_USER=1: La gente que usted ve en Instagram que apoya a los demócratas]
- I. [SHOW IF P_IG_USER=1: La gente que usted ve en Instagram que apoya a los republicanos]

SHOW IF RND_00=1:

GRID ITEMS:

- A. Yourself
- C. Republicans running for office
- B. Democrats running for office
- E. People who support Republicans
- D. People who support Democrats
- G. [SHOW IF P_FB_USER=1: People you see on Facebook who support Republicans]
- F. [SHOW IF P_FB_USER=1: People you see on Facebook who support Democrats]
- I. [SHOW IF P_IG_USER=1: People you see on Instagram who support Republicans]
- H. [SHOW IF P_IG_USER=1: People you see on Instagram who support Democrats]
- A. Usted mismo
- C. Los republicanos que se presentan a las elecciones
- B. Los demócratas que se presentan a las elecciones
- E. Las personas que apoyan a los republicanos
- D. Las personas que apoyan a los demócratas
- G. [SHOW IF P_FB_USER=1: La gente que usted ve en Facebook que apoya a los republicanos]
- F. [SHOW IF P_FB_USER=1: La gente que usted ve en Facebook que apoya a los demócratas]
- I. [SHOW IF P_IG_USER=1: La gente que usted ve en Instagram que apoya a los republicanos]
- H. [SHOW IF P_IG_USER=1: La gente que usted ve en Instagram que apoya a los demócratas]

IF RND_03=0 1,2,3,4,5,6,7

IF RND_03=1 7,6,5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Very liberal
- 2. Liberal
- 3. Somewhat liberal
- 4. Middle of the road
- 5. Somewhat conservative
- 6. Conservative
- 7. Very conservative
- 1. Muy liberal
- 2. Liberal
- 3. Algo liberal
- 4. Moderado(a)
- 5. Algo conservador(a)
- 6. Conservador(a)
- 7. Muy conservador(a)

[SHOW IF P_FB_USER=1 AND (NOT P_SAMPLE_GROUP=2, 3, OR 4)]

[GRID, SP]

NETDIVFF.

Think about your friends and family.

Piense en sus amigos y familia.

[CAWI: [SHOW IF RND_00=0: How many are Democrats, and how many are Republicans?;

SHOW IF RND_00=1: How many are Republicans, and how many are Democrats?]
[SHOW IF RND_00=0: ¿Cuántos son demócratas y cuántos republicanos?;
SHOW IF RND_00=1: ¿Cuántos son republicanos y cuántos son demócratas?]

Your best guess is fine.]
Su mejor suposición está bien.]

SHOW IF RND_00=0:
GRID ITEMS:

- A. How many of your friends and family are Democrats?
- B. How many of your friends and family are Republicans?
- A. ¿Cuántos de sus amigos y familiares son demócratas?
- B. ¿Cuántos de sus amigos y familiares son republicanos?

SHOW IF RND_00=1:
GRID ITEMS:

- B. How many of your friends and family are Republicans?
- A. How many of your friends and family are Democrats?
- B. ¿Cuántos de sus amigos y familiares son republicanos?
- A. ¿Cuántos de sus amigos y familiares son demócratas?

IF RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. None or almost none
- 2. A few
- 3. About half
- 4. A lot
- 5. All or nearly all
- 1. Ninguno o casi ninguno
- 2. Unos cuantos
- 3. Alrededor de la mitad
- 4. Muchos
- 5. Todos o casi todos

[SHOW IF P_FB_USER=1 AND (NOT P_SAMPLE_GROUP=2, 3, OR 4)]
[GRID, SP]

NETDIVFB.

Now think about your Facebook "friends."
Ahora piensa en sus "amigos" de Facebook.

[CAWI: Among your "friends" on Facebook, [SHOW IF RND_00=0: how many are Democrats, and how many are Republicans?; SHOW IF RND_00=1: how many are Republicans, and how many are Democrats?]

[SHOW IF RND_00=0: ¿cuántos son demócratas y cuántos republicanos?;

SHOW IF RND_00=1: ¿cuántos son republicanos y cuántos son demócratas?]

Your best guess is fine.]

Su mejor suposición está bien.]

[CATI: IF NEEDED: Your best guess is fine.]

[CATI: IF NEEDED: Su mejor suposición está bien.]

SHOW IF RND_00=0:

GRID ITEMS:

- A. How many of your Facebook friends are Democrats?
- B. How many of your Facebook friends are Republicans?
- A. ¿Cuántos de sus amigos de Facebook son demócratas?
- B. ¿Cuántos de sus amigos de Facebook son republicanos?

SHOW IF RND_00=1:

GRID ITEMS:

- B. How many of your Facebook friends are Republicans?
- A. How many of your Facebook friends are Democrats?
- B. ¿Cuántos de sus amigos de Facebook son republicanos?
- A. ¿Cuántos de sus amigos de Facebook son demócratas?

IF RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. None or almost none
- 2. A few
- 3. About half
- 4. A lot
- 5. All or nearly all
- 1. Ninguno o casi ninguno
- 2. Unos cuantos
- 3. Alrededor de la mitad
- 4. Muchos
- 5. Todos o casi todos

DISP_ISSUE.

Next, we have some questions about issues facing the country.

A continuación, tenemos algunas preguntas sobre los problemas que enfrenta el país.

[GRID]

POL.

How strongly do you [INSERT IF RND_02=0 support or oppose][INSERT IF RND_02=1 oppose or support] the following policies?

¿Qué tanto [INSERT IF RND_02=0 apoya o se opone][INSERT IF RND_02=1 se opone o apoya] a las siguientes políticas?

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

IMMIG. Decrease the number of civilian refugees allowed into the United States from countries where people are trying to escape violence and war

HEALTH. Repeal the Affordable Care Act, also known as Obamacare

UNEMPLOY. Bring back the extra \$600-per-week unemployment benefit to address economic problems resulting from the coronavirus outbreak

COVID. Require all Americans to wear face masks in public when they're around other people

FOREIGN. Ban apps that are owned by Chinese companies (like TikTok and WeChat) from operating in the United States

POLICE. Reduce funding for police departments and spend that money on social services instead

IMMIG. Reducir el número de refugiados civiles permitidos en los Estados Unidos de países donde la gente está tratando de escapar de la violencia y la guerra

SALUD. Derogar la Ley de Cuidado de Salud Asequible, también conocida como Obamacare

UNEMPLOY. Reintroducir los 600 dólares extra por semana del subsidio de desempleo para hacer frente problemas económicos derivados del brote de coronavirus

COVID. Requerir que todos los americanos usen máscaras faciales en público cuando estén cerca de otras personas

FOREIGN. Prohibir que las aplicaciones que son propiedad de empresas chinas (como TikTok y WeChat) operen en los Estados Unidos

POLICE. Reducir los fondos para los departamentos de policía y en su lugar gastar ese dinero en servicios sociales

RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Strongly support
2. Somewhat support
3. Neither support nor oppose
4. Somewhat oppose
5. Strongly oppose
1. Muy a favor
2. Algo a favor
3. Ni apoya a favor ni en contra
4. Algo en contra
5. Muy en contra

ECONOMY.

Compared to one year ago, is the nation's economy now [RND_02=0 better, the same, or worse][RND_02=1 worse, the same, or better]?

Comparada con la de hace un año, ¿la economía de la nación está ahora [RND_02=0 mejor, igual o peor][RND_02=1 peor, igual, o mejor]?

IF RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Much better
 2. Somewhat better
 3. The same
 4. Somewhat worse
 5. Much worse
 1. Mucho mejor
 2. Algo mejor
 3. Igual
 4. Algo peor
 5. Mucho peor
-

[GRID, SP]

BLACKWHITE.

In general in our country these days, would you say that [SHOW IF RND_02=0: black people are treated less fairly than white people, white people are treated less fairly than black people; SHOW IF RND_02=1: white people are treated less fairly than black people, black people are treated less fairly than white people], or both are treated about equally in each of the following situations?

¿En general, en nuestro país en estos días, ¿diría usted que [SHOW IF RND_02=0: las personas negras son tratadas menos justamente que las personas blancas, las personas blancas son tratadas menos justamente que las personas negras; SHOW IF RND_02=1: las personas blancas son tratadas menos justamente que las personas negras, las personas negras son tratadas menos justamente que las personas blancas] o ambas son tratadas más o menos por igual en cada una de las siguientes situaciones?

GRID ITEMS, RANODMIZE:

- A. In dealing with the police
- B. When voting in elections
- C. When seeking medical treatment
- D. In hiring, pay, and promotions
- A. En el trato con la policía
- B. Cuando se vota en las elecciones
- C. Cuando se busca tratamiento médico
- D. En la contratación, el pago y los ascensos

SHOW IF RND_02=0:

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Black people are treated much less fairly than white people
2. Black people are treated somewhat less fairly than white people
3. Both are treated about equally
4. White people are treated somewhat less fairly than black people
5. White people are treated much less fairly than black people
1. Los negros son tratados mucho menos justamente que los blancos
2. Los negros son tratados de manera algo menos justa que los blancos

3. Ambos son tratados casi por igual
4. Los blancos son tratados de manera algo menos justa que los negros
5. Los blancos son tratados mucho menos justamente que los negros

SHOW IF RND_02=1:

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

5. White people are treated much less fairly than black people
4. White people are treated somewhat less fairly than black people
3. Both are treated about equally
2. Black people are treated somewhat less fairly than white people
1. Black people are treated much less fairly than white people
5. Los blancos son tratados mucho menos justamente que los negros
4. Los blancos son tratados de manera algo menos justa que los negros
3. Ambos son tratados casi por igual
2. Los negros son tratados de manera algo menos justa que los blancos
1. Los negros son tratados mucho menos justamente que los blancos

[GRID, SP]

SEXISM1_2.

Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

¿Está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes declaraciones?

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

- A. Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist
- B. Recent allegations of sexual harassment and assault reflect widespread problems in society
- A. Muchas mujeres malinterpretan comentarios o actos inocentes como sexistas
- B. Las recientes denuncias de acoso y agresión sexual reflejan problemas generalizados en la sociedad

IF RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Agree strongly
2. Agree somewhat
3. Neither agree nor disagree
4. Disagree somewhat
5. Disagree strongly
1. Fuertemente de acuerdo
2. Algo de acuerdo
3. Ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo
4. Algo en desacuerdo
5. Fuertemente en desacuerdo

IF RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. AGREE STRONGLY
2. AGREE SOMEWHAT
3. NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE
4. DISAGREE SOMEWHAT
5. DISAGREE STRONGLY
1. FUERTEMENTE DE ACUERDO
2. ALGO DE ACUERDO
3. NI DE ACUERDO NI EN DESACUERDO
4. ALGO EN DESACUERDO
5. FUERTEMENTE EN DESACUERDO

[GRID, SP]

USDEMOC.

How well does the United States meet the following standards?

¿Qué tan bien cumple los Estados Unidos con las siguientes normas?

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

- A. Government does not interfere with journalists or news organizations
- B. Government protects individuals' right to engage in unpopular speech or expression
- C. Elections are free from foreign influence
- D. All adult citizens have equal opportunity to vote
- E. Elections are conducted without fraud
- F. Voters are knowledgeable about candidates and issues
- A. El gobierno no interfiere con los periodistas o las organizaciones de noticias
- B. El gobierno protege el derecho de las personas a participar en discursos o expresiones impopulares
- C. Las elecciones están libres de influencia extranjera
- D. Todos los ciudadanos adultos tienen la misma oportunidad de votar
- E. Las elecciones se llevan a cabo sin fraude
- F. Los votantes son conocedores de los candidatos y de las cuestiones

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4

IF RND_01=1 4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. The U.S. does not meet this standard
 2. The U.S. partly meets this standard
 3. The U.S. mostly meets this standard
 4. The U.S. fully meets this standard
 1. Los EE.UU. no cumplen con este estándar
 2. Los EE.UU. cumplen en parte con este estándar
 3. Los EE.UU. en su mayoría cumplen con este estándar
 4. Los EE.UU. cumplen plenamente con este estándar
-

KNOWLEDGE.

The next set of questions helps us learn what types of information are commonly known to the public. Please answer these questions on your own without asking anyone or looking up the answers. Many people don't know the answers to these questions, but [IF CAWI: we'd; IF CATI: I'd] be grateful if you would please answer every question even if you're not sure what the right answer is.

La siguiente serie de preguntas nos ayuda a saber qué tipo de información es comúnmente conocida por el público. Por favor, conteste estas preguntas por su cuenta sin preguntar a nadie o buscar las respuestas. Mucha gente no conoce las respuestas a estas preguntas, pero le [IF CAWI: agradeceríamos; IF CATI: agradecería] que por favor respondiera a cada pregunta aunque no esté seguro de cuál es la respuesta correcta.

It is important to us that you do not use outside sources like the Internet to search for the correct answer. Will you answer the following questions without help from outside sources?

Es importante para nosotros que usted no utilice fuentes externas como Internet para buscar la respuesta correcta. ¿Responderá a las siguientes preguntas sin ayuda de fuentes externas?

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Yes
2. No
1. Sí
2. No

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. YES
2. NO
1. SÍ
2. NO

[GRID]

SPECKNOWEV.

The following is a list of events. Please indicate how certain you are about whether each event did or did not happen in the last few weeks.

La siguiente es una lista de eventos. Por favor, indique que tan seguro está de que cada evento haya ocurrido o no haya ocurrido en las últimas semanas.

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

- A. France lifted all COVID-related restrictions
- B. Donald Trump announced that he would stop holding public rallies out of concern for COVID-related risks
- C. A militia's plot to kidnap Michigan governor Gretchen Whitmer was foiled by undercover agents
- D. Derek Chauvin, the Minneapolis police officer who killed George Floyd, was promoted
- E. Pope Francis voiced support for same-sex civil unions

- F. During the final presidential debate, each candidate was given time to speak while the other candidate's microphone was muted
- G. Amy Coney Barrett, Donald Trump's nominee, became the newest Supreme Court justice
- A. Francia levantó todas las restricciones relacionadas con el COVID
- B. Donald Trump anunció que dejaría de hacer mítines públicos por preocupación por los riesgos relacionados con COVID
- C. El complot de una milicia para secuestrar a la gobernadora de Michigan Gretchen Whitmer fue frustrado por agentes encubiertos
- D. Derek Chauvin, el policía de Minneapolis que mató a George Floyd, fue ascendido de puesto
- E. El Papa Francisco expresó su apoyo a las uniones civiles entre personas del mismo sexo
- F. Durante el debate presidencial final, cada candidato tuvo tiempo de hablar mientras el micrófono del otro candidato estaba silenciado
- G. Amy Coney Barrett nominada por Donald Trump, se convirtió en la nueva jueza de la Corte Suprema

RND_01=0 1,2,3,4

RND_01=1 4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Definitely did happen
- 2. Probably did happen
- 3. Probably didn't happen
- 4. Definitely didn't happen
- 1. Definitivamente sucedió
- 2. Probablemente sucedió
- 3. Probablemente no sucedió
- 4. Definitivamente no sucedió

[GRID]

SPECKNOWPO.

CAWI: Below is a list of policies. Please indicate whether either [INSERT IF RND_04=0: Joe Biden or Donald Trump][INSERT IF RND_04=1: Donald Trump or Joe Biden] has publicly voiced their support for each of these policies, or if the policy is supported by neither candidate. If you're not sure, just give your best guess.

CATI: I am about to read a list of policies. Please tell me whether either [INSERT IF RND_04=0: Joe Biden or Donald Trump][INSERT IF RND_04=1: Donald Trump or Joe Biden] has publicly voiced their support for each of these policies, or if the policy is supported by neither candidate. If you're not sure, just give your best guess.

CAWI: A continuación encontrará una lista de políticas. Por favor, indique si [INSERT IF RND_04=0: Joe Biden o Donald Trump][INSERT IF RND_04=1: Donald Trump o Joe Biden] ha expresado públicamente su apoyo a cada una de esta políticas, o no son apoyadas por ninguno de los candidatos. Si no está seguro, sólo dé su mejor estimación.

CATI: Voy a leer una lista de políticas. Por favor, dígame si [INSERT IF RND_04=0: Joe Biden o Donald Trump][INSERT IF RND_04=1: Donald Trump o Joe Biden] ha expresado públicamente su apoyo a cada una de esta políticas, o no son apoyadas por ninguno de los candidatos. Si no está seguro, sólo dé su mejor estimación.

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

- A. Allow undocumented immigrants to get insurance through Medicaid
- B. Raise the federal minimum wage to \$15 per hour
- C. Withdraw the United States from the World Health Organization (WHO)
- D. Allow fossil fuel extraction in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
- E. Replace the electoral college with a national popular vote
- F. Eliminate taxes on corporations based in the U.S.
- A. Permitir a los inmigrantes indocumentados obtener un seguro a través de Medicaid
- B. Aumentar el salario mínimo federal a \$15 por hora
- C. Retirar a los Estados Unidos de la Organización Mundial de la Salud (OMS)
- D. Permitir la extracción de combustibles fósiles en el Refugio Nacional de Vida Silvestre del Ártico
- E. Sustituir el colegio electoral por un voto popular nacional
- F. Eliminar los impuestos a las corporaciones con sede en los Estados Unidos.

RND_04=0 1,2,3

RND_04=1 2,1,3

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Supported by Joe Biden
- 2. Supported by Donald Trump
- 3. Supported by neither candidate
- 1. Apoyado por Joe Biden
- 2. Apoyado por Donald Trump
- 3. Apoyado por ninguno de los dos candidatos

[GRID]

MISINFO.

Next [CAWI: you will see][CATI: I will read to you] a series of statements.] We'd like to know how accurate you think each of the statements are to the best of your knowledge.

A continuación [CAWI: verá][CATI: le leeré] una serie de declaraciones. Nos gustaría saber cuán precisas cree que son cada una de las declaraciones según su conocimiento.

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

- A. Evidence found on Hunter Biden's laptop proves Joe Biden took bribes from foreign powers
- B. The current FBI director, Christopher Wray, has said that the greatest domestic terrorist threat is white supremacists
- C. Amy Coney Barrett said that a woman needs a man's permission to own property
- D. The U.S. government has a plan to force a COVID-19 vaccine on everyone
- E. Masks and face coverings are not effective in preventing the spread of COVID-19
- F. Millions of fraudulent ballots were cast in the 2020 presidential election
- G. Donald Trump held a Bible upside-down in front of a church
- H. In October, most rural counties were in the COVID-19 "red zone" based on their high rates of new cases
- I. At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, Anthony Fauci did not recommend wearing masks in public

- J. Prior to the 2016 presidential election, Donald Trump arranged a payment to an adult film star
- K. Joe Biden is a pedophile
- A. Las pruebas encontradas en el portátil de Hunter Biden prueban que Joe Biden aceptó sobornos de potencias extranjeras
- B. El director actual del FBI, Christopher Wray, ha dicho que la mayor amenaza terrorista doméstica son los supremacistas blancos
- C. Amy Coney Barrett dijo que una mujer necesita el permiso de un hombre para tener una propiedad
- D. El gobierno de EE.UU. tiene un plan para forzar una vacuna COVID-19 a todos
- E. Las mascarillas y las coberturas faciales no son eficaces para prevenir la propagación de COVID-19
- F. Se emitieron millones de votos fraudulentos en las elecciones presidenciales de 2020
- G. Donald Trump sostuvo una Biblia al revés frente a una iglesia
- H. En octubre, la mayoría de los condados rurales estuvieron en la "zona roja" de COVID-19, basándose en sus altos índices de nuevos casos
- I. Al principio de la pandemia de COVID-19, Anthony Fauci no recomendó usar mascarillas en público
- J. Antes de las elecciones presidenciales de 2016, Donald Trump arregló un pago a una estrella de cine para adultos
- K. Joe Biden es un pedófilo

RND_01=0 1,2,3,4

RND_01=1 4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Not at all accurate
- 2. Not very accurate
- 3. Somewhat accurate
- 4. Very accurate
- 1. Para nada preciso
- 2. No es muy preciso
- 3. Algo preciso
- 4. Muy preciso

DISPLAY_SELF.

Lastly, [CAWI: we'd][CATI: I'd] like to ask you a few questions about yourself.

Finalmente, [CAWI: nos][CATI: me] gustaría hacerle algunas preguntas sobre usted.

EMOT.

Please tell [CAWI: us][CATI: me] how much of the time during the past 4 weeks you felt...

Por favor, [CAWI: díganos][CATI: dígame] cuánto tiempo durante las últimas 4 semanas se sintió...

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

- A. Happy

- B. Depressed
- C. Anxious

- A. Feliz
- B. Deprimido
- C. Ansioso

IF RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. All the time
 - 2. Often
 - 3. Sometimes
 - 4. Rarely
 - 5. Never
 - 1. Todo el tiempo
 - 2. A menudo
 - 3. A veces
 - 4. Raramente
 - 5. Nunca
-

reg.

Are you now registered to vote, or are you not registered? [CATI: If you're not sure, you can say that too.]

¿Está usted registrado para votar o actualmente no está registrado? [CATI: Si no está seguro/a, puede decir eso también.]

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Registered
- 2. Not registered
- 77. Not sure
- 1. Registrado
- 2. No registrado
- 77. No estoy seguro

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. REGISTERED
 - 2. NOT REGISTERED
 - 77. NOT SURE
 - 1. REGISTRADO
 - 2. NO REGISTRADO
 - 77. NO ESTOY SEGURO
-

[SHOW IF reg=1]

[SHOW IF P_MAILADDRESS AND P_CITY AND S_STATE AND P_ZIP NOT MISSING]
regloc1.

Where are you registered to vote?

¿Dónde está registrado para votar?

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. At [P_MAILADDRESS P_CITY, S_STATE P_ZIP]
2. At another address
77. Not sure
1. En [P_MAILADDRESS P_CITY, S_STATE P_ZIP]
2. En otra dirección
77. No estoy seguro

[SHOW IF regloc1=2 OR (reg=1 AND P_MAILADDRESS OR P_CITY OR S_STATE OR P_ZIP MISSING)]

regloc2.

What is the address where you are registered to vote now?

¿Cuál es la dirección donde está registrado para votar ahora?

regloc2_add. Address [SMALL TEXT BOX]

regloc2_city. City [SMALL TEXT BOX]

regloc2_st. State [DROPDOWN WITH 50 STATES AND DC]

regloc2_zip. Zip [NUMBER BOX RANGE 01001 to 99950; SAVE LEADING ZERO]

regloc2_add. Dirección [SMALL TEXT BOX]

regloc2_city. Ciudad [SMALL TEXT BOX]

regloc2_st. Estado [DROPDOWN WITH 50 STATES AND DC]

regloc2_zip. Código postal [NUMBER BOX RANGE 01001 to 99950; SAVE LEADING ZERO]

[SHOW IF regloc1 = 77,98,99 or regloc2_state = 98]

[DROPDOWN]

regstate.

In what state are you registered to vote now?

¿En qué estado está registrado para votar ahora?

[DROPDOWN WITH 50 STATES AND DC]

****THIS IS THE IG/FB ACCOUNT LINKING SECTION – SHOWN TO AMSP + ABS SAMPLE SOURCES WHO ARE FB or IG USER BASED ON PRELOADED SURVEY RESPONSES AT W2****

[SHOW IF CAWI AND (PANEL_TYPE=1,22 AND (P_FB_USER=1 OR P_IG_USER=1))]

INTRO_7.

Next, we ask for your help on a related voluntary research study of how people use Facebook and Instagram to learn about current events.

A continuación, le pedimos su ayuda en un estudio de investigación voluntario sobre cómo las personas usan Facebook e Instagram para conocer temas de actualidad.

[SHOW IF CAWI AND (PANEL_TPYE=1,22 AND (P_FB_USER=1 OR P_IG_USER=1))]

CONSENT_FBIG.

[INSERT IF PANEL_TYPE=1]

The Data Collected and Your Privacy If You Choose to Participate in the Study

Los datos recopilados y su privacidad si decide participar en el estudio

- NORC will join your survey responses to publicly available third-party data like if you've voted or made a political contribution, if this data is available
- Facebook will combine this data with your activity on Facebook and Instagram from the 2020 calendar year, collectively called Combined Data
- This Combined Data will only be used for research purposes and will not be used to show you ads
- This Combined Data will be shared with Facebook, their academic partners and, if legally required, with the Institutional Review Board (IRB) that reviewed this study
- All access to this Combined Data will be monitored and logged by Facebook and NORC
- Once this study is over, de-identified data may be stored and shared by Facebook for future research on elections, to validate the findings of this study, or if required by law for an IRB inquiry
- NORC cruzará sus respuestas a la encuesta con datos de terceros disponibles públicamente, como por ejemplo si usted ha votado o hecho una contribución política, si estos datos están disponibles
- Facebook combinará estos datos con su actividad en Facebook e Instagram en el año 2020, colectivamente llamados Datos Combinados
- Estos datos combinados sólo se utilizarán con fines de investigación y no se utilizarán para mostrarle anuncios
- Estos Datos Combinados se compartirán con Facebook, sus socios académicos y, si se requiere legalmente, con la Junta de Revisión Institucional (IRB) que estuvo a cargo de revisó este estudio
- Todo el acceso a estos datos combinados será monitoreado y registrado por Facebook y NORC
- Una vez finalizado este estudio, Facebook puede almacenar y compartir datos anónimos para futuras investigaciones sobre elecciones, para validar los resultados de este estudio o, si así lo exige la ley, para una consulta del IRB

You can decide to stop participating in this study at any time, for any reason, and without consequences. You may withdraw from the study by emailing support@amerispeak.org or calling AmeriSpeak support at (888) 326-9424.

Puede decidir dejar de participar en este estudio en cualquier momento, por cualquier motivo y sin consecuencias. Puede retirarse del estudio enviando un correo electrónico a support@amerispeak.org o llamando a la unidad de soporte de AmeriSpeak al (888) 326-9424.

Do you agree to share this information with Facebook?

¿Acepta compartir esta información con Facebook?

[INSERT IF PANEL_TYPE=22]

The Data Collected and Your Privacy If You Choose to Participate in the Study

Los datos recopilados y su privacidad si decide participar en el estudio

- NORC will join your survey responses to publicly available third-party data like if you've voted or made a political contribution, if this data is available
- Facebook will combine this data with your activity on Facebook and Instagram from the 2020 calendar year, collectively called Combined Data
- This Combined Data will only be used for research purposes and will not be used to show you ads
- This Combined Data will be shared with Facebook, their academic partners and, if legally required, with the Institutional Review Board (IRB) that reviewed this study
- All access to this Combined Data will be monitored and logged by Facebook and NORC
- Once this study is over, de-identified data may be stored and shared by Facebook for future research on elections, to validate the findings of this study, or if required by law for an IRB inquiry
- NORC cruzará sus respuestas a la encuesta con datos de terceros disponibles públicamente, como por ejemplo ha votado o hecho una contribución política, si estos datos están disponibles
- Facebook combinará estos datos con su actividad en Facebook e Instagram en el año 2020, colectivamente llamados Datos Combinados
- Estos datos combinados sólo se utilizarán con fines de investigación y no se utilizarán para mostrarle anuncios
- Estos datos combinados se compartirán con Facebook, sus socios académicos y, si se requiere legalmente, con la Junta de Revisión Institucional (IRB) que estuvo a cargo de revisar este estudio
- Todo el acceso a estos datos combinados será monitoreado y registrado por Facebook y NORC
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You can decide to stop participating in this study at any time, for any reason, and without consequences. You may withdraw from the study by visiting 2020erp.norc.org, by emailing erpSurvey@norc.org or by calling toll-free (877) 839-1505.

Puede decidir dejar de participar en este estudio en cualquier momento, por cualquier motivo y sin consecuencias. Puede retirarse del estudio visitando 2020erp.norc.org, enviando un correo electrónico a erpSurvey@norc.org o llamando al número gratuito (877) 839-1505.

Do you agree to share this information with Facebook?

¿Acepta compartir esta información con Facebook?

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Yes, I agree
2. No, I do not agree
1. Sí, estoy de acuerdo
2. No, no estoy de acuerdo

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Yes, you agree
2. No, you do not agree
1. Sí, está de acuerdo
2. No, no está de acuerdo

END.

Those are all the questions we have. The survey is now complete. Thank you!
Esas fueron todas las preguntas. La encuesta ya está completa. ¡Gracias!

We will come back to you for the next survey in early December.
Volveremos a usted para la próxima encuesta a principios de diciembre.

[IF P_SAMPLE_GRP=3,4] You may now reactivate your [INSERT IF P_SAMPLE_GRP=3: Facebook][INSERT IF P_SAMPLE_GRP=4: Instagram] account.
[IF P_SAMPLE_GRP=3,4] Ahora puede reactivar su cuenta de [INSERT IF P_SAMPLE_GRP=3: Facebook][INSERT IF P_SAMPLE_GRP=4: Instagram].
[IF PANEL_TYPE=1] We will add [INCENTWCOMMA] AmeriPoints to your AmeriPoints balance for completing the survey today. [SHOW IF P_W3COMP=1 As a reminder, if you complete the final wave of this study in early December, you will be eligible for a bonus 15,000 AmeriPoints.] If you have any questions at all for us, you can email us at support@AmeriSpeak.org or call us toll-free at 888-326-9424.
[CATI: Let me repeat that again: email us at support@AmeriSpeak.org or call us at 888-326-9424.] Thank you for participating in our new AmeriSpeak survey!
[IF PANEL_TYPE=1] Agregaremos [INCENTWCOMMA] AmeriPoints a su saldo de AmeriPoints por completar la encuesta hoy. [SHOW IF P_W3COMP=1 Como recordatorio, si completa la última parte del estudio a principios de diciembre, tendrá derecho a una bonificación de 15.000 AmeriPoints.] Si tiene alguna pregunta, puede enviarnos un correo electrónico a ayuda@AmeriSpeak.org o llamarnos al número gratuito 888-326-9424. [CATI: Permítame repetirlo nuevamente: envíenos un correo electrónico a ayuda@AmeriSpeak.org o llámenos al 888-326-9424.] ¡Gracias por participar en nuestra nueva encuesta AmeriSpeak!

[CAWI: Please click Continue below to submit your answers.]
[CAWI: Por favor haga clic en Continuar a continuación para enviar sus respuestas.]

13.4 Wave 5 Survey



Client	Facebook
Project Name	Election Research Project W5
Project Number	8870
Survey length (median)	20 minute survey
Population	Age 18+
Pretest	N/A
Main	N= 160,906
MODE	CAWI/CATI-fied web
Language	English/Spanish
Sample Source	AmeriSpeak + IG/FB sourced + ABS (from W2 completes)
Incentive	AmeriSpeak (PANEL_TYPE<20): 5,000 ABS (PANEL_TYPE=22): \$10 Facebook/Instagram (PANEL_TYPE=23): \$20
Survey description	Election and Politics Study 2020 Wave 5
Eligibility Rate	100%

This survey will use the following RND_xx variables:

Note, these are randomized in the script (NOT preloads)

<u>RND_xx</u>	<u>Associated survey Qs</u>
RND_00	FT_PEOP
RND_01	POLINFO_SO, USDEMOC, COVIDWORRY, VACCINE, PROTEST1, TRUMPCONCEDE, MISINFO,
RND_02	INFOTRUST, CONFINST, POLVIOLENCE, ELECT, CONFOFFICIALS, COUNTACCURATE, MAILACCURATE, EMOT,
RND_03	ELECTWIN
RND_04	FBSAT, INSTSAT, SOC MEDIAUSE
RND_05	
RND_06	

LANGSWITCH.

Welcome Back to the 2020 Election Research Project
Bienvenidos al Proyecto de Investigación Electoral 2020

Thanks for your participation in the earlier surveys in this project.
Gracias por su participación en las encuestas anteriores de este proyecto.

Let's get started with an easy question.
Empecemos con una pregunta fácil.

This survey is currently available in English and Spanish. Which language would you prefer to use to share your opinions?
Esta encuesta está actualmente disponible en inglés y en español. ¿Qué idioma prefiere usar para compartir sus opiniones?

1. English/Inglés
2. Spanish/Español

If LANGSWITCH=1, 77, 98, 99 continue in English
If LANGSWITCH=2, switch to Spanish language version of the survey

PROGRAMMING NOTE: FOR ALL PROMPTS: We would really like your answer to this question.]
PROGRAMMING NOTE: FOR ALL PROMPTS: Realmente nos gustaría una respuesta a esta pregunta.]

PROGRAMMING NOTE: IN CAWI MODE, HIDE BACK BUTTON IN APROD
CATI MODE MUST HAVE BACK BUTTON

[SHOW IF PANEL_TYPE=<20 1,22,23]
DISPLAY – OPTINTRO.
[CAWI: We ask you to fill out this survey that will take about 20 minutes.][CATI: This survey will take about 20 minutes.]
[CAWI: Le pedimos que complete esta encuesta que le tomará unos 20 minutos.][CATI: Esta encuesta tomará unos 20 minutos.]

Your participation helps researchers at New York University, The University of Texas at Austin, and other academic institutions, in partnership with Facebook, to learn more about the role of social media in elections in the United States.
Su participación ayuda a los investigadores de la Universidad de Nueva York, la Universidad de Texas en Austin y otras instituciones académicas, en colaboración con Facebook, a aprender más sobre el papel de las redes sociales en las elecciones en los Estados Unidos.

Once this study is over, de-identified data will be stored and shared by Facebook for future research on elections, to validate the findings of this study, or if required by law for an inquiry by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) that reviewed this study.

Una vez que este estudio termine, los datos desidentificados serán almacenados y compartidos por Facebook para futuras investigaciones sobre las elecciones, para validar los resultados de este estudio, o si la ley lo requiere, para una auditoría de la Junta de Revisión Institucional (IRB), la cual revisó este estudio.

There are no benefits to participating in this research, nor are there risks greater than those encountered in everyday life, including risks related to the loss of confidentiality. Your participation is completely voluntary.

No hay beneficios por participar en esta investigación, ni tampoco hay riesgos mayores que los que se encuentran en la vida cotidiana, incluyendo riesgos relacionados con la pérdida de confidencialidad. Su participación es completamente voluntaria.

[\[\[SHOW IF PANEL TYPE=1\]](#)

You may withdraw at any time by emailing support@amerispeak.org or calling toll-free (888) 326-9424. Puede retirarse en cualquier momento enviando un correo electrónico a ayuda@amerispeak.org o llamando al número gratuito (888) 326-9424.

[\[SHOW IF PANEL TYPE=22\]](#)

You may withdraw at any time by visiting 2020erp.norc.org, by emailing erpSurvey@norc.org or by calling toll-free (877) 839-1505.

Puede retirarse en cualquier momento visitando 2020erp.norc.org, enviando un correo electrónico a erpSurvey@norc.org o llamando al teléfono gratuito (877) 839-1505.

[\[SHOW IF PANEL TYPE=23\]](#)

You may withdraw at any time by visiting 2020erp.norc.org, by emailing erpStudy@norc.org or by calling toll-free (866) 270-2602

Puede retirarse en cualquier momento visitando 2020erp.norc.org, enviando un correo electrónico a erpStudy@norc.org o llamando al teléfono gratuito (866) 270-2602

Let's get started! We ask for your help today to tell us about yourself.

¡Empecemos! Le pedimos su ayuda hoy para que nos hable de usted.

[DISPLAY_MED.](#)

First we have some questions about your media use.

Primero tenemos algunas preguntas sobre su uso de los medios de comunicación.

[\[GRID; 5,5,4; SP\]](#)

[POLINFO_SO.](#)

How often in the past week have you gotten political information from the following sources?

¿Con qué frecuencia en la última semana ha obtenido información política de las siguientes fuentes?

[GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:](#)

- A. National network TV news like ABC, CBS, or NBC
- B. Print newspapers

- C. Online news websites
- D. Local TV news
- E. Facebook
- F. Instagram
- G. Twitter
- H. FOX News
- I. MSNBC
- J. CNN
- K. Newsmax
- L. Talk radio programs like Sean Hannity or Rush Limbaugh
- M. Public radio/NPR
- N. Friends and family
- O. YouTube
- P. TikTok
- A. Noticias de televisión nacional como ABC, CBS, o NBC
- B. Periódico impreso
- C. Sitios web de noticias en línea
- D. Noticias de la televisión local
- E. Facebook
- F. Instagram
- G. Twitter
- H. Noticias FOX
- I. MSNBC
- J. CNN
- K. Newsmax
- L. Los programas de radio como Sean Hannity o Rush Limbaugh
- M. Radio público/NPR
- N. Amigos y familiares
- O. YouTube
- P. TikTok

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4

IF RND_01=1 4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Every day
- 2. Several times
- 3. Once
- 4. Never
- 1. Todos los días
- 2. Varias veces
- 3. Una vez
- 4. Nunca

[GRID; 5,4; SP]

INFOTRUST.

How much do you think political information from each of these sources can be trusted?

¿Cuánto cree usted que se puede confiar en la información política de cada una de estas fuentes?

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

- A. Local news
- B. National newspapers
- C. Facebook
- D. Instagram
- E. Twitter
- F. National network TV news like ABC, CBS, or NBC
- G. MSNBC
- H. CNN
- I. FOX News
- A. Noticias locales
- B. Periódicos nacionales
- C. Facebook
- D. Instagram
- E. Twitter
- F. Noticias de televisión nacional como ABC, CBS, o NBC
- G. MSNBC
- H. CNN
- I. Noticias FOX

IF RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Not at all
- 2. A little
- 3. A moderate amount
- 4. A lot
- 5. A great deal
- 1. Nada
- 2. Un poco
- 3. Algo
- 4. Mucho
- 5. Muchísimo

INTRO_2.

The next set of questions asks about your perceptions of various people and groups.

La siguiente serie de preguntas se refiere a sus percepciones sobre varias personas y grupos.

[CAWI: HORIZONTAL SCALE; SP; LABEL ENDPOINTS 0 AND 100; 6,4]

[CATI: NUMBOXES; VALIDATION BETWEEN 0 AND 100; 6,4]

FT_PEOP.

Please rate the person or group on a thermometer that runs from 0 to 100 degrees. Rating above 50 means that you feel favorable and warm toward the person or group. Rating below 50 means that you feel unfavorable and cool toward the person or group.

Por favor califique a la persona o grupo usando un termómetro que va de 0 a 100 grados. Una calificación por encima de 50 significa que tiene sentimientos favorables y positivos hacia esa persona o grupo. Una calificación por debajo de 50 significa que tiene sentimientos desfavorables y frío hacia la persona o grupo.

[CAWI: Click on the line for the indicator to appear, then slide the indicator on the scale where it best reflects your answer.

Haga clic en la línea para que aparezca el indicador, luego deslice el indicador por la escala para indicar dónde se refleja mejor su respuesta.]

SHOW IF RND_00=0:

- A. Joe Biden [SLIDER SCALE]
 - B. Donald Trump [SLIDER SCALE]
 - C. People who support Democrats [SLIDER SCALE]
 - D. People who support Republicans [SLIDER SCALE]
 - E. Democrats who ran for office [SLIDER SCALE]
 - F. Republicans who ran for office [SLIDER SCALE]
-
- A. Joe Biden [SLIDER SCALE]
 - B. Donald Trump [SLIDER SCALE]
 - C. Las personas que apoyan a los demócratas [SLIDER SCALE]
 - D. Las personas que apoyan a los republicanos [SLIDER SCALE]
 - E. Los demócratas que se postularon para el cargo [SLIDER SCALE]
 - F. Los republicanos que se postularon para el cargo [SLIDER SCALE]

SHOW IF RND_00=1:

- B. Donald Trump [SLIDER SCALE]
 - A. Joe Biden [SLIDER SCALE]
 - D. People who support Republicans [SLIDER SCALE]
 - C. People who support Democrats [SLIDER SCALE]
 - F. Republicans who ran for office [SLIDER SCALE]
 - E. Democrats who ran for office [SLIDER SCALE]
-
- B. Donald Trump [SLIDER SCALE]
 - A. Joe Biden [SLIDER SCALE]
 - D. Las personas que apoyan a los republicanos [SLIDER SCALE]
 - C. Las personas que apoyan a los demócratas [SLIDER SCALE]
 - F. Los republicanos que se postularon para el cargo [SLIDER SCALE]
 - E. Los demócratas que se postularon para el cargo [SLIDER SCALE]

INTRO_5.

Next, we have some questions about your opinions on U.S. government.

A continuación, tenemos algunas preguntas sobre sus opiniones sobre el gobierno de EE. UU.

[GRID, SP]

USDEMOC.

How well does the United States meet the following standards?

¿Qué tan bien cumple los Estados Unidos con las siguientes normas?

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

- A. Government does not interfere with journalists or news organizations
- B. Government protects individuals' right to engage in unpopular speech or expression
- C. Elections are free from foreign influence
- D. All adult citizens have equal opportunity to vote
- E. Elections are conducted without fraud
- F. Voters are knowledgeable about candidates and issues
- A. El gobierno no interfiere con los periodistas o las organizaciones de noticias
- B. El gobierno protege el derecho de las personas a participar en discursos o expresiones impopulares
- C. Las elecciones están libres de influencia extranjera
- D. Todos los ciudadanos adultos tienen la misma oportunidad de votar
- E. Las elecciones se llevan a cabo sin fraude
- F. Los votantes son conocedores de los candidatos y de las cuestiones

IF RND_01=0 1,2,3,4

IF RND_01=1 4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. The U.S. does not meet this standard
- 2. The U.S. partly meets this standard
- 3. The U.S. mostly meets this standard
- 4. The U.S. fully meets this standard
- 1. Los EE.UU. no cumplen con este estándar
- 2. Los EE.UU. cumplen en parte con este estándar
- 3. Los EE.UU. en su mayoría cumplen con este estándar
- 4. Los EE.UU. cumplen plenamente con este estándar

[GRID; SP; 4,4]

CONFINST.

How much confidence do you have in each of the following?

¿Cuánta confianza tiene en cada uno de los siguientes?

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

- A. Presidency/executive branch
- B. Congress
- C. Police
- D. Supreme Court
- E. Your local government
- F. Your state government
- G. Scientific community
- H. Large corporations
- A. Presidencia / poder ejecutivo
- B. Congreso

- C. Policía
- D. Tribunal Supremo
- E. Su gobierno local
- F. Su gobierno estatal
- G. Comunidad científica
- H. Grandes corporaciones

RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. None
- 2. A little
- 3. A moderate amount
- 4. A lot
- 5. A great deal

- 1. Nada
- 2. Poca
- 3. Una cantidad moderada
- 4. Mucho
- 5. Una gran cantidad

[GRID; 3,3; SP]

DEMATT_FEATURES.

How important is it that the United States meets the following standards?

¿Qué tan importante es que los Estados Unidos cumpla con los siguientes estándares?

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

- A. Government does not interfere with journalists or news organizations
- B. Government protects individuals' right to engage in unpopular speech or expression
- C. Elections are free from foreign influence
- D. All adult citizens have equal opportunity to vote
- E. Elections are conducted without fraud
- F. Voters are knowledgeable about candidates and issues
- A. Un gobierno que no interfiere con periodistas u organizaciones de noticias
- B. Un gobierno que protege el derecho de las personas a participar en discursos o expresiones impopulares
- C. Las elecciones libres de influencias extranjeras
- D. Todos los ciudadanos adultos tienen la misma oportunidad de votar
- E. Las elecciones que se llevan a cabo sin fraude
- F. Votantes que conocen los candidatos y los problemas

RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Not important at all
- 2. Slightly important
- 3. Moderately important

4. Very important
5. Extremely important
1. Nada importante
2. Ligeramente importante
3. Moderadamente importante
4. Muy importante
5. Extremadamente importante

INTRO_4.

We now have some questions about COVID-19, the disease caused by the coronavirus.

Ahora tenemos algunas preguntas sobre COVID-19, la enfermedad causada por el coronavirus.

[SP]

COVIDWORRY.

How worried, if at all, are you about the risk of COVID-19?

¿Qué tan preocupado/a, si es que lo está, está por el riesgo de exposición al COVID-19?

RND_01=0 1,2,3,4

RND_01=1 4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS

1. Very worried
2. Somewhat worried
3. Not too worried
4. Not at all worried
1. Muy preocupado/a
2. Algo preocupado/a
3. No muy preocupado/a
4. Nada preocupado/a

[MP]

COVIDEXP.

For each of the following, indicate whether or not it is something that happened to you or someone in your household because of the COVID-19 outbreak.

Para cada uno de los siguientes, indique si es algo que le sucedió a usted o alguien en su hogar debido al brote de COVID-19.

Select all that apply.

Seleccione todas las opciones que correspondan.

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Tested positive for COVID-19
2. Been laid off or lost a job
3. Had to take a cut in pay due to reduced hours or demand for their work
4. None of the above [SP]

1. Probó positivo de COVID-19
2. Ha sido despedido o perdió un trabajo
3. Tuvo que aceptar un recorte salarial debido a la reducción de horas o la demanda de su trabajo
4. Ninguna de las anteriores [SP]

[SP]

VACCINE.

When a COVID-19 vaccine becomes available to you, will you get vaccinated?

Cuando una vacuna COVID-19 esté disponible para usted, ¿se vacunará?

RND_01=0 1,2,3,4

RND_01=1 4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Definitely will get vaccinated
2. Probably will get vaccinated
3. Probably will not get vaccinated
4. Definitely will not get vaccinated
1. Definitivamente se vacunará
2. Probablemente se vacunará
3. Probablemente no se vacunará
4. Definitivamente no se vacunará

DISP_ISSUE.

Next, we have some questions about issues facing the country.

A continuación, tenemos algunas preguntas sobre los problemas que enfrenta el país.

[SP]

PROTEST1.

Thinking about what it means to be a good citizen, how important is it to protest if you think government actions are wrong?

Pensando en lo que significa ser un buen ciudadano, ¿qué tan importante es protestar si cree que las acciones del gobierno están mal?

RND_01=0 1,2,3,4

RND_01=1 4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Very important
2. Somewhat important
3. Not too important
4. Not at all important
1. Muy importante
2. Algo importante
3. No es demasiado importante
4. Nada importante

[SP]

ELECTWIN.

In your opinion, which candidate won the 2020 presidential election?

En su opinión, ¿qué candidato ganó las elecciones presidenciales de 2020?

RND_03=0 1,2,3

RND_03=1 2,1,3

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Joe Biden
 2. Donald Trump
 3. Not yet determined
 1. Joe Biden
 2. Donald Trump
 3. Aún no se ha determinado
-

[SP]

POLVIOLENCE.

Suppose that a presidential candidate declares victory even though that candidate did not legitimately win the election. To what extent do you feel like violence would be justified to ensure the actual winner is president?

Supongamos que un candidato presidencial declara la victoria a pesar de que ese candidato no ganó legítimamente las elecciones. ¿Hasta qué punto cree que la violencia estaría justificada para garantizar que el verdadero ganador sea el presidente?

RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Not at all
 2. A little
 3. A moderate amount
 4. A lot
 5. A great deal
 1. Nada en lo absoluto
 2. Un poco
 3. Una cantidad moderada
 4. Mucho
 5. Una gran cantidad
-

[GRID; SP]

IRREG2020.

How often did the following occur in the 2020 presidential election?

¿Con qué frecuencia ocurrió lo siguiente en las elecciones presidenciales de 2020?

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

- A. Registered voters were illegally prevented from voting
- B. People voted illegally
- A. A los votantes registrados se les impidió ilegalmente votar
- B. Personas votaron ilegalmente

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Often
- 2. Sometimes
- 3. Rarely
- 4. Never
- 1. A menudo
- 2. A veces
- 3. Raramente
- 4. Nunca

CREATE STRING DOV_IRREGA

IF IRREG2020A=1	DOV_IRREGA=often
IF IRREG2020A=2	DOV_IRREGA=sometimes
IF IRREG2020A=3	DOV_IRREGA=rarely
IF IRREG2020A=1	DOV_IRREGA=a menudo
IF IRREG2020A=2	DOV_IRREGA=a veces
IF IRREG2020A=3	DOV_IRREGA=raramente

CREATE STRING DOV_IRREGB

IF IRREG2020B=1	DOV_IRREGB=often
IF IRREG2020B=2	DOV_IRREGB=sometimes
IF IRREG2020B=3	DOV_IRREGB=rarely
IF IRREG2020B=1	DOV_IRREGB=a menudo
IF IRREG2020B=2	DOV_IRREGB=a veces
IF IRREG2020B=3	DOV_IRREGB=raramente

[SHOW IF IRREG2020A=1,2,3]

[SP]

PREVENTEFFECT2020.

You said that registered voters [INSERT DOV_IRREGA] were illegally prevented from voting in the 2020 presidential election.

Usted dijo que a los votantes registrados se les impidieron ilegalmente votar [INSERT DOV_IRREGA] en las elecciones presidenciales de 2020.

Do you think this changed who won the presidential election?

¿Cree que esto cambió quién ganó las elecciones presidenciales?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Yes
- 2. No

77. Not sure
1. Sí
2. No
77. No sabe
-

[SHOW IF IRREG2020B=1,2,3]

[SP]

ILLEGALVOTEFFECT2020.

You said that people [INSERT DOV_IRREGB] voted illegally in the 2020 presidential election.

Usted dijo que [INSERT DOV_IRREGB] la gente votó ilegalmente en las elecciones presidenciales de 2020.

Do you think this changed who won the presidential election?

¿Cree que esto cambió quién ganó las elecciones presidenciales?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Yes
2. No
77. Not sure
1. Sí
2. No
77. No sabe
-

[SP]

TRUMP CONCEDE.

Do you think Donald Trump should or should not concede the election to Joe Biden?

¿Cree que el Donald Trump debería o no conceder la elección a Joe Biden?

RND_01=0 1,2,3,4

RND_01=1 4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Definitely should concede
2. Probably should concede
3. Probably should not concede
4. Definitely should not concede
1. Definitivamente debería conceder
2. Probablemente debería conceder
3. Probablemente no debería conceder
4. Definitivamente no debería conceder
-

[SP]

CONFOFFICIALS.

How much confidence do you have in the officials who oversee elections?

¿Cuánta confianza tiene en los funcionarios que supervisan las elecciones?

IF RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. None
 2. A little
 3. A moderate amount
 4. A lot
 5. A great deal
 1. Nada en lo absoluto
 2. Un poco
 3. Una cantidad moderada
 4. Mucha
 5. Una gran cantidad
-

[SP]

COUNTACCURATE.

In the November 2020 general election, how accurately do you think the votes were counted?

En las elecciones generales de noviembre de 2020, ¿con qué exactitud cree que se contaron los votos?

IF RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Not at all accurately
 2. Not very accurately
 3. Moderately accurately
 4. Very accurately
 5. Completely accurately
 1. Sin ninguna exactitud
 2. Poca exactitud
 3. Moderada exactitud
 4. Mucha exactitud
 5. Total exactitud
-

[SP]

MAILACCURATE.

How much do you trust that votes are counted accurately when people mail in their ballots?

¿Cuánto confía en que los votos sean contados con exactitud cuando la gente envía sus boletas electorales por correo?

IF RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. A great deal
2. A lot
3. A moderate amount

4. A little
5. Not at all
1. Una gran cantidad
2. Mucho
3. Una cantidad moderada
4. Un poco
5. Nada en lo absoluto

[GRID]
MISINFO.

Next [CAWI: you will see][CATI: I will read to you] a series of statements about the 2020 election. We'd like to know how accurate you think each of the statements are to the best of your knowledge.
A continuación [CAWI: verá][CATI: le leeré] una serie de declaraciones sobre las elecciones de 2020. Nos gustaría saber cuán precisas cree que son cada una de las declaraciones según su conocimiento.

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

- A. Election observers were prohibited from observing the vote count in numerous states.
- B. Millions of fraudulent mail and absentee ballots were cast.
- C. The US Postal Service failed to deliver hundreds of thousands of ballots.
- D. Voting machines were manipulated to add tens of thousands of votes for Joe Biden.
- E. Tens of thousands of votes were recorded from dead people.
- F. Immediately after the election, a pharmaceutical company announced that a new coronavirus vaccine is more than 90% effective.
- G. Donald Trump's campaign held a press conference at a landscaping company next to an adult book store.
- H. Donald Trump improved his vote share among Hispanic voters in Florida compared to 2016.
- I. Church bells rang in Paris to celebrate Joe Biden's victory.
- J. First lady Melania Trump put out a statement in the week after the election saying this would be her final Christmas in the White House.
- A. Se prohibió a los observadores electorales observar el recuento de votos en numerosos estados.
- B. Se emitieron millones de votos fraudulentos por correo y de votación ausente.
- C. El Servicio Postal de los Estados Unidos fracasó en enviar cientos de miles de boletas electorales.
- D. Las máquinas de votación fueron manipuladas para agregar decenas de miles de votos a Joe Biden.
- E. Se registraron decenas de miles de votos de personas fallecidas.
- F. Inmediatamente después de las elecciones, una compañía farmacéutica anunció que una nueva vacuna contra el coronavirus tiene una efectividad superior al 90%.
- G. La campaña electoral de Donald Trump celebró una conferencia de prensa en una empresa de jardinería junto a una librería para adultos.
- H. Donald Trump mejoró su porcentaje de votos entre los votantes hispanos en Florida en comparación con 2016.
- I. Las iglesias en París tocaron sus campanas para celebrar la victoria electoral del Joe Biden.
- J. La primera dama Melania Trump emitió un comunicado la semana después de las elecciones informando que esta sería su última Navidad en la Casa Blanca.

RND_01=0 1,2,3,4
RND_01=1 4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Not at all accurate
2. Not very accurate
3. Somewhat accurate
4. Very accurate
1. Para nada preciso
2. No es muy preciso
3. Algo preciso
4. Muy preciso

[SHOW IF P_FB_USER=1 OR P_IG_USER=1]

INTRO_6.

Next we have some questions about your use of social media.

A continuación tenemos algunas preguntas sobre su uso de las redes sociales.

[SHOW IF P_FB_USER=1]

[SP]

FBSAT.

Overall, how satisfied are you with your Facebook experience?

En general, ¿qué tan satisfecho/a estaba con su experiencia en Facebook antes de unirse al estudio?

RND_04=0 1,2,3,4,5,6,7

RND_04=1 7,6,5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Completely satisfied
2. Very satisfied
3. Fairly satisfied
4. Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
5. Fairly dissatisfied
6. Very dissatisfied
7. Completely dissatisfied
1. Completamente satisfecho/a
2. Muy satisfecho/a
3. Algo satisfecho/a
4. Ni satisfecho/a ni insatisfecho/a
5. Bastante insatisfecho/a
6. Muy insatisfecho/a
7. Completamente insatisfecho/a

[SHOW IF P_IG_USER=1]

[SP]

INSTSAT.

Overall, how satisfied are you with your Instagram experience?

En general, ¿qué tan satisfecho/a estaba con su experiencia en Instagram antes de unirse al estudio?

RND_04=0 1,2,3,4,5,6,7

RND_04=1 7,6,5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Completely satisfied
2. Very satisfied
3. Fairly satisfied
4. Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
5. Fairly dissatisfied
6. Very dissatisfied
7. Completely dissatisfied

1. Completamente satisfecho/a
 2. Muy satisfecho/a
 3. Algo satisfecho/a
 4. Ni satisfecho/a ni insatisfecho/a
 5. Bastante insatisfecho/a
 6. Muy insatisfecho/a
 7. Completamente insatisfecho/a
-

[SHOW IF P_FB_USER=1]

[SP]

UNFRIEND.

In the last 90 days, have you unfriended one or more people on Facebook? [CATI: If you're not sure you can say that too.]

En los últimos 90 días, ¿ha eliminado a un o más amigo(s) en Facebook? [CATI: Si no está seguro puede decir eso también.]

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Yes
2. No
77. Not sure
1. Sí
2. No
77. No estoy seguro

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. YES
 2. NO
 77. NOT SURE
-

[SHOW IF UNFRIEND=1]

[SP]

UNFRIEND_WHO.

Thinking about the people you unfriended on Facebook, to the best of your knowledge, were any of them on the opposite side of the political spectrum? [CATI: If you're not sure you can say that too.]

Pensando en los amigos que eliminó en Facebook, según su conocimiento, ¿alguno de ellos estaba en el lado opuesto del espectro político? [CATI: Si no está seguro puede decir eso también.]

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Yes
2. No
77. Not sure
1. Sí
2. No
77. No estoy seguro

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. YES
2. NO
77. NOT SURE

[SHOW IF UNFRIEND=1]

[MP]

UNFRIEND_WHY.

What are the reasons that you unfriended that person or persons?

¿Cuáles son las razones por las que eliminó a ese amigo o esos amigos en Facebook?

Select all that apply,

Seleccione todas las opciones que correspondan.

RESPONSE OPTIONS

1. Posted too much political content
2. Posted things that you disagreed with politically
3. Posted something you found offensive
4. Were abusive or harassing
5. Some other reason [TEXTBOX]
1. Publicó demasiado contenido político
2. Publicó cosas con las que no estaba de acuerdo políticamente
3. Publicó algo que encontró ofensivo
4. Fueron abusivos o acosadores
5. Alguna otra razón

SOCMEDIAUSE.

How often do you visit or use each site or application, if at all?

¿Con qué frecuencia visita o utiliza cada sitio o aplicación, si es que lo hace?

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

- A. Facebook
- B. Instagram

- C. Twitter
- D. Snapchat
- E. YouTube
- F. Parler
- G. TikTok

RND_04=0 1,2,3,4,5,6,7

RND_04=1 7,6,5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. Never
- 2. Less than monthly
- 3. Monthly
- 4. Every couple weeks
- 5. A few times a week
- 6. About once a day
- 7. Several times a day
- 1. Nunca
- 2. Menos de un mes
- 3. Mensual
- 4. Cada dos semanas
- 5. Unas cuantas veces a la semana
- 6. Alrededor de una vez al día
- 7. Varias veces al día

[SHOW IF P_W4COMP=0]DISPLAY_PRES.

Next, we have several questions about voting.

A continuación, tenemos varias preguntas sobre votación.

[SHOW IF P_W4COMP=0] [SP]

TURNOUT.

In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they weren't registered, they were sick, or they just didn't have time.

Al hablar con la gente sobre las elecciones, a menudo nos encontramos con que muchas personas no pudieron votar porque no estaban registradas, estaban enfermas o simplemente no tenían tiempo.

Which of the following statements best describes you:

Cuál de las siguientes declaraciones lo/a describe mejor:

RND_01=0 1,2,3,4

RND_01=1 4,3,2,1

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. I did not vote in the 2020 presidential election
- 2. I thought about voting this time, but didn't
- 3. I usually vote, but didn't this time
- 4. I am sure I voted in the 2020 presidential election
- 1. No voté en las elecciones presidenciales de 2020

2. Pensé en votar esta vez, pero no lo hice
3. Normalmente voto, pero esta vez no lo hice
4. Estoy seguro de que voté en las elecciones presidenciales de 2020

RND_01=0 1,2,3,4

RND_01=1 4,3,2,1

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. You did not vote in the 2020 presidential election
2. You thought about voting this time, but didn't
3. You usually vote, but didn't this time
4. You are sure you voted in the 2020 presidential election
1. No votó en las elecciones presidenciales de 2020
2. Pensó en votar esta vez, pero no lo hizo
3. Normalmente vota, pero esta vez no lo hizo
4. Está seguro/a de que votó en las elecciones presidenciales de 2020

[SHOW IF TURNOUT=4]

[SP]

HOWVOTED.

Which one of the following best describes how you voted?

¿Cuál de las siguientes declaraciones describe mejor cómo votó?

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Definitely voted in person at a polling place before election day
2. Definitely voted in person at a polling place on election day
3. Definitely voted before election day by mailing in my ballot or depositing my mail ballot into a drop box
4. Definitely voted on election day by mailing in my ballot or depositing my mail ballot into a drop box
5. Definitely voted in some other way
77. Not completely sure whether I voted or not
1. Definitivamente voté en persona en un lugar de votación antes el día de la elección
2. Definitivamente voté en persona en un lugar de votación en el día de la elección
3. Definitivamente voté antes del día de la elección enviando mi boleta o depositando mi boleta en un buzón
4. Definitivamente voté en el día de la elección enviando mi boleta o depositando mi boleta en un buzón
5. Definitivamente voté de alguna otra manera
77. No estoy completamente seguro de si voté o no

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Definitely voted in person at a polling place before election day
2. Definitely voted in person at a polling place on election day
3. Definitely voted before election day by mailing in your ballot or depositing your mail ballot into a drop box
4. Definitely voted on election day by mailing in your ballot or depositing your ballot into a drop box
5. Definitely voted in some other way

77. Not completely sure whether you voted or not

1. Definitivamente votó en persona en un lugar de votación antes el día de la elección
2. Definitivamente votó en persona en un lugar de votación en el día de la elección
3. Definitivamente votó antes del día de la elección enviando su boleta o depositando su boleta en un buzón
4. Definitivamente votó en el día de la elección enviando su boleta o depositando su boleta en un buzón
5. Definitivamente votó de alguna otra manera
77. No está completamente seguro de si votó o no

[SHOW IF TURNOUT=4]

VOTE_POST.

For whom did you vote for President of the United States?

¿Por quién votó usted para Presidente de los Estados Unidos?

SHOW IF RND_00=0:

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Joe Biden (Democrat)
2. Donald Trump (Republican)
3. Jo Jorgensen (Libertarian)
4. Howie Hawkins (Green)
5. Other candidate, please specify: [TEXTBOX]
6. [CAWI I][CATI You] didn't vote in this race
77. Not sure
1. Joe Biden (demócrata)
2. Donald Trump (republicano)
3. Jo Jorgensen (libertario)
4. Howie Hawkins (verde)
5. Otro candidato, por favor especifique: [TEXTBOX]
6. [CAWI Yo no voté][CATI Usted no votó] en esta elección
77. No estoy seguro

SHOW IF RND_00=1:

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

2. Donald Trump (Republican)
1. Joe Biden (Democrat)
3. Jo Jorgensen (Libertarian)
4. Howie Hawkins (Green)
5. Other candidate, please specify: [TEXTBOX]
6. [CAWI I][CATI You] didn't vote in this race
77. Not sure
2. Donald Trump (republicano)
1. Joe Biden (demócrata)
3. Jo Jorgensen (libertario)
4. Howie Hawkins (verde)
5. Otro candidato, por favor especifique: [TEXTBOX]
6. [CAWI Yo no voté][CATI Usted no votó] en esta elección

77. No estoy seguro

[SHOW IF TURNOUT=4 AND P_SCMPGN=1]

[INSERT IF S_STATE=GA]

Your state had 2 senate seats up for election in November 2020. Please let us know who you voted for in each race.

Su estado tiene 2 escaños en el Senado para las elecciones de noviembre de 2020. Por favor, díganos por quién votó en la contienda por cada uno de los escaños.

[SHOW ALL]

VOTESenate.

For whom did you vote for <u>U.S. Senator</u> [INSERT IF S_STATE=GA for the November 2020 election]?

¿Por quién votó usted para <u>Senador de los EE.UU.</u> [INSERT IF S_STATE=GA para las elecciones de noviembre de 2020]?

RESPONSE OPTIONS, RANDOMIZE:

1. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE1 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE1] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO1]
2. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE2 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE2] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO2]
3. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE3 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE3] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO3]
4. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE4 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE4] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO4]
5. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE5 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE5] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO5]
6. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE6 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE6] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO6]
7. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE7 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE7] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO7]
8. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE8 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE8] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO8]
9. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE9 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE9] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO9]
10. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE10 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE10] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO10]
11. Other, please specify: [TEXTBOX] [ANCHOR]
12. [CAWI I][CATI You] didn't vote in this race [ANCHOR]
 1. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS1 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS1] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO1]
 2. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS2 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS2] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO2]
 3. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS3 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS3] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO3]

4. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS4 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS4 [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO4]
5. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS5 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS5 [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO5]
6. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS6 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS6 [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO6]
7. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS7 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS7 [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO7]
8. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS8 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS8 [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO8]
9. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS9 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS9 [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO9]
10. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS10 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS10] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO10]
11. Otro, por favor especifique: [TEXTBOX] [ANCHOR]
12. [CAWI Yo no voté][CATI Usted no votó en esta carrera[ANCHOR]

[INSERT IF S_STATE=GA]

[SP]

VOTESenate2

For whom did you vote for U.S. Senator [INSERT IF S_STATE=GA for the November 2020 election]?

¿Por quién votó usted para Senador de los EE.UU. [INSERT IF S_STATE=GA para las elecciones de noviembre de 2020]?

1. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE12 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE12] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO12]
2. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE22 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE22] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO22]
3. [SHOW IF P_SCANDE32 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDE32] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO32]
4. Other, please specify: [TEXTBOX]
5. [CAWI I][CATI You] didn't vote in this race
1. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS12 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS12] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO12]
2. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS22 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS22] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO22]
3. [SHOW IF P_SCANDS32 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_SCANDS32] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_SCPRO32]
4. Otro, por favor especifique: [TEXTBOX]
5. [CAWI Yo no voté][CATI Usted no votó en esta carrera[ANCHOR]

[SHOW IF TURNOUT=4 AND P_GCMPGN=1]

VOTEGOV.

For whom did you vote for Governor?

¿Por quién votó usted para Gobernador?

RESPONSE OPTIONS, RANDOMIZE:

1. [SHOW IF P_GCANDE1 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_GCANDE1] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_GCPRO1]
 2. [SHOW IF P_GCANDE2 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_GCANDE2] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_GCPRO2]
 3. [SHOW IF P_GCANDE3 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_GCANDE3] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_GCPRO3]
 4. [SHOW IF P_GCANDE4 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_GCANDE4] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_GCPRO4]
 5. Other, please specify: [TEXTBOX]
 6. [CAWI I][CATI You] didn't vote in this race
1. [SHOW IF P_GCANDS1 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_GCANDS1] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_GCPRO1]
 2. [SHOW IF P_GCANDS2 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_GCANDS2] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_GCPRO2]
 3. [SHOW IF P_GCANDS3 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_GCANDS3] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_GCPRO3]
 4. [SHOW IF P_GCANDS4 NOT BLANK] [INSERT: P_GCANDS4] [CATI: CANDIDATE NAME PRONUNCIATION INSERT P_GCPRO4]5.
 5. Otro, por favor especifique: [TEXTBOX]
 - 6.[CAWI Yo no voté][CATI Usted no votó] en esta carrera

[SHOW IF TURNOUT=4]
VOTEHOUSE.

For whom did you vote for U.S. House?

¿Por quién votó usted para la Cámara de Representantes de los EE.UU.?

RESPONSE OPTIONS, RANDOMIZE:

1. A Democratic candidate
 2. A Republican candidate
 3. Other, please specify: [TEXTBOX]
 4. [CAWI I][CATI You] didn't vote in this race
1. Un candidato demócrata
 2. Un candidato republicano
 3. Otro, por favor especifique: [TEXTBOX]
 4. [CAWI Yo no voté][CATI Usted no votó] en esta carrera

DISPLAY_SELF.

Lastly, [CAWI: we'd][CATI: I'd] like to ask you a few questions about yourself.

Finalmente, [CAWI: nos][CATI: me] gustaría hacerle algunas preguntas sobre usted.

[SP]

EMOT.

Please tell [CAWI: us][CATI: me] how much of the time during the past 4 weeks you felt...

Por favor, [CAWI: díganos][CATI: dígame] cuánto tiempo durante las últimas 4 semanas se sintió...

GRID ITEMS, RANDOMIZE:

- A. Happy
- B. Depressed
- C. Anxious

- A. Feliz
- B. Deprimido
- C. Ansioso

IF RND_02=0 1,2,3,4,5

IF RND_02=1 5,4,3,2,1

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. All the time
- 2. Often
- 3. Sometimes
- 4. Rarely
- 5. Never
- 1. Todo el tiempo
- 2. A menudo
- 3. A veces
- 4. Raramente
- 5. Nunca

[SP]

CITIZENSHIP.

Which of these statements best describes you?

¿Cuál de estas afirmaciones lo describe mejor?

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. I am an immigrant to the USA and a naturalized citizen
- 2. I am an immigrant to the USA and not a citizen of the USA
- 3. I was born in the USA but at least one of my parents is an immigrant
- 4. My parents and I were born in the USA but at least one of my grandparents was an immigrant
- 5. My parents, grandparents and I were all born in the USA
- 1. Soy un inmigrante en los Estados Unidos y un ciudadano naturalizado
- 2. Soy un inmigrante en los Estados Unidos y no un ciudadano naturalizado
- 3. Nací en los Estados Unidos pero al menos uno de mis padres es un inmigrante
- 4. Mis padres y yo nacimos en los Estados Unidos pero al menos uno de mis abuelos era un inmigrante
- 5. Mis padres, mis abuelos y yo nacimos en los Estados Unidos

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. You are an immigrant to the USA and a naturalized citizen
- 2. You are an immigrant to the USA and not a citizen of the USA
- 3. You were born in the USA but at least one of your parents is an immigrant

4. Your parents and you were born in the USA but at least one of your grandparents was an immigrant
5. Your parents, grandparents and you were all born in the USA
1. Usted es un inmigrante en los Estados Unidos y un ciudadano naturalizado
2. Usted es un inmigrante en los Estados Unidos y no un ciudadano naturalizado
3. Nació en los Estados Unidos pero al menos uno de sus padres es un inmigrante
4. Sus padres y usted nacieron en los Estados Unidos pero al menos uno de sus abuelos era un inmigrante
5. Sus padres, sus abuelos y usted nacieron en los Estados Unidos

[SP]

BORNAGAIN.

Would you describe yourself as a "born again" or evangelical Christian, or not?

¿Se describiría como un cristiano "nacido de nuevo" o evangélico, o no?

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Yes
2. No
1. Sí
2. No

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. YES
2. NO
1. Sí
2. NO

[SP]

RELFREQ.

How often do you attend religious services?

¿Con qué frecuencia asiste a servicios religiosos?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Never
2. Less than once a year
3. About once or twice a year
4. Several times a year
5. About once a month
6. 2-3 times a month
7. Nearly every week
8. Every week
9. Several times a week
1. Nunca
2. Menos de una vez al año
3. Alrededor de una o dos veces al año
4. Varias veces al año

5. Alrededor de una vez al mes
6. 2-3 veces al mes
7. Casi todas las semanas
8. Cada semana
9. Varias veces a la semana

[SP]

RELIGION.

What is your present religion, if any?

¿Cuál es su religión actual, si es que la tiene?

RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Protestant
2. Roman Catholic
3. Mormon
4. Eastern or Greek Orthodox
5. Jewish
6. Muslim
7. Buddhist
8. Hindu
9. Atheist
10. Agnostic
11. Nothing in particular
12. Something else, please specify:
 1. Protestante
 2. Católica Romana
 3. Mormón
 4. Ortodoxa oriental o griega
 5. Judío
 6. Musulmán
 7. Budista
 8. Hindú
 9. Ateo
 10. Agnóstico
 11. Ninguna en particular
 12. Alguna más, por favor especifique:

[SHOW IF P_CONSENTW4=MISSING]

DISPLAY_REG.

Next, we ask for your help on a different part of the November 2020 US Election study that you are a research participant in.

A continuación, le pedimos su ayuda en una investigación voluntario relacionado con una parte diferente del estudio sobre las elecciones de noviembre de 2020 en los Estados Unidos en el que usted es un participante en la investigación.

The goal of this part of the study is to develop an understanding of how people participate in elections, such as by voting or donating to political campaigns. As a result, we would like to ask you to allow NORC

to collect publicly available third-party data on whether you've voted or made a political contribution, if that data is available.

El objetivo de esta parte del estudio de desarrollar una comprensión de la forma en que las personas participan en las elecciones, por ejemplo, votando o haciendo donaciones a campañas políticas. Como resultado, nos gustaría pedirle que permita a NORC datos de terceros disponibles públicamente sobre si ha votado o hecho una contribución política, si esos datos están disponibles.

[SHOW IF P_CONSENTW4=MISSING]

[SP]

CONSENT_REG The Data Collected and Your Privacy If You Choose to Participate in this part of the Study
Los datos recopilados y su privacidad si decide participar en esta parte del estudio

- NORC will collect publicly available third-party data on whether you've voted or made a political contribution, if this data is available
- NORC will share this data on your voting and donation history with Facebook and exclude data that may directly identify you such as your name
- Facebook will join the third-party data it receives from NORC with data you previously consented to sharing for the November 2020 US Election research study (such as your survey data, and/or device data, as applicable), collectively called Combined Data
- This Combined Data will only be used for research purposes and will not be used to show you ads
- This Combined Data will be shared with Facebook's academic partners and, if legally required, with the Institutional Review Board (IRB) that reviewed this study
- All access to this Combined Data will be monitored and logged by Facebook
- Once this study is over, de-identified data (i.e. data where identifiers such as your name and other information that could reasonably be linked to you are removed) will be stored and shared by Facebook for future research on elections, to validate the findings of this study, or if required by law for an IRB inquiry
- NORC recogerá datos de terceros disponibles públicamente sobre si usted ha votado o hecho una contribución política, si estos datos están disponibles
- NORC compartirá estos datos sobre su historial de votación y donaciones con Facebook y excluirá los datos que puedan identificarlo directamente, como su nombre.
- Facebook unirá a los datos de terceros que recibe de NORC con los datos que previamente consintió en compartir para el estudio de investigación de las elecciones de noviembre de 2020 en los Estados Unidos (como los datos de su encuesta, y/o los datos del dispositivo, según corresponda), llamados colectivamente Datos Combinados
- Estos datos combinados sólo se utilizarán con fines de investigación y no se utilizarán para mostrarle anuncios
- Estos Datos Combinados se compartirán con los socios académicos de Facebook y, si se requiere legalmente, con la Junta de Revisión Institucional (IRB) que estuvo a cargo de revisar este estudio
- Todo el acceso a estos datos combinados será monitoreado y registrado por Facebook
- Una vez finalizado este estudio, los datos desidentificados (es decir, en los que se eliminan los identificadores como su nombre y otra información que podría estar razonablemente vinculada a usted) serán almacenados y compartidos por Facebook para futuras investigaciones sobre elecciones, para validar los resultados de este estudio o, si lo requiere la ley para una investigación de la IRB

You can decide to stop participating in this study at any time, for any reason, and without consequences. You may withdraw from the study by emailing [\[INSERT IF P_PANEL=1: support@amerispeak.org\]\[INSERT IF P_PANEL=22: erpSurvey@norc.org\]\[INSERT IF P_PANEL=23: erpStudy@norc.org\]](#) or calling [\[INSERT IF P_PANEL=1: AmeriSpeak support at \(888\) 326-9424\]\[INSERT IF P_PANEL=22: toll-free \(877\) 839-1505\]\[INSERT IF P_PANEL=23: toll-free \(866\) 270-2602\]](#).

Puede decidir dejar de participar en este estudio en cualquier momento, por cualquier motivo y sin consecuencias. Puede retirarse del estudio enviando un correo electrónico a [\[INSERT IF P_PANEL=1: ayuda@amerispeak.org\]\[INSERT IF P_PANEL=22: erpSurvey@norc.org\]](#) o llamando [\[INSERT IF P_PANEL=1: a la unidad de soporte de AmeriSpeak al \(888\) 326-9424\]\[INSERT IF P_PANEL=22: gratis a \(877\) 839-1505\]](#).

Do you agree to share your information as described above?

¿Acepta compartir su información como se ha descrito anteriormente?

CAWI REPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Yes, I agree
2. No, I do not agree
1. Sí, estoy de acuerdo
2. No, no estoy de acuerdo

CATI REPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Yes, you agree
2. No, you do not agree
1. Sí, está de acuerdo
2. No, no está de acuerdo

[SHOW IF P_W4COMP=0]

[SP]

reg.

Are you now registered to vote, or are you not registered? [CATI: If you're not sure, you can say that too.]

¿Está usted registrado para votar o actualmente no está registrado? [CATI: Si no está seguro/a, puede decir eso también.]

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Registered
2. Not registered
77. Not sure
1. Registrado
2. No registrado
77. No estoy seguro

CATI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. REGISTERED
2. NOT REGISTERED
77. NOT SURE
1. REGISTRADO

- 2. NO REGISTRADO
- 77. NO ESTOY SEGURO

[SHOW IF reg=1]
[SHOW IF P_MAILADDRESS AND P_CITY AND S_STATE AND P_ZIP NOT MISSING]
regloc1.

Where are you registered to vote?
¿Dónde está registrado para votar?

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

- 1. At [P_MAILADDRESS P_CITY, S_STATE P_ZIP]
- 2. At another address
- 77. Not sure
- 1. En [P_MAILADDRESS P_CITY, S_STATE P_ZIP]
- 2. En otra dirección
- 77. No estoy seguro

[SHOW IF regloc1=2 OR (reg=1 AND P_MAILADDRESS OR P_CITY OR S_STATE OR P_ZIP MISSING)]
regloc2.

What is the address where you are registered to vote now?
¿Cuál es la dirección donde está registrado para votar ahora?

regloc2_add. Address
regloc2_city. City
regloc2_st. State
regloc2_zip. Zip
regloc2_add. Dirección
regloc2_city. Ciudad
regloc2_st. Estado
regloc2_zip. Código postal

[SHOW IF regloc1 = 77,98,99 or regloc2_state = 98]
regstate.

In what state are you registered to vote now?
¿En qué estado está registrado para votar ahora?

****THIS IS THE IG/FB ACCOUNT LINKING SECTION – SHOWN TO AMSP + ABS SAMPLE SOURCES WHO ARE
FB or IG USER BASED ON PRELOADED SURVEY RESPONSES AT W2****
[SHOW IF (P_W4COMP=0 OR P_RED_ERROR=1) AND CAWI AND (PANEL_TYPE=<20,22 AND
(P_FB_USER=1 OR P_IG_USER=1))]
INTRO_7.

Next, we ask for your help on a related voluntary research study of how people use Facebook and Instagram to learn about current events.

A continuación, le pedimos su ayuda en un estudio de investigación voluntario sobre cómo las personas usan Facebook e Instagram para conocer temas de actualidad.

[SHOW IF (P_W4COMP=0 OR P_RED_ERROR=1) AND CAWI AND (PANEL_TPYE=1,22 AND (P_FB_USER=1 OR P_IG_USER=1))]

[SP]

CONSENT_FBIG.

[INSERT IF PANEL_TYPE<20]

The Data Collected and Your Privacy If You Choose to Participate in the Study

Los datos recopilados y su privacidad si decide participar en el estudio

- NORC will join your survey responses to publicly available third-party data like if you've voted or made a political contribution, if this data is available
- Facebook will combine this data with your activity on Facebook and Instagram from the 2020 calendar year, collectively called Combined Data
- This Combined Data will only be used for research purposes and will not be used to show you ads
- This Combined Data will be shared with Facebook, their academic partners and, if legally required, with the Institutional Review Board (IRB) that reviewed this study
- All access to this Combined Data will be monitored and logged by Facebook and NORC
- Once this study is over, de-identified data may be stored and shared by Facebook for future research on elections, to validate the findings of this study, or if required by law for an IRB inquiry
- NORC cruzará sus respuestas a la encuesta con datos de terceros disponibles públicamente, como por ejemplo si usted ha votado o hecho una contribución política, si estos datos están disponibles
- Facebook combinará estos datos con su actividad en Facebook e Instagram en el año 2020, colectivamente llamados Datos Combinados
- Estos datos combinados sólo se utilizarán con fines de investigación y no se utilizarán para mostrarle anuncios
- Estos Datos Combinados se compartirán con Facebook, sus socios académicos y, si se requiere legalmente, con la Junta de Revisión Institucional (IRB) que estuvo a cargo de revisó este estudio
- Todo el acceso a estos datos combinados será monitoreado y registrado por Facebook y NORC
- Una vez finalizado este estudio, Facebook puede almacenar y compartir datos anónimos para futuras investigaciones sobre elecciones, para validar los resultados de este estudio o, si así lo exige la ley, para una consulta del IRB

You can decide to stop participating in this study at any time, for any reason, and without consequences. You may withdraw from the study by emailing support@amerispeak.org or calling AmeriSpeak support at (888) 326-9424.

Puede decidir dejar de participar en este estudio en cualquier momento, por cualquier motivo y sin consecuencias. Puede retirarse del estudio enviando un correo electrónico a ayuda@amerispeak.org o llamando a la unidad de soporte de AmeriSpeak al (888) 326-9424.

Do you agree to share this information with Facebook?

¿Acepta compartir esta información con Facebook?

[INSERT IF PANEL_TYPE=22]

The Data Collected and Your Privacy If You Choose to Participate in the Study

Los datos recopilados y su privacidad si decide participar en el estudio

- NORC will join your survey responses to publicly available third-party data like if you've voted or made a political contribution, if this data is available
- Facebook will combine this data with your activity on Facebook and Instagram from the 2020 calendar year, collectively called Combined Data
- This Combined Data will only be used for research purposes and will not be used to show you ads
- This Combined Data will be shared with Facebook, their academic partners and, if legally required, with the Institutional Review Board (IRB) that reviewed this study
- All access to this Combined Data will be monitored and logged by Facebook and NORC
- Once this study is over, de-identified data may be stored and shared by Facebook for future research on elections, to validate the findings of this study, or if required by law for an IRB inquiry
- NORC cruzará/únirá sus respuestas a la encuesta con datos de terceros disponibles públicamente, como por ejemplo ha votado o hecho una contribución política, si estos datos están disponibles
- Facebook combinará estos datos con su actividad en Facebook e Instagram en el año 2020, colectivamente llamados Datos Combinados
- Estos datos combinados sólo se utilizarán con fines de investigación y no se utilizarán para mostrarle anuncios
- Estos datos combinados se compartirán con Facebook, sus socios académicos y, si se requiere legalmente, con la Junta de Revisión Institucional (IRB) que estuvo a cargo de revisó este estudio
- Todo el acceso a estos datos combinados será monitoreado y registrado por Facebook y NORC
- Una vez finalizado este estudio, Facebook puede almacenar y compartir datos anónimos para futuras investigaciones sobre elecciones, para validar los resultados de este estudio o, si así lo exige la ley, para una consulta del IRB

You can decide to stop participating in this study at any time, for any reason, and without consequences. You may withdraw from the study by visiting 2020erp.norc.org, by emailing erpSurvey@norc.org or by calling toll-free (877) 839-1505.

Puede decidir dejar de participar en este estudio en cualquier momento, por cualquier motivo y sin consecuencias. Puede retirarse del estudio visitando 2020erp.norc.org, enviando un correo electrónico a erpSurvey@norc.org o llamando al número gratuito (877) 839-1505.

Do you agree to share this information with Facebook?

¿Acepta compartir esta información con Facebook?

CAWI REPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Yes, I agree
2. No, I do not agree
1. Sí, estoy de acuerdo
2. No, no estoy de acuerdo

CATI REPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Yes, you agree
2. No, you do not agree

1. Sí, está de acuerdo
2. No, no está de acuerdo

[SHOW IF CONSENT_FBIG=1 AND ((P_FB_USER=1 AND P_IG_USER=0) OR (P_IG_USER=1 AND P_FB_USER=0))]
CONST2_FBIG.

Thank you. When you click "Continue" you will be taken to [INSERT IF P_FB_USER=1 AND P_IG_USER=0 Facebook][INSERT IF P_IG_USER=1 AND P_FB_USER=0 Instagram] to confirm your account. Once you confirm your account, you'll be sent back here to complete the survey.

Gracias. Cuando haga clic en "Continuar", se le llevará a [INSERT IF P_FB_USER = 1 AND P_IG_USER = 0 Facebook] [INSERT IF P_IG_USER = 1 AND P_FB_USER = 0 Instagram] para confirmar su cuenta. Una vez que confirme su cuenta, se le enviará de regreso aquí para completar la encuesta.

REDIRECT TO FACEBOOK/INSTAGRAM, CONFIRM IDENTITY, THEN REDIRECT BACK TO THE SUREVY TO RESUME AT NEXT ITEM.

FACEBOOK

IF PANEL_TYPE=22 (ABS):

https://www.facebook.com/distance_survey/?oid=821494361720519&id1=<P_EPIN>&id2=1

IF PANEL_TYPE<20 (AmeriSpeak):

https://www.facebook.com/distance_survey/?oid=821494361720519&id1=<P_EPIN>&id2=2

INSTAGRAM

IF PANEL_TYPE=22 (ABS):

https://www.instagram.com/fbsurvey/confirm_user/?survey_fbid=3422369734466790&id1=<P_EPIN>&id2=1

IF PANEL_TYPE<20 (AmeriSpeak):

https://www.instagram.com/fbsurvey/confirm_user/?survey_fbid=3422369734466790&id1=<P_EPIN>&id2=2

[SHOW IF CONSENT_FBIG=1 AND (P_FB_USER=1 AND P_IG_USER=1)]
CONSENT2_FB.

Thank you. When you click "Continue" you will go to a Facebook screen to confirm your account.

Gracias. Cuando haga clic en "Continuar", irá a una pantalla de Facebook para confirmar su cuenta.

REDIRECT TO FACEBOOK, CONFIRM IDENTITY, THEN REDIRECT BACK TO THE SUREVY TO CONSENT WITH INSTAGRAM.

FACEBOOK

IF PANEL_TYPE=22 (ABS):

https://www.facebook.com/distance_survey/?oid=821494361720519&id1=<P_EPIN>&id2=1

IF PANEL_TYPE<20 (AmeriSpeak):

https://www.facebook.com/distance_survey/?oid=821494361720519&id1=<P_EPIN>&id2=2

IF R FINISHES CLIENT SURVEY, CLIENT WILL CREATE FLAG:

IF P_FB_USER=1
 AND FBSTAT=C "finished external client survey"
 AND FBSTAT= (MISSING) "did not finish external client survey"
IF P_IG_USER=1
 AND IGSTAT=C "finished external client survey"
 AND IGSTAT= (MISSING) "did not finish external client survey"

[SHOW IF (FBSTAT=C AND (P_FB_USER=1 AND P_IG_USER=0)) OR (IGSTAT=C AND (P_IG_USER=1 AND P_FB_USER=0))] Respondent finished external client survey
RESUME1_FBIG.

Thank you for allowing Facebook to share this information. Please click "Continue" to resume the survey.

Gracias por permitir que Facebook comparta esta información. Por favor haga clic en "Continuar" para reanudar la encuesta.

[SHOW IF ((FBSTAT = MISSING AND P_FB_USER=1 AND P_IG_USER=0) OR (IGSTAT = MISSING AND P_IG_USER=1 AND P_FB_USER=0)) AND CONSENT_FBIG=1]] Respondent consented, but did not finish external survey
RESUME2_FBIG.

Please click "Continue" to resume the survey.

Por favor haga clic en "Continuar" para reanudar la encuesta.

[SHOW IF FBSTAT=C AND (P_FB_USER=1 AND P_IG_USER=1)] Respondent finished external client survey
RESUMED1_FB.

Thank you for allowing Facebook to share this information. Please click "Continue" to go to an Instagram screen to confirm your account.

Gracias por permitir que Facebook comparta esta información. Por favor haga clic en "Continuar" para ir a una pantalla de Instagram y confirmar su cuenta.

INSTAGRAM

IF PANEL_TYPE=22 (ABS):

https://www.instagram.com/fbsurvey/confirm_user/?survey_fbid=3422369734466790&id1=<P_EPIN>&id2=1

IF PANEL_TYPE<20 (AmeriSpeak):

https://www.instagram.com/fbsurvey/confirm_user/?survey_fbid=3422369734466790&id1=<P_EPIN>&id2=2

[SHOW IF FBSTAT = MISSING AND CONSENT_FBIG=1 AND (P_FB_USER=1 AND P_IG_USER=1)]
Respondent consented, but did not finish external survey
RESUMED2_FB.

Please click "Continue" to go to an Instagram screen to confirm your account.

Por favor haga clic en "Continuar" para ir a una pantalla de Instagram y confirmar su cuenta.

INSTAGRAM

IF PANEL_TYPE=22 (ABS):

https://www.instagram.com/fbsurvey/confirm_user/?survey_fbid=3422369734466790&id1=<P_EPIN>&id2=1

IF PANEL_TYPE<20 (AmeriSpeak):

https://www.instagram.com/fbsurvey/confirm_user/?survey_fbid=3422369734466790&id1=<P_EPIN>&id2=2

[SHOW IF IGSTAT=C AND (P_FB_USER=1 AND P_IG_USER=1)] Respondent finished external client survey
RESUMED3_FB.

Thank you for allowing Instagram to share this information. Please click "Continue" to resume the survey.

Gracias por permitir que Instagram comparta esta información. Por favor haga clic en "Continuar" para reanudar la encuesta.

[SHOW IF IGSTAT = MISSING AND CONSENT_FBIG=1 AND (P_FB_USER=1 AND P_IG_USER=1)]
Respondent consented, but did not finish external survey
RESUMED4_FB.

Please click "Continue" to resume the survey.

Por favor haga clic en "Continuar" para reanudar la encuesta.

[SHOW IF MODE=CAWI AND ((P_W4COMP=1 AND P_RED_ERROR=0,MISSING) OR (P_W4COMP=0 AND P_FB_USER=0 AND P_IG_USER=0))]
[SP]

TWITACCT.

We're interested in learning a little more about how people use Twitter. Do you have an account on the social networking site Twitter?

Estamos interesados en aprender un poco más sobre cómo la gente usa Twitter. ¿Usted tiene una cuenta en la red social Twitter?

CAWI RESPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Yes
 2. No
 1. Sí
 2. No
-

[SHOW IF TWITACCT=1]

TWITPERM.

Next, we ask for your help on another different part of the November 2020 US Election Study that you are a research participant in.

A continuación, le pedimos su ayuda en otra parte diferente del estudio de las elecciones de noviembre de 2020 en los Estados Unidos. en el que usted es un participante de la investigación.

As social media plays an increasing role in society, we would like to know who uses Twitter, and how people use it. The overarching goal of this part of the study is to develop an understanding of people's use of social media during the lead up to and after the 2020 US elections. As a result, we would like to ask you to share your Twitter account handle with NORC and verify that it's yours so we may look at what you have publicly posted, commented on, followed, and engaged with on Twitter.

Como los medios sociales juegan un papel cada vez más importante en la sociedad, nos gustaría saber quién usa Twitter y cómo lo usa la gente. El objetivo general de esta parte del estudio es desarrollar una comprensión del uso de los medios sociales por parte de la gente durante el período previo y posterior a las elecciones estadounidenses de 2020. Como resultado, nos gustaría pedirle que comparta su nombre de usuario de Twitter con NORC y verifique que es suya para que podamos ver lo que ha publicado, comentado, seguido y participado con públicamente en Twitter.

If you link your Twitter account, you will receive an additional [INSERT IF PANEL_TYPE<20: 5,000 AmeriPoints][INSERT IF PANEL_TYPE=22,23: \$5].

Si usted conecta su cuenta de Twitter, recibirá [INSERT IF PANEL_TYPE<20: 5,000 AmeriPoints][INSERT IF PANEL_TYPE=22,23: \$5] adicional.

[SHOW IF TWITACCT=1]

[SP]

TWIT_CONSENT.

The Data Collected and Your Privacy If You Choose to Participate in this part of the Study

Los datos recopilados y su privacidad si decide participar en esta parte del estudio

- NORC will collect data from your Twitter account that is publicly available. This will include your account information from July 1, 2020 through December 31, 2020, such as your profile description, who you follow and who follows you, the content of your tweets (including text, images, videos and web links), and background information about your tweets (such as when you tweeted, what type of device you tweeted from, and if enabled, the location the tweet was sent from)
- NORC will share your Twitter data with Facebook and exclude data that may directly identify you such as your Twitter handle or display name
- Facebook will join the Twitter data it receives from NORC with data you previously consented to sharing for the November 2020 US Election research study (such as your survey data, publicly available third-party data, your activity on Facebook and Instagram from the 2020 calendar year, and/or device data, as applicable), collectively called Combined Data
- This Combined Data will be shared with Facebook's academic partners and, if legally required, with the Institutional Review Board (IRB) that reviewed this study
- This Combined Data will only be used for research purposes and will not be used to show you ads
- All access to this Combined Data will be monitored and logged by Facebook

- Once this study is over, de-identified data (i.e. data where identifiers such as your name and other information that could reasonably be linked to you are removed) will be stored and shared by Facebook for future research on elections, to validate the findings of this study, or if required by law for an IRB inquiry
- NORC recogerá datos de su cuenta de Twitter que estén disponibles públicamente. Esto incluirá información de su cuenta desde el 1 de julio de 2020 hasta el 31 de diciembre de 2020 como la descripción de su perfil, a quién sigue y quién le sigue a usted, el contenido de sus tweets (incluyendo texto, imágenes, vídeos y enlaces web), e información de fondo sobre sus tweets (como cuándo hizo el tweet, desde qué tipo de dispositivo lo hizo y, si está configurado, la ubicación desde la que se envió el tweet)
- NORC compartirá sus datos de Twitter con Facebook y excluirá los datos que puedan identificarlo directamente, como su nombre de usuario en Twitter o nombre de perfil
- Facebook unirá los datos de Twitter que recibe de NORC con los datos que usted puede haber consentido previamente en compartir para el estudio de investigación de las elecciones de noviembre de 2020 en los Estados Unidos (como los datos de su encuesta, los datos de terceros disponibles públicamente, su actividad en Facebook e Instagram a partir del año calendario 2020, y/o los datos del dispositivo, como corresponda), denominados colectivamente Datos Combinados
- Estos Datos Combinados serán compartidos con los socios académicos de Facebook y, si se requiere legalmente, con la Junta de Revisión Institucional (IRB) que revisó este estudio
- Estos datos combinados sólo se utilizarán para fines de investigación y no se usarán para mostrarle anuncios
- Todo acceso a estos Datos Combinados será monitoreado y registrado por Facebook
- Una vez finalizado este estudio, los datos des-identificados (es decir, los datos en los que se eliminan los identificadores como su nombre y otra información que podría estar razonablemente vinculada a usted) aún serán almacenados y compartidos por Facebook para futuras investigaciones sobre las elecciones, para validar los resultados de este estudio, o si lo requiere la ley para una investigación de la IRB

You can decide to stop participating in this study at any time, for any reason, and without consequences. You may withdraw from the study by emailing [INSERT IF P_PANEL=1: support@amerispeak.org][INSERT IF P_PANEL=22: erpSurvey@norc.org][INSERT IF P_PANEL=23: erpStudy@norc.org] or calling [INSERT IF P_PANEL=1: AmeriSpeak support at (888) 326-9424][INSERT IF P_PANEL=22: toll-free (877) 839-1505][INSERT IF P_PANEL=23: toll-free (866) 270-2602]. If you have questions about your rights as a research participant, please contact the NORC IRB at 1-866-309-0542 or send an email to irb@norc.org.

Puede decidir dejar de participar en este estudio en cualquier momento, por cualquier motivo y sin consecuencias. Puede retirarse del estudio enviando un correo electrónico a [INSERT IF P_PANEL=1: ayuda@amerispeak.org][INSERT IF P_PANEL=22: erpSurvey@norc.org][INSERT IF P_PANEL=23: erpStudy@norc.org] o llamando [INSERT IF P_PANEL=1: a la unidad de soporte de AmeriSpeak al (888) 326-9424][INSERT IF P_PANEL=22: gratis a (877) 839-1505][INSERT IF P_PANEL=23: gratis a (866) 270-2602]. Si tiene preguntas sobre sus derechos como participante en una investigación, por favor contacte al NORC IRB al 1-866-309-0542 o envíe un correo electrónico a irb@norc.org.

Do you agree to share this information as described above?

¿Acepta compartir esta información como se ha descrito anteriormente?

CAWI REPONSE OPTIONS:

1. Yes, I agree

2. No, I do not agree
1. Sí, estoy de acuerdo
2. No, no estoy de acuerdo

[SHOW IF TWIT_CONSENT =1]
TWITPERM_2.

Thank you. When you click "Continue" you will be taken to Twitter to confirm your account.

Gracias. Cuando haga clic en "Continuar", se le llevará a Twitter para confirmar su cuenta.

Once on Twitter, you will be asked to enter your account name and authorize the app. If you have multiple Twitter accounts please enter the account you use most frequently for personal reasons.

Una vez en Twitter, se le pedirá que introduzca su nombre de cuenta y que autorice la aplicación. Si tiene varias cuentas de Twitter por favor introduzca la cuenta que utiliza con más frecuencia por razones personales.

Once you confirm your account, you'll be sent back here to complete the survey.

Una vez que confirme su cuenta, se le enviará de regreso aquí para completar la encuesta.

If you decide you do not want to confirm your account and chose "Cancel" on the next screen, you will need to choose to "Return to 2020 Election Research Project" (see image below) in order to return to this survey and let us know how you would like to receive your incentives.

Si decide que no quiere confirmar su cuenta y elige "Cancelar" en la siguiente pantalla, tendrá que elegir "Volver a 2020 Election Research Project" (ver imagen abajo) para volver a esta encuesta y hacernos saber cómo le gustaría recibir sus incentivos.



Sign up › | Sign in ›

You have not signed in to 2020 Election Research Project.

If you've used 2020 Election Research Project before, you can log in and view [Application Settings](#) to verify the access permissions you have granted.

Return to 2020 Election Research Project

- [Go to Twitter.](#)
- [Go to the 2020 Election Research Project homepage.](#)

We recommend reviewing the app's terms and privacy policy to understand how it will use data from your Twitter account. You can revoke access to any app at any time from the [Apps and sessions](#) section of your Twitter account settings.

By authorizing an app you continue to operate under Twitter's [Terms of Service](#). In particular, some usage information will be shared back with Twitter. For more, see our [Privacy Policy](#).

No iniciaste sesión en 2020 Election Research Project.

Ten en cuenta que 2020 Election Research Project sigue teniendo acceso a tu cuenta. Puedes revocar el acceso en cualquier momento desde la [configuración de aplicaciones](#).

Volver a 2020 Election Research Project

- [Ir a Twitter](#).
- [Ir a la página de inicio de 2020 Election Research Project](#).

Te recomendamos que revises los términos y la política de privacidad de la aplicación a fin de comprender de qué manera usará los datos de tu cuenta de Twitter. Puedes revocar el acceso de cualquier aplicación en cualquier momento desde la sección [Aplicaciones y sesiones](#) de la configuración de tu cuenta de Twitter.

Al autorizar una aplicación, continuarás operando bajo los [Términos de servicio](#) de Twitter. En concreto, algunos datos de uso se compartirán con Twitter. Para obtener más información, consulta nuestra [Política de privacidad](#).

REDIRECT TO TWITTER, CONFIRM IDENTITY, THEN REDIRECT BACK TO THE SUREVY TO RESUME AT NEXT ITEM.

TWITTER

<https://erpauth.norc.org/twitter/authenticate?st=<TOKEN>&p=<PIN>>

AFTER R FINISHES TWITTER AUTHORIZATION, THEY WILL BE REDIRECTED BACK TO THE SURVEY AND THE TSAT VARIABLE WILL BE PASSED AS FOLLOWS:

IF TSTAT=1 "success"

IF TSTAT= 2, (MISSING) "fail"

[SHOW IF TSTAT=1] Respondent finished twitter authorization

RESUME1_TWIT.

Thank you for verifying your Twitter account name. Please click "Continue" to resume the survey.

Gracias por verificar el nombre de su cuenta de Twitter. Por favor haga clic en "Continuar" para reanudar la encuesta.

[SHOW IF ((TSTAT = 2,MISSING AND TWITPERM =1)] Respondent consented, but did not finish twitter authorization
RESUME2_TWIT.

What is the username for the account you use most frequently for personal reasons?

¿Cuál es su nombre de usuario para la cuenta que utiliza con más frecuencia por razones personales?

Twitter usernames must have a maximum of 15 characters (A-Z, a-z, 0-9, underscore), no word spaces.

Please do not include the @ character.

Los nombres de usuario de Twitter deben tener un máximo de 15 caracteres (A-Z, a-z, 0-9, guión bajo), sin espacios de palabras. Por favor, no incluya el carácter @.

Remember that all your answers will be kept confidential and used only for research purposes.

Recuerde que todas sus respuestas se mantendrán de forma confidencial y se usarán sólo con fines de investigación.

@

END.

Those are all the questions we have. The survey is now complete. Thank you!

Esas fueron todas las preguntas. La encuesta ya está completa. ¡Gracias!

[SPACE]

[IF P_SAMPLE_GRP=3,4] You may now reactivate your [INSERT IF P_SAMPLE_GRP=3: Facebook][INSERT IF P_SAMPLE_GRP=4: Instagram] account.

[IF P_SAMPLE_GRP=3,4] Ahora puede reactivar su cuenta de [INSERT IF P_SAMPLE_GRP=3: Facebook][INSERT IF P_SAMPLE_GRP=4: Instagram].

[IF PANEL_TYPE<20: [IF TSTAT=1 OR TVALID=1 To thank you for confirming your Twitter username, we've added 5,000 AmeriPoints to your total reward.] We will add [INCENTWCOMMA] AmeriPoints to your AmeriPoints balance for completing the survey today.

[IF PANEL_TYPE<20 AND P_W3COMP=1 AND P_W4COMP=1: And since you completed all 4 Election Research Project surveys, you will also receive 15,000 bonus AmeriPoints.]

If you have any questions at all for us, you can email us at support@AmeriSpeak.org or call us toll-free at **888-326-9424**. [CATI: Let me repeat that again: email us at support@AmeriSpeak.org or call us at **888-326-9424**.] Thank you for participating in our new AmeriSpeak survey!

[IF PANEL_TYPE<20 [IF TSTAT=1 OR TVALID=1 Para agradecerle la confirmación de su nombre de usuario de Twitter, hemos añadido 5.000 AmeriPoints a su premio total.] Agregaremos [INCENTWCOMMA] AmeriPoints a su saldo de AmeriPoints por completar la encuesta hoy.

[IF PANEL_TYPE<20 AND P_W3COMP=1 AND P_W4COMP=1: Y ya que ha completado las 4 encuestas del Proyecto de Investigación Electoral, también recibirá 15.000 AmeriPoints de bonificación.]

Si tiene alguna pregunta, puede enviarnos un correo electrónico a ayuda@AmeriSpeak.org o llamarnos al número gratuito **888-326-9424**. [CATI: Permítame repetirlo nuevamente: envíenos un correo electrónico a ayuda@AmeriSpeak.org o llámenos al **888-326-9424**.] ¡Gracias por participar en nuestra nueva encuesta AmeriSpeak!]

[CAWI: Please click Continue below to submit your answers.]

[CAWI: Por favor haga clic en Continuar a continuación para enviar sus respuestas.]

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